Theological Essays and Other Papers v2

T >> Thomas de Quincey >> Theological Essays and Other Papers v2

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17

Joshua Hutchinson, Charles Franks and the Online Distributed Proofreading
Team.

THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS AND OTHER PAPERS

By THOMAS DE QUINCEY, AUTHOR OF

_'CONFESSIONS OF AN ENGLISH OPIUM-EATER,' ETC. ETC._

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. II.

CONTENTS

SECESSION FROM THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND
TOILETTE OF THE HEBREW LADY
MILTON
CHARLEMAGNE
MODERN GREECE
LORD CARLISLE ON POPE

SECESSION FROM THE CHURCH OF SCOTLAND.

[1844.]

A great revolution has taken place in Scotland. A greater has been
threatened. Nor is that danger even yet certainly gone by. Upon the
accidents of such events as may arise for the next five years, whether
fitted or not fitted to revive discussions in which many of the
Non-seceders went in various degrees along with the Seceders, depends
the final (and, in a strict sense, the very awful) question, What is
to be the fate of the Scottish church? Lord Aberdeen's Act is well
qualified to tranquillize the agitations of that body; and at an earlier
stage, if not intercepted by Lord Melbourne, might have prevented them
in part. But Lord Aberdeen has no power to stifle a conflagration once
thoroughly kindled. That must depend in a great degree upon the
favorable aspect of events yet in the rear.

Meantime these great disturbances are not understood in England; and
chiefly from the differences between the two nations as to the language
of their several churches and law courts. The process of ordination
and induction is totally different under the different ecclesiastical
administrations of the two kingdoms. And the church courts of Scotland
do not exist in England. We write, therefore, with an express view to
the better information of England proper. And, with this purpose, we
shall lead the discussion through four capital questions:--

I. _What_ is it that has been done by the moving party?

II. _How_ was it done? By what agencies and influence?

III. What were the _immediate results_ of these acts?

IV. What are the _remote results_ yet to be apprehended?

I. First, then, WHAT _is it that has been done?_ Up to the month of
May in 1834, the fathers and brothers of the 'Kirk' were in harmony
as great as humanity can hope to see. Since May, 1834, the church has
been a fierce crater of volcanic agencies, throwing out of her bosom
one-third of her children; and these children are no sooner born into
their earthly atmosphere, than they turn, with unnatural passions, to
the destruction of their brethren. What can be the grounds upon which
an _acharnement_ so deadly has arisen?

It will read to the ears of a stranger almost as an experiment upon
his credulity, if we tell the simple truth. Being incredible, however,
it is not the less true; and, being monstrous, it will yet be recorded
in history, that the Scottish church has split into mortal feuds upon
two points absolutely without interest to the nation; first, upon a
demand for creating clergymen by a new process; secondly, upon a demand
for Papal latitude of jurisdiction. Even the order of succession in
these things is not without meaning. Had the second demand stood first,
it would have seemed possible that the two demands might have grown
up independently, and so far conscientiously. But, according to the
realities of the case, this is _not_ possible; the second demand grew
_out_ of the first. The interest of the Seceders, as locked up in their
earliest requisition, was that which prompted their second. Almost
everybody was contented with the existing mode of creating the pastoral
relation. Search through Christendom, lengthways and breadthways, there
was not a public usage, an institution, an economy, which more
profoundly slept in the sunshine of divine favor or of civil prosperity,
than the peculiar mode authorized and practised in Scotland of
appointing to every parish its several pastor. Here and there an
ultra-Presbyterian spirit might prompt a murmur against it. But the
wise and intelligent approved; and those who had the appropriate--that
is, the religious interest--confessed that it was practically successful.
From whom, then, came the attempt to change? Why, from those only who
had an alien interest, an indirect interest, an interest of ambition
in its subversion. As matters stood in the spring of 1834, the patron
of each benefice, acting under the severest restraints--restraints which
(if the church courts did their duty) left no room or possibility for
an unfit man to creep in--nominated the incumbent. In a spiritual sense,
the church had all power: by refusing, first of all, to '_license_'
unqualified persons; secondly, by refusing to '_admit_' out of these
licensed persons such as might have become warped from the proper standard
of pastoral fitness, the church had a negative voice, all-potential in
the creation of clergymen; the church could exclude whom she pleased.
But this contented her not. Simply to shut out was an ungracious office,
though mighty for the interests of orthodoxy through the land. The
children of this world, who became the agitators of the church, clamored
for something more. They desired for the church that she should become a
lady patroness; that she should give as well as take away; that she should
wield a sceptre, courted for its bounties, and not merely feared for its
austerities. Yet how should this be accomplished? Openly to translate
upon the church the present power of patrons--_that_ were too
revolutionary, that would have exposed its own object. For the present,
therefore, let this device prevail--let the power nominally be
transferred to congregations: let this be done upon the plea that each
congregation understands best what mode of ministrations tends to its
own edification. There lies the semblance of a Christian plea; the
congregation, it is said, has become anxious for itself; the church
has become anxious for the congregation. And then, if the translation
should be effected, the church has already devised a means for
appropriating the power which she has unsettled; for she limits this
power to the communicants at the sacramental table. Now, in Scotland,
though not in England, the character of communicant is notoriously
created or suspended by the clergyman of each parish; so that, by the
briefest of circuits, the church causes the power to revolve into her
own hands.

