Augusta J. Evans - "St. Elmo"

William Shakespeare - "The First Part of Henry the Fourth"

J. M. Barrie - "Echoes of the War"

A.R. Narayanan - "Truth and the Myth"

The Life of Francis Marion

W >> William Gilmore Simms >> The Life of Francis Marion




Marion's cavalry, meanwhile, under Col. Mayham, had joined the Legion cavalry
in pursuit of the infantry. About a mile to the north of Quinby Creek,
the rearguard of the retreating army was overtaken. With this body,
which consisted of one hundred men, under Capt. Campbell, was nearly
all the baggage of the British army. Terrified by the furious charge
of the Americans, they threw down their arms without firing a gun.
Favored by this circumstance, the cavalry of Mayham, and the Legion,
pressed forward. Coates had passed Quinby Bridge, and made dispositions
for its demolition, as soon as the rear-guard and baggage should have passed.
The planks which covered the bridge had been loosened from the sleepers,
and a howitzer, at the opposite extremity, was placed to check the pursuit.
But, as the rear-guard had been captured without firing a shot,
their commander was unapprised of their fate, and unprepared for
immediate defence. Fortunately for his command, he was present at the bridge
when the American cavalry came in view. His main body, at this moment,
was partly on the causeway, on the south side of the bridge,
and partly pressed into a lane beyond it -- in both situations so crowded
as to be almost wholly incapable of immediate action. Coates, however,
coolly took measures for his safety. Orders were dispatched to them to halt,
form, and march up, whilst the artillerists were summoned to the howitzer,
and the fatigue party to the destruction of the bridge.

The legion cavalry were in advance of Mayham's command. Captain Armstrong
led the first section. Their approach to the bridge was marked
by all the circumstances of danger. They were pressing upon each other
into a narrow causeway, the planks of the bridge were fast sliding
into the water, and the blazing port-fire hung over the howitzer.
The disappearance of the fatigue party from the bridge would be the signal
for it to vomit death upon the ranks of the approaching Americans.
There was no time for deliberation. Armstrong, followed close by his section,
dashed over the bridge and drove the artillerists from the gun.
Lieutenant Carrington followed, but the third section faltered.
Mayham, of Marion's cavalry, feeling the halt, charged by them;
but the death of his horse arrested his career. Captain Macauley,
who led his front section, pressed on and passed the bridge. The causeway
was now crowded; the conflict was hand to hand. Some of the working party,
snatching up their guns, delivered a single fire and fled.
Two of the legion dragoons were slain at the mouth of the howitzer,
several wounded. But the officers remained unhurt. Coates,
with several of the British, covered by a wagon, opposed them
with their swords, while their troops were hurrying forward
to where they could display. Meanwhile, Lee, with the rest of the legion,
had reached the bridge, which they proceeded to repair.
A momentary pause for reflection, a glance before and around them,
revealed to Armstrong and Macauley, the fact that they were almost alone,
unsupported by their party, and with the British recovering themselves
in front. They reflected that, only while the British officers
were in their rear, should they be secure from the fire of the enemy in front;
and, urging their way through the flying soldiers on the causeway,
they wheeled into the woods on their left, and escaped by heading the stream.
Had they been followed by the whole party, boldly charging across the bridge,
the entire force of the enemy must have laid down their arms.
The British were so crowded in the lane and causeway, in such
inextricable confusion, without room to display or to defend themselves,
that they must have yielded by spontaneous movement to avoid being
cut to pieces. The reproach lies heavily against the halting cavalry,
that could leave to their fate the brave fellows who had crossed the bridge.

Colonel Coates dared not longer trust himself in the open country
in the face of a cavalry so active and powerful. Retiring to
Shubrick's plantation, after destroying the bridge, he resolved
to defend himself under cover of the buildings. These were situated
on a rising ground, and consisted of a dwelling-house of two stories,
with outhouses and fences. They afforded security against cavalry,
and a good covering from the American marksmen.

It was not till 3 o'clock, P.M., that Sumter, with the main body
of the Americans, reached the ground. He found the British
drawn up in a square in front of the house, and ready to receive him.
As he had very few bayonets, to march directly up to the attack
would have been out of the question. He divided his force into three bodies.
His own brigade, led by Cols. Middleton and Polk, Taylor and Lacy,
advanced in front, under shelter of a line of negro houses, which they
were ordered to occupy. Marion's brigade, thrown into two divisions,
was ordered to advance on the right of the British, where there was no shelter
but that of fences, and those within forty or fifty yards of the houses
held by the enemy. The cavalry constituted a reserve, to cover the infantry
from pursuit.

