The Expansion Of Europe
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Ramsay Muir >> The Expansion Of Europe
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On the other hand, we are urged by enthusiasts for liberty,
especially in Russia, to believe that imperialism as such is the
enemy; that we must put an end for ever to all dominion exercised
by one people over another; and that outside of Europe as within
it we must trust to the same principles for the hope of future
peace--the principles of national freedom and self-government--
and leave all peoples everywhere to control freely their own
destinies. But this is a misreading of the facts as fatal as the
other. It disregards the value of the work that has been done in
the extension of European civilisation to the rest of the world by
the imperial activities of the European peoples. It fails to
recognise that until Europe began to conquer the world neither
rational law nor political liberty had ever in any real sense
existed in the outer world, and that their dominion is even now
far from assured, but depends for its maintenance upon the
continued tutelage of the European peoples. It fails to realise
that the economic demands of the modern world necessitate the
maintenance of civilised administration after the Western pattern,
and that this can only be assured, in large regions of the earth,
by means of the political control of European peoples. Above all
this view does not grasp the essential fact that the idea of
nationhood and the idea of self-government are both modern ideas,
which have had their origin in Europe, and which can only be
realised among peoples of a high political development; that the
sense of nationhood is but slowly created, and must not be
arbitrarily defined in terms of race or language; and that the
capacity for self-government is only formed by a long process of
training, and has never existed except among peoples who were
unified by a strongly felt community of sentiment, and had
acquired the habit and instinct of loyalty to the law. Assuredly
it is the duty of Europe and America to extend these fruitful
conceptions to the regions which have passed under their
influence. But the process must be a very slow one, and it can
only be achieved under tutelage. It is the control of the European
peoples over the non-European world which has turned the world
into an economic unit, brought it within a single political
system, and opened to us the possibility of making a world-order
such as the most daring dreamers of the past could never have
conceived. This control cannot be suddenly withdrawn. For a very
long time to come the world-states whose rise we have traced must
continue to be the means by which the political discoveries of
Europe, as well as her material civilisation, are made available
for the rest of the world. The world-states are such recent things
that we have not yet found a place for them in our political
philosophy. But unless we find a place for them, and think in
terms of them, in the future, we shall be in danger of a terrible
shipwreck.
If, then, it is essential, not only for the economic development
of the world, but for the political advancement of its more
backward peoples, that the political suzerainty of the European
peoples should survive, and as a consequence that the world should
continue to be dominated by a group of great world-states, how are
we to conjure away the nightmare of inter-imperial rivalry which
has brought upon us the present catastrophe, and seems to threaten
us with yet more appalling ruin in the future? Only by resolving
and ensuring, as at the great settlement we may be able to do,
that the necessary political control of Europe over the outer
world shall in future be exercised not merely in the interests of
the mistress-states, but in accordance with principles which are
just in themselves, and which will give to all peoples a fair
chance of making the best use of their powers. But how are we to
discover these principles, if the ideas of nationality and self-
government, to which we pin our faith in Europe, are to be held
inapplicable to the greater part of the non-European world? There
is only one possible source of instruction: our past experience,
which has now extended over four centuries, and which we have in
this book endeavoured to survey.
Now while it is undeniably true that the mere lust of power has
always been present in the imperial activities of the European
peoples, it is certainly untrue (as our study ought to have shown)
that it has ever been the sole motive, except, perhaps, in the
great German challenge. And in the course of their experience the
colonising peoples have gradually worked out certain principles in
their treatment of subject peoples, which ought to be of use to
us. The fullest and the most varied experience is that of the
British Empire: it is the oldest of all the world-states; it alone
includes regions of the utmost variety of types, new lands peopled
by European settlers, realms of ancient civilisation like India,
and regions inhabited by backward and primitive peoples. It would
be absurd to claim that its methods are perfect and infallible.
But they have been very varied, and quite astonishingly
successful. And it is because they seem to afford clearer guidance
than any other part of the experiments which we have recorded that
we have studied them, especially in their later developments, with
what may have seemed a disproportionate fulness. What are the
principles which experience has gradually worked out in the
British Empire? They cannot be embodied in a single formula,
because they vary according to the condition and development of
the lands to which they apply.