That was the first change--a change full of Jacobinism; and for which
to be published was to be denounced. It was necessary, therefore, to
place this Jacobin change upon a basis privileged from attack. How
should _that_ be done? The object was to create a new clerical power;
to shift the election of clergymen from the lay hands in which law and
usage had lodged it; and, under a plausible mask of making the election
popular, circuitously to make it ecclesiastical. Yet, if the existing
patrons of church benefices should see themselves suddenly denuded of
their rights, and within a year or two should see these rights settling
determinately into the hands of the clergy, the fraud, the fraudulent
purpose, and the fraudulent machinery, would have stood out in gross
proportions too palpably revealed. In this dilemma the reverend
agitators devised a second scheme. It was a scheme bearing triple
harvests; for, at one and the same time, it furnished the motive which
gave a constructive coherency and meaning to the original purpose, it
threw a solemn shadow over the rank worldliness of that purpose, and
it opened a diffusive tendency towards other purposes of the same
nature, as yet undeveloped. The device was this: in Scotland, as in
England, the total process by which a parish clergyman is created,
subdivides itself into several successive acts. The initial act belongs
to the patron of the benefice: he must '_present_;' that is, he notifies
the fact of his having conferred the benefice upon A B, to a public
body which officially takes cognizance of this act; and that body is,
not the particular parish concerned, but the presbytery of the district
in which the parish is seated. Thus far the steps, merely legal, of
the proceedings, were too definite to be easily disturbed. These steps
are sustained by Lord Aberdeen as realities, and even by the
Non-intrusionists were tolerated as formalities.