Sumter's brigade soon gained the negro houses, from whence
they delivered their rifles with great effect. Col. Taylor
with about forty-five men of his regiment, pressing forward to the fences
on the enemy's left, drew upon him the bayonets of the British,
before which they yielded. Marion's men, in the meantime,
seeing the danger of Taylor's party, with a degree of firmness and gallantry
which would have done honor to any soldiers, rushed through a galling fire
and extricated them; and, notwithstanding the imperfect covering
afforded them by the rail fence along which they ranged themselves,
they continued to fight and fire as long as a single charge of ammunition
remained with the corps. The brunt of the battle fell upon them,
and they maintained in this, the reputation acquired
in many a border struggle. More than fifty men, all of Marion's,
were killed or wounded in this affair, but the loss did not dispirit
the survivors. They were drawn off in perfect order,
only when their ammunition was expended.

The fight lasted three hours, from four o'clock until dark.
Seventy of the British fell. But the want of the field-piece
left behind with Singleton, and the failure of their ammunition,
not a charge of which remained with the Americans at the close of the fight,
saved the enemy, whose infantry alone, according to Sumter, was superior
to his whole force. The Americans attacked them with half their number.
But Coates held his position, and tidings of the approach of Rawdon,
who had left Orangeburg, prompted Sumter to retreat across the Santee.
His expedition had not been successful. It does not concern us
to inquire by whose errors or defects it failed. Enough, that, in all things,
where Marion and his men were concerned, they acquitted themselves in a manner
calculated to sustain their former reputation. The attack upon Coates
at the house, we are told, was made against Marion's opinion,
who blamed Sumter for wasting the lives of his men. Without a field-piece,
it was scarcely possible that an inferior should have succeeded against
a superior force, in a strong position. Sumter was courageous to rashness.
His spirit could not be restrained in sight of the enemy.
With a brave force at his command, he was not satisfied to be idle,
and his courage was frequently exercised at the expense of his judgment.
The men of Marion complained that they had been exposed unnecessarily
in the conflict. It is certain that they were the only sufferers.
Had Sumter but waited for his artillery, and simply held the enemy in check,
the victory must have been complete, and this victory
was of the last importance to the Americans. It would have involved
the loss of one entire British regiment, at a moment when,
two others having been required at New York from South Carolina,
the force remaining with Rawdon would have been barely adequate
to the retention of Charleston. This necessity would have withdrawn
the latter general at once from Orangeburg, and the subsequent
bloody battle of Eutaw would have been averted accordingly.
Greene, speaking of this combat, writes: -- "The affair was clever,
but by no means equal to what it ought to have been.
The whole regiment of six hundred men would have been captured,
if General Sumter had not detailed too much, and had not mistaken
a covering party for an attack." It may be added, that the party
actually engaged in the attack on Coates, were almost exclusively
South Carolina militia. Under favorite leaders they had betrayed
no such apprehensions as are natural enough to men who lack confidence
in themselves and captains. They had shown the courage of veterans,
though they may have failed of that entire success which is usually supposed
to follow from a veteran experience.




Chapter 16.

Marion moves secretly to Pon-Pon -- Rescues Col. Harden --
Defeats Major Frazier at Parker's Ferry -- Joins the main Army under Greene
-- Battle of Eutaw.