But in the first place we have learnt by a very long experience
that in lands inhabited by European settlers, who bring with them
European traditions, the only satisfactory solution is to be found
in the concession of the fullest self-governing rights, since
these settlers are able to use them, and in the encouragement of
that sentiment of unity which we call the national spirit. And
this involves a recognition of the fact that nationality is never
to be defined solely in terms of race or language, but can arise,
and should be encouraged to arise, among racially divided
communities such as Canada and South Africa. Any attempt to
interpret nationhood in terms of race is not merely dangerous, but
ruinous; and such endeavours to stimulate or accentuate racial
conflict, as Germany has been guilty of in Brazil, in South
Africa, and even in America, must be, if successful, fatal to the
progress of the countries affected, and dangerous to the peace of
the world.
In the second place we have learnt that in lands of ancient
civilisation, where ruling castes have for centuries been in the
habit of exploiting their subjects, the supreme gift which Europe
can offer is that of internal peace and a firmly administered and
equal law, which will render possible the gradual rise of a sense
of unity, and the gradual training of the people in the habits of
life that make self-government possible. How soon national unity
can be established, or self-government made practicable in any
full sense, must be matter of debate. But the creation of these
things is, or ought to be, the ultimate aim of European government
in such countries. And in the meantime, and until they become
fully masters of their own fate, these lands, so our British
experience tells us, ought to be treated as distinct political
units; they should pay no tribute; all their resources should be
devoted to their own development; and they should not be expected
or required to maintain larger forces than are necessary for their
own defence. At the same time, the ruling power should claim no
special privileges for its own citizens, but should throw open the
markets of such realms equally to all nations. In short it should
act not as a master, but as a trustee, on behalf of its subjects
and also on behalf of civilisation.
In the third place we have learnt that in the backward regions of
the earth it is the duty of the ruling power, firstly, to protect
its primitive subjects from unscrupulous exploitation, to guard
their simple customs, proscribing only those which are immoral,
and to afford them the means of a gradual emancipation from
barbarism; secondly, to develop the economic resources of these
regions for the needs of the industrial world, to open them up by
modern communications, and to make them available on equal terms
to all nations, giving no advantage to its own citizens.
In spite of lapses and defects, it is an undeniable historical
fact that these are the principles which have been wrought out and
applied in the administration of the British Empire during the
nineteenth century. They are not vague and Utopian dreams; they
are a matter of daily practice. If they can be applied by one of
the world-states, and that the greatest, why should they not be
applied by the rest? But if these principles became universal, is
it not apparent that all danger of a catastrophic war between
these powers would be removed, since every reason for it would
have vanished? Thus the necessary and advantageous tutelage of
Europe over the non-European world, and the continuance of the
great world-states, could be combined with the conjuring away of
the ever-present terror of war, and with the gradual training of
the non-European peoples to enjoy the political methods of Europe;
while the lesser states without extra-European dominions need no
longer feel themselves stunted and reduced to economic dependence
upon their great neighbours. Thus, and thus alone, can the
benefits of the long development which we have traced be reaped in
full; thus alone can the dominion of the European peoples over the
world be made to mean justice and the chance for all peoples to
make the best of their powers.
But it is not only the principles upon which particular areas
outside of Europe should be governed which we must consider. We
must reflect also upon the nature of the relations that should
exist between the various members of these great world-empires,
which must hence-forward be the dominating factors in the world's
politics. And here the problem is urgent only in the case of the
British Empire, because it alone is developed to such a point that
the problem is inevitably raised. Whatever else may happen, the
war must necessarily bring a crisis in the history of the British
Empire. On a vastly greater scale the situation of 1763 is being
reproduced. Now, as then, the Empire will emerge from a war for
existence, in which mother and daughter lands alike have shared.