But at this point commence other steps not so rigorously defined by
law or usage, nor so absolutely within one uniform interpretation of
their value. In practice they had long sunk into forms. But ancient
forms easily lend themselves to a revivification by meanings and
applications, new or old, under the galvanism of democratic forces.
The disturbers of the church, passing by the act of 'presentation' as
an obstacle too formidable to be separately attacked on its own account,
made their stand upon one of the two acts which lie next in succession.
It is the regular routine, that the presbytery, having been warned of
the patron's appointment, and having 'received' (in technical language)
the presentee--that is, having formally recognised him in that
character--next appoint a day on which he is to preach before the
congregation. This sermon, together with the prayers by which it is
accompanied, constitute the probationary act according to some views;
but, according to the general theory, simply the inaugural act by which
the new pastor places himself officially before his future parishioners.
Decorum, and the sense of proportion, seem to require that to every
commencement of a very weighty relation, imposing new duties, there
should be a corresponding and ceremonial entrance. The new pastor,
until this public introduction, could not be legitimately assumed for
known to the parishioners. And accordingly at this point it was--viz.
subsequently to his authentic publication, as we may call it--that,
in the case of any grievous scandal known to the parish as outstanding
against him, arose the proper opportunity furnished by the church for
lodging the accusation, and for investigating it before the church
court. In default, however, of any grave objection to the presentee,
he was next summoned by the presbytery to what really _was_ a
probationary act at their bar; viz. an examination of his theological
sufficiency. But in this it could not be expected that he should fail,
because he must previously have satisfied the requisitions of the
church in his original examination for a license to preach. Once
dismissed with credit from this bar, he was now beyond all further
probation whatsoever; in technical phrase, he was entitled to
'admission.' Such were the steps, according to their orderly succession,
by which a man consummated the pastoral tie with any particular parish.
And all of these steps, subsequent to the '_reception_' and inaugural
preaching, were now summarily characterized by the revolutionists as
'spiritual;' for the sake of sequestering them into their own hands.
As to the initiatory act of presentation, _that_ might be secular, and
to be dealt with by a secular law. But the rest were acts which belonged
not to a kingdom of this world. 'These,' with a newborn scrupulosity
never heard of until the revolution of 1834, clamored for new
casuistries; 'these,' said the agitators, 'we cannot consent any longer
to leave in their state of collapse as mere inert or ceremonial forms.
They must be revivified. By all means, let the patron present as
heretofore. But the acts of "examination" and "admission," _together
with the power of altogether refusing to enter upon either,_ under a
protest against the candidate from a clear majority of the
parishioners--these are acts falling within the spiritual jurisdiction
of the church. And these powers we must, for the future, see exercised
according to spiritual views.'

Here, then, suddenly emerged a perfect ratification for their own
previous revolutionary doctrine upon the creation of parish clergymen.
This new scruple was, in relation to former scruples, a perfect
linch-pin for locking their machinery into cohesion. For vainly would
they have sought to defeat the patron's right of presenting, unless
through this sudden pause and interdict imposed upon the _latter_ acts
in the process of induction, under the pretext that these were acts
competent only to a spiritual jurisdiction. This plea, by its tendency,
rounded and secured all that they had yet advanced in the way of claim.
But, at the same time, though indispensable negatively, positively it
stretched so much further than any necessity or interest inherent in
their present innovations, that not improbably they faltered and shrank
back at first from the immeasurable field of consequences upon which
it opened. They would willingly have accepted less. But, unfortunately,
it sometimes happens, that, to gain as much as is needful in one
direction, you must take a great deal more than you wish for in another.
Any principle, which _could_ carry them over the immediate difficulty,
would, by a mere necessity, carry them incalculably beyond it. For if
every act bearing in any one direction a spiritual aspect, showing at
any angle a relation to spiritual things, is therefore to be held
spiritual in a sense excluding the interference of the civil power,
there falls to the ground at once the whole fabric of civil authority
in any independent form. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the claim
to a spiritual jurisdiction, in collision with the claims of the state,
would not probably have offered itself to the ambition of the agitators,
otherwise than as a measure ancillary to their earlier pretension of
appointing virtually all parish clergymen. The one claim was found to
be the integration or _sine qua non_ complement of the other. In order
to sustain the power of appointment in their own courts, it was
necessary that they should defeat the patron's power; and, in order
to defeat the patron's power, ranging itself (as sooner or later it
would) under the law of the land, it was necessary that they should
decline that struggle, by attempting to take the question out of all
secular jurisdictions whatever.

In this way grew up that twofold revolution which has been convulsing
the Scottish church since 1834; first, the audacious attempt to disturb
the settled mode of appointing the parish clergy, through a silent
robbery perpetrated on the crown and great landed aristocracy; secondly,
and in prosecution of that primary purpose, the far more frantic attempt
to renew in a practical shape the old disputes so often agitating the
forum of Christendom, as to the bounds of civil and spiritual power.