After the battle of Quinby the joint forces of Sumter and Marion
were separated. The former retired up the Congaree; the latter took charge
of the country on the Santee; while Greene placed himself in a camp of rest
at the High Hills in the district which has since taken the name of Sumter.
His troops were in a wretched state of incapacity, in consequence of sickness.
The region to which he retired was famous for its salubrity,
and the intense heat of the season effectually forbade much military activity.
The opposing generals were content to watch each other.
It was while he held this position that Col. Hayne, of the militia,
was executed as a traitor by the British. The case of this gentleman
was that of many in the State. He had taken parole at a time when the country
was overrun by the enemy. This parole was subsequently withdrawn
by the conquerors, when they supposed the people to have been subdued,
and desired their services as militia. But the British were in turn
driven from the field. The Americans acquired the ascendant.
The section of the country in which Hayne resided was overrun by a detachment
of Marion, under Col. Harden, and Hayne availed himself of the occasion
to take up arms for his country. He was a popular gentleman,
and soon gathered a strong party of militia. His career was distinguished
by some small successes, and, with a party of Col. Harden's horse,
by a sudden dash in the vicinity of Charleston, he succeeded
in taking prisoner General Williamson, formerly of the Americans,
whose life was forfeited to the country. The capture of Williamson
put all the available cavalry of the British into activity,
and by an unfortunate indiscretion, Hayne suffered himself to be overtaken.
His execution soon followed his capture. This was a proceeding equally
barbarous and unjustifiable -- neither sanctioned by policy nor propriety.
It took place after a brief examination, and without any trial.
The proceeding was equally unauthorized by civil and martial law.
It was not long before this, as the reader will remember, that Marion,
in consequence of the execution of some of his men by the British,
had threatened them with retaliation. Greene, who knew the decisive character
of Marion, and was apprehensive that this wanton crime would render him
as prompt as he was fearless, in avenging it, thus writes to prevent him:
"Do not take any measures in the matter towards retaliation,
for I do not intend to retaliate upon the TORY officers, but the BRITISH.
It is my intention to demand the reasons of the Colonel's being put to death;
and if they are unsatisfactory, as I am sure they will be,
and if they refuse to make satisfaction, as I expect they will,
to publish my intention of giving no quarter to British officers, of any rank,
that fall into our hands. Should we attempt to retaliate
upon their militia officers, I am sure they would persevere in the measure,
in order to increase the animosity between the Whigs and Tories,
that they might stand idle spectators, and see them butcher each other.
As I do not wish my intentions known to the enemy but through
an official channel, and as this WILL BE DELAYED FOR SOME FEW DAYS
TO GIVE OUR FRIENDS IN ST. AUGUSTINE TIME TO GET OFF,
I wish you not to mention the matter to any mortal out of your family."

Weems represents Marion as being greatly averse to this measure
of retaliation, and as having censured those officers of the regular army
who demanded of Greene the adoption of this remedy. But the biographer
wrote rather from his own benevolent nature than from the record.
Marion had no scruples about the necessity of such a measure
in particular cases; and, however much he might wish to avoid its execution,
he was yet fully prepared to adopt it whenever the policy of the proceeding
was unquestionable. Fortunately, the decisive resolutions which were
expressed by the Americans, their increasing successes, the fact that
they had several British officers of reputation in their hands, --
all conspired to produce, in the minds of the enemy, a greater regard
to the rights of justice and humanity. As retaliation in such cases
is justifiable only as a preventive and remedial measure,
it now ceased to be necessary; and, with proper views of the affair,
the resolves of Greene and Marion were suffered to remain unexpunged,
in proof of their indignation, rather than their purpose. But a few days
had elapsed after the execution of Hayne when a party of Marion's men,
under Captain Ervine, fell in with and captured a favorite British officer,
Captain Campbell, with two subalterns, in charge of a convoying detachment.
They were at once committed to the provost guard, and soon communicated
their apprehensions to Charleston. A meeting of British officers was held,
and their dissatisfaction at this new feature, introduced into
the warfare of the country, was expressed in such terms, as contributed,
along with the prompt proceedings of the Americans, to bring Balfour,
the commandant of Charleston, under whose authority the execution of Hayne
had taken place, to a better sense of mercy and prudence. We shall have
no farther occasion to refer to these proceedings. It is enough
that the threat of retaliation, followed up by such decided movements
as left no doubt of the resolution of the Americans,
produced all the beneficial effects which could have accrued
from its execution.

The incursion of Sumter and Marion into the low country, drew Lord Rawdon
from Orangeburg, with five hundred men, to Charleston, from which place,
after lingering just long enough to witness the death of Hayne,
he sailed for New York. He left Lieut.-Col. Stewart in command at Orangeburg.
From this post, Stewart moved to McCord's ferry, on the Congaree,
on the south side of which he took post, amidst the hills near the confluence
of the Wateree and Congaree. Greene's camp lay directly opposite,
and the fires of the mutual armies were distinctly seen by each other.
The heat of the weather suspended all regular military operations.
Two large rivers intervening secured each from sudden attack,
and their toils were confined to operating in small detachments,
for foraging or convoy. In this service, on the American side,
Col. Washington was detached -- as soon as the course of Stewart
was ascertained -- down the country across the Santee; Lee was sent upward,
along the north bank of the Congaree; the latter to operate
with Col. Henderson, then in command of Sumter's brigade,
at Fridig's ferry, and the former to strike at the communication
between the enemy and Charleston, and to cooperate with Marion and Mayham,
in covering the lower Santee. Col. Harden, at the same time,
with a body of mounted militia, had it in charge to straiten the enemy
upon the Edisto.