Now, as then, the strain and pressure of the war will have brought
to light deficiencies in the system of the Empire. Now, as then,
the most patent of these deficiencies will be the fact that,
generous as the self-governing powers of the great Dominions have
been, they still have limits; and the irresistible tendency of
self-government to work towards its own fulfilment will once more
show itself. For there are two spheres in which even the most
fully self-governing of the empire-nations have no effective
control: they do not share in the determination of foreign policy,
and they do not share in the direction of imperial defence. The
responsibility for foreign policy, and the responsibility, and
with it almost the whole burden, of organising imperial defence,
have hitherto rested solely with Britain. Until the Great War,
foreign policy seemed to be a matter of purely European interest,
not directly concerning the great Dominions; nor did the problems
of imperial defence appear very pressing or urgent. But now all
have realised that not merely their interests, but their very
existence, may depend upon the wise conduct of foreign relations;
and now all have contributed the whole available strength of their
manhood to support a struggle in whose direction they have had no
effective share. These things must henceforth be altered; and they
can be altered only in one or other of three ways. Either the
great Dominions will become independent states, as the American
colonies did, and pursue a foreign policy and maintain a system of
defence of their own; or the Empire must reshape itself as a sort
of permanent offensive and defensive alliance, whose external
policy and modes of defence will be arranged by agreement; or some
mode of common management of these and other questions must be
devised. The first of these solutions is unlikely to be adopted,
not only because the component members of the Empire are conscious
of their individual weakness, but still more because the memory of
the ordeal through which all have passed must form an indissoluble
bond. Yet rashness or high-handedness in the treatment of the
great issue might lead even to this unlikely result. If either of
the other two solutions is adopted, the question will at once
arise of the place to be occupied, in the league or in the
reorganised super-state, of all those innumerable sections of the
Empire which do not yet enjoy, and some of which may never enjoy,
the full privileges of self-government; and above all, the place
to be taken by the vast dominion of India, which though it is not,
and may not for a long time become, a fully self-governing state,
is yet a definite and vitally important unit in the Empire,
entitled to have its needs and problems considered, and its
government represented, on equal terms with the rest. The problem
is an extraordinarily difficult one; perhaps the most difficult
political problem that has ever faced the sons of men. But it is
essentially the same problem which has continually recurred in the
history of British imperialism, though it now presents itself on a
vastly greater scale, and in a far more complex form, than ever
before: it is the problem of reconciling unity with liberty and
variety; of combining nationality and self-government with
imperialism, without impairing the rights of either. And beyond
any doubt the most tremendous and fascinating political question
which now awaits solution in the world, is the question whether
the political instinct of the British peoples, and the genius of
self-government, will find a way out of these difficulties, as
they have found a way out of so many others. Patience, mutual
tolerance, willingness to compromise, will be required in the
highest measure if the solution is to be found; but these are the
qualities which self-government cultivates.
'A thing that is wholly a sham,' said Treitschke, speaking of the
British Empire, 'cannot in this world of ours, endure for ever.'
Why did this Empire appear to Treitschke to be 'wholly a sham'?
Was it not because it did not answer to any definition of the word
'Empire' to be found in German political philosophy; because it
did not mean dominion and uniformity, but liberty and variety;
because it did not rest upon Force, as, in his view, every firmly
established state must do; because it was not governed by a single
master, whose edicts all its subjects must obey? But for 'a thing
that is wholly a sham' men do not lay down their lives, in
thousands and in hundreds of thousands, not under the pressure of
compulsion, but by a willing self-devotion; for the defence of 'a
thing that is wholly a sham' men will not stream in from all the
ends of the earth, abandoning their families and their careers,
and offering without murmur or hesitation themselves and all they
have and are. There must be a reality in the thing that calls
forth such sacrifices, a reality of the kind to which Realpolitik,
with its concentration upon purely material concerns, is wholly
blind: it is the reality of an ideal of honour, and justice, and
freedom. And if the Germans have been deceived in their
calculations of Realpolitik, is it not perhaps because they have
learnt to regard honour, and justice, and freedom as 'things that
are wholly shams'?
This amazing political structure, which refuses to fall within any
of the categories of political science, which is an empire and yet
not an empire, a state and yet not a state, a super-nation
incorporating in itself an incredible variety of peoples and
races, is not a structure which has been designed by the ingenuity
of man, or created by the purposive action of a government; it is
a natural growth, the product of the spontaneous activity of
innumerable individuals and groups springing from among peoples
whose history has made liberty and the tolerance of differences
their most fundamental instincts; it is the outcome of a series of
accidents, unforeseen, but turned to advantage by the unfailing
and ever-new resourcefulness of men habituated to self-government.
There is no logic or uniformity in its system, which has arisen
from an infinite number of makeshifts and tentative experiments,
yet in all of these a certain consistency appears, because they
have been presided over by the genius of self-government. It is
distributed over every continent, is washed by every ocean,
includes half the dust of islands that Nature has scattered about
the seas of the world, controls almost all the main avenues of the
world's sea-going commerce, and is linked together by ten thousand
ships perpetually going to and fro. Weak for offensive purposes,
because its resources are