In our rehearsal of the stages through which the process of induction
ordinarily travels, we have purposely omitted one possible interlude
or parenthesis in the series; not as wishing to conceal it, but for
the very opposite reason. It is right to withdraw from a
_representative_ account of any transaction such varieties of the
routine as occur but seldom: in this way they are more pointedly
exposed. Now, having made that explanation, we go on to inform the
Southern reader--that an old traditionary usage has prevailed in
Scotland, but not systematically or uniformly, of sending to the
presentee, through the presbytery, what is designated a '_call_,'
subscribed by members of the parish congregation. This call is simply
an invitation to the office of their pastor. It arose in the disorders
of the seventeenth century; but in practice it is generally admitted
to have sunk into a mere formality throughout the eighteenth century;
and the very position which it holds in the succession of steps, not
usually coming forward until _after_ the presentation has been notified
(supposing that it comes forward at all), compels us to regard it in
that light. Apparently it bears the same relation to the patron's act
as the Address of the two Houses to the Speech from the Throne: it is
rather a courteous echo to the personal compliment involved in the
presentation, than capable of being regarded as any _original_ act of
invitation. And yet, in defiance of that notorious fact, some people
go so far as to assert, that a call is not good unless where it is
subscribed by a clear majority of the congregation. This is amusing.
We have already explained that, except as a liberal courtesy, the very
idea of a call destined to be inoperative, is and must be moonshine.
Yet between two moonshines, some people, it seems, can tell which is
the denser. We have all heard of Barmecide banquets, where, out of
tureens filled to the brim with--nothings the fortunate guest was
helped to vast messes of--air. For a hungry guest to take this
tantalization in good part, was the sure way to win the esteem of the
noble Barmecide. But the Barmecide himself would hardly approve of a
duel turning upon a comparison between two of his tureens, question
being--which had been the fuller, or of two nihilities which had been
seasoned the more judiciously. Yet this in effect is the reasoning of
those who say that a call, signed by fifty-one persons out of a hundred,
is more valid than another signed only by twenty-six, or by nobody;
it being in the mean time fully understood that neither is valid in
the least possible degree. But if the '_call_,' was a Barmecide call,
there was another act open to the congregation which was not so.

For the English reader must now understand, that over and above the
passive and less invidious mode of discountenancing or forbearing to
countenance a presentee, by withdrawing from the direct 'call' upon
him, usage has sanctioned another and stronger sort of protest; one
which takes the shape of distinct and clamorous _objections_. We are
speaking of the routine in this place, according to the course which
it _did_ travel or _could_ travel under that law and that practice
which furnished the pleas for complaint. Now, it was upon these
'objections,' as may well be supposed, that the main battle arose.
Simply to want the 'call,' being a mere _zero_, could not much lay
hold upon public feeling. It was a case not fitted for effect. You
cannot bring a blank privation strongly before the public eye. 'The
"call" did not take place last week;' well, perhaps it will take place
next week. Or again, if it should never take place, perhaps it may be
religious carelessness on the part of the parish. Many parishes
notoriously feel no interest in their pastor, except as a quiet member
of their community. Consequently, in two of three cases that might
occur, there was nothing to excite the public; the parish had either
agreed with the patron, or had not noticeably dissented. But in the
third case of positive 'objections,' which (in order to justify
themselves as not frivolous and vexatious) were urged with peculiar
emphasis, the attention of all men was arrested. Newspapers reverberated
the fact: sympathetic groans arose: the patron was an oppressor: the
parish was under persecution: and the poor clergyman, whose case was
the most to be pitied, as being in a measure _endowed_ with a lasting
fund of dislike, had the mortification to find, over and above this
resistance from within, that he bore the name of 'intruder' from
without. He was supposed by the fiction of the case to be in league
with his patron for the persecution of a godly parish; whilst in reality
the godly parish was persecuting _him_, and hallooing the world _ab
extra_ to join in the hunt.