The activity of these several parties and their frequent successes,
were such that Stewart was compelled to look for his supplies to the country
below him. This necessity caused him to re-establish and strengthen the post
at Dorchester, in order to cover the communication by Orangeburg; and to place
a force at Fairlawn, near the head of the navigation of Cooper river,
from which supplies from Charleston were transported to headquarters
over land. As this route was watched by Marion, Washington and Mayham,
the British commander was compelled, in order to secure
the means of communication with the opposite bank of the Congaree
and to draw supplies from thence, to transport boats adapted to the purpose,
on wagon-wheels, from Fairlawn to the Congaree.

Such were the relative positions of the two armies until the 22d of August,
when Greene, calling in all his detachments except those under Marion,
Mayham and Harden, broke up his camp at the High Hills and proceeded
to Howell's ferry, on the Congaree, with the intention
immediately to cross it and advance upon Stewart. That officer,
on hearing of the movement of the Americans, fell back upon
his reinforcements and convoys, and took up a strong position
at the Eutaw Springs.

Meanwhile, Marion disappeared from the Santee on one of those
secret expeditions in which his wonderful celerity and adroit management
conducted his men so frequently to success. His present aim was the Pon-Pon.
Col. Harden was at this time in that quarter, and closely pressed
by a superior British force of five hundred men. Detaching a party
of mounted militia to the neighborhood of Dorchester and Monk's Corner,
as much to divert the enemy from his own movements as with any other object,
he proceeded with two hundred picked men on his secret expedition.

By a forced march, he crossed the country from St. Stephen's to the Edisto --
passing through both lines of the enemy's communication with Charleston,
and reached Harden -- a distance of one hundred miles -- in season for
his relief. His approach and arrival were totally unsuspected by the enemy,
for whom he prepared an ambush in a swamp near Parker's ferry.
A small body of his swiftest horse were sent out to decoy the British
into the snare. A white feather, rather too conspicuously worn
by one of his men in ambush, had nearly defeated his design.
Some Tories passing, discovered this unnecessary plumage, and one of them
fired upon the wearer. This led to an exchange of shots; but Major Frazier,
by whom the British were commanded, assuming the party thus concealed
to be that of Harden, whom it was his aim to find, pursued the horsemen
whom Marion had sent out to entice him to the ambuscade. His cavalry
was led at full charge within forty yards of the concealed riflemen.
A deadly fire was poured in, under which the British recoiled;
attempting to wheel and charge the swamp, they received a second;
and, closely wedged as their men were upon the narrow causeway
over which they came, every shot bore its warrant. There was no retreating,
no penetrating the ambush, and the British cavalry had but to go forward,
along the road to the ferry, thus passing the entire line of the ambuscade.
The corps was most effectually thinned by the time it got beyond rifle reach;
and still more fatal would have been the affray to the advancing
infantry of Frazier -- a large body, with a field-piece --
but for one of those lamentable deficiencies of materiel,
which so frequently plucked complete success from the grasp of the Americans.
The ammunition of our partisan failed him, and he was compelled
to yield the ground to the enemy, who was otherwise wholly in his power.
The British loss was unknown. Twenty-seven dead horses
were counted on the field the day after; the men had all been buried.
As Marion's men fired with either a ball or heavy buck-shot, and as none
would aim at horses, the loss of the British must have been very great.
Nine days after, at the battle of Eutaw, they had few cavalry in the field.

But, though the victory was incomplete, Marion had attained his object.
He had rescued Harden, without loss to himself. He had traversed
more than two hundred miles of country, through a region held by the enemy;
returned by the same route, -- delivered his prisoners to the care of Mayham,
-- returned twenty miles below the Eutaw, in order to watch the communication
between that place and Fairlawn -- then, at the call of Greene,
made a circuit and passed the British army, so as to reach a position
on the south side of the Santee, in the track of Greene's advance;
and all this in the brief compass of six days. Yet, of these movements,
which merited and received the particular thanks of Congress, we are without
any data in our records. The complimentary resolution of Congress
fixes the battle at Parker's ferry on the 31st August.

Seventeen miles from Eutaw Springs, at Lauren's plantation,
Marion effected a junction with the commander-in-chief.
Greene was pressing forward to a meeting with Stewart. Of this object
the latter seemed to have been profoundly ignorant up to this moment.
But the day before, he knew that Marion was twenty miles below him,
and did not conjecture that, by marching the whole night,
he had thrown himself above him to join with Greene. Without this junction
he had no apprehension that the latter, with an inferior force,
would venture an attack upon him, in the strong position which he held.
On the afternoon of the 7th September, the army reached Burdell's tavern
on the Congaree road, seven miles from the Eutaws. The force under Greene
amounted to two thousand men, all told. That under General Stewart
was probably about the same. It is estimated to have been
two thousand three hundred. These were all disciplined troops,
and a large proportion of the old regiments consisted of native marksmen
from the ranks of the loyalists. In cavalry, Greene had the advantage,
but a great portion of his men were militia. In artillery the two armies
were equal. The British had five and the Americans four pieces.

The memorable battle of the Eutaw Springs was fought on the 8th September.
At four o'clock in the morning the Americans moved from their bivouac
down to the attack. The day was fair, but intensely hot; but the combatants
at the commencement of the battle were relieved by the shade of the woods.
The South Carolina State troops and Lee's legion formed the advance
under Colonel Henderson. The militia, both of South and North Carolina,
moved next, under Marion. Then followed the regulars under Gen. Sumner;
and the rear was closed by Washington's cavalry, and Kirkwood's Delawares,
under Col. Washington. The artillery moved between the columns.
The troops were thus arranged in reference to their order of battle.

Of the approach of the Americans Stewart was wholly ignorant on the evening
of the 7th. The only patrol which had been sent up the Congaree road
had been captured during the night, and Stewart himself says, in excuse,
that "the Americans had waylaid the swamps and passes in such a manner
as to cut off every avenue of intelligence." So entirely secure
had he felt himself in his position, which was a strong one,
that he had sent out an unarmed party of one hundred men,
in the very direction of Greene's advance, to gather sweet potatoes.
This party, called a rooting party, after advancing about three miles,
had pursued a road to the right, which led to the river plantations.
Advised, by two deserters from the North Carolina militia,
of Greene's approach, Stewart dispatched Captain Coffin, with his cavalry,
to recall the rooting party, and to reconnoitre the Americans.
Before Coffin could effect either object, he encountered
the American advance, and, in total ignorance of its strength,
charged it with a degree of confidence, which led Greene to imagine
that Stewart with his whole army was at hand. Coffin was easily repulsed;
the rooting party, alarmed by the firing, hurried from the woods,
and were all made prisoners. Meanwhile, Stewart, now thoroughly aware
of the proximity of his enemy, pushed forward a detachment of infantry,
a mile distant from the Eutaw, with orders to engage and detain
the American troops while he formed his men and prepared for battle.
But Greene, whom the audacity of Coffin had deceived, halted his columns
where they stood, and proceeded to display them. The column of militia
formed the first line; the South Carolina militia in equal divisions
on the right and left, and the North Carolinians in the centre.
General Marion commanded the right, General Pickens the left,
and Col. Malmedy the centre. Col. Henderson, with the State troops,
including Sumter's brigade, covered the left of this line,
and Col. Lee, with his legion, the right. The column of regulars
also displayed in one line. The North Carolinians, under Gen. Sumner,
occupied the right; the Marylanders, under Col. Williams, the left;
the Virginians, under Col. Campbell, the centre. Two pieces of artillery
were assigned to each line. Col. Washington moved in column in the rear,
keeping himself in reserve. In this order, the troops pressed forward slowly,
as the country on both sides of the road was in wood,
and prevented much expedition. Moving thus, the first line encountered
the advance parties of Stewart, and drove them before it,
until the entire line of the British army, displayed in order of battle,
received, and gave shelter to, the fugitives.

Copyright (c) 2007. topbookz.net. All rights reserved.