In such cases of pretended objections to men who have not been tried,
we need scarcely tell the reader, that usually they are mere cabals
and worldly intrigues. It is next to impossible that any parish or
congregation should sincerely agree in their opinion of a clergyman.
What one man likes in such cases, another man detests. Mr. A., with
an ardent nature, and something of a histrionic turn, doats upon a
fine rhetorical display. Mr. B., with more simplicity of taste,
pronounces this little better than theatrical ostenostentation. Mr.
C. requires a good deal of critical scholarship, Mr. D quarrels with
this as unsuitable to a rustic congregation. Mrs. X., who is 'under
concern' for sin, demands a searching and (as she expresses it) a
'faithful' style of dealing with consciences. Mrs. Y., an aristocratic
lady, who cannot bear to be mixed up in any common charge together
with low people, abominates such words as 'sin,' and wills that the
parson should confine his 'observations' to the 'shocking demoralization
of the lower orders.'

Now, having stated the practice of Scottish induction as it was formerly
sustained in its first stage by law, in its second stage by usage, let
us finish that part of the subject by reporting the _existing_ practice
as regulated in all its stages by law. What law? The law as laid down
in Lord Aberdeen's late Act of Parliament. This statement should,
historically speaking, have found itself under our _third_ head, as
being one amongst the consequences immediately following the final
rupture. But it is better placed at this point; because it closes the
whole review of that topic; and because it reflects light upon the
former practice--the practice which led to the whole mutinous tumult:
every alteration forcing more keenly upon the reader's attention what
had been the previous custom, and in what respect it was held by any
man to be a grievance.

This act, then, of Lord Aberdeen's removes all _legal_ effect from the
'_call_.' Common sense required _that_. For what was to be done with
patronage? Was it to be sustained, or was it not? If not, then why
quarrel with the Non-intrusionists? Why suffer a schism to take place
in the church? Give legal effect to the 'call,' and the original cause
of quarrel is gone. For, with respect to the opponents of the
Non-intrusionists, _they_ would bow to the law. On the other hand, if
patronage _is_ to be sustained, then why allow of any lingering or
doubtful force to what must often operate as a conflicting claim? 'A
call,' which carries with it any legal force, annihilates patronage.
Patronage would thus be exercised only on sufferance. Do we mean then,
that a 'call' should sink into a pure fiction of ceremony, like the
English _conge-d'elire_ addressed to a dean and chapter, calling on
them to elect a bishop, when all the world knows that already the see
has been filled by a nomination from the crown? Not at all; a _moral_
weight will still attach to the 'call,' though no legal coercion: and
what is chiefly important, all those _doubts_ will be removed by express
legislation, which could not but arise between a practice pointing
sometimes in one direction, and sometimes in another, between legal
decisions again upholding one view, whilst something very like legal
prescription was occasionally pleaded for the other. Behold the evil
of written laws not rigorously in harmony with that sort of customary
law founded upon vague tradition or irregular practice. And here, by
the way, arises the place for explaining to the reader that
irreconcilable dispute amongst Parliamentary lawyers as to the question
whether Lord Aberdeen's bill were _enactory_, that is, created a new
law, or _declaratory_, that is, simply expounded an old one. If
enactory, then why did the House of Lords give judgment against those
who allowed weight to the 'call?' That might need altering; _that_
might be highly inexpedient; but if it required a new law to make it
illegal, how could those, parties be held in the wrong previously to
the new act of legislation? On the other hand, if declaratory, then
show us any old law which made the 'call' illegal. The fact is, that
no man can decide whether the act established a new law, or merely
expounded an old one. And the reason why he cannot, is this: the
practice, the usage, which often is the law, had grown up variously
during the troubles of the seventeenth century. In many places political
reasons had dictated that the elders should nominate the incumbent.
But the ancient practice had authorized patronage: by the act of Queen
Anne (10th chap.) it was even formally restored; and yet the patron
in known instances was said to have waived his right in deference to
the 'call.' But why? Did he do so in courteous compliance with the
parish, as a party whose _reasonable_ wishes ought, for the sake of
all parties, to meet with attention? Or did he do so, in humble
submission to the parish, as having by their majorities a legal right
to the presentation? There lay the question. The presumptions from
antiquity were all against the call. The more modern practice had
occasionally been _for_ it. Now, we all know how many colorable claims
of right are created by prescription. What was the exact force of the
'call,' no man could say. In like manner, the exact character and limit
of allowable objections had been ill-defined in practice, and rested
more on a vague tradition than on any settled rule. This also made it
hard to say whether Lord Aberdeen's Act were enactory or declaratory,
a predicament, however, which equally affects all statutes _for removing
doubts_.

The 'call,' then, we consider as no longer recognised by law. But did
Lord Aberdeen by that change establish the right of the patron as an
unconditional right? By no means. He made it strictly a conditional
right. The presentee is _now_ a candidate, and no more. He has the
most important vote in his favor, it is true; but that vote may still
be set aside, though still only with the effect of compelling the
patron to a new choice. '_Calls_' are no longer doubtful in their
meaning, but '_objections_' have a fair field laid open to them. All
reasonable objections are to be weighed. But who is to judge whether
they _are_ reasonable? The presbytery of the district. And now pursue
the action of the law, and see how little ground it leaves upon which
to hang a complaint. Everybody's rights are secured. Whatever be the
event, first of all the presentee cannot complain, if he is rejected
only for proved insufficiency. He is put on his trial as to these
points only: 1. Is he orthodox? 2. Is he of good moral reputation? 3.
Is he sufficiently learned? And note this (which in fact Sir James
Graham remarked in his official letter to the Assembly), strictly
speaking, he ought not to be under challenge as respects the third
point, for it is your own fault, the fault of your own licensing courts
(the presbyteries), if he is not qualified so far. You should not have
created him a licentiate, should not have given him a license to preach,
as must have been done in an earlier stage of his progress, if he were
not learned enough. Once learned, a man is learned for life. As to the
other points, he may change, and _therefore_ it is that an examination
is requisite. But how can _he_ complain if he is found by an impartial
court of venerable men objectionable on any score? If it were possible,
however, that he should be wronged, he has his appeal. Secondly, how
can the patron complain? _His_ case is the same as his presentee's
case; his injuries the same; his relief the same. Besides, if _his_
man is rejected, it is not the parish man that takes his place. No;
but a second man of his own choice: and, if again he chooses amiss,
who is to blame for _that_? Thirdly, can the congregation complain?
They have a _general_ interest in their spiritual guide. But as to the
preference for oratory--for loud or musical voice--for peculiar views
in religion--these things are special: they interest but an exceedingly
small minority in any parish; and, what is worse, that which pleases
one is often offensive to another. There are cases in which a parish
would reject a man for being a married man: some of the parish have
unmarried daughters. But this case clearly belongs to the small
minority; and we have little doubt that, where the objections lay 'for
cause not shown,' it was often for _this_ cause. Fourthly, can the
church complain? Her interest is represented, 1, not by the presentee;
2, not by the patron; 3, not by the congregation; but 4, by the
presbytery. And, whatever the presbytery say, _that_ is supported.
Speaking either for the patron, for the presentee, for the congregation,
or for themselves as conservators of the church, that court is heard;
what more would they have? And thus in turn every interest is protected.
Now the point to be remarked is-that each party in turn has a separate
influence. But on any other plan, giving to one party out of the four
an absolute or unconditional power, no matter which of the four it
be--all the rest have none at all. Lord Aberdeen has reconciled the
rights of patrons for the first time with those of all other parties
interested. Nobody has more than a conditional power. Everybody has
_that_. And the patron, as necessity requires, if property is to be
protected, has, in all circumstances, the revisionary power.

Pages:
1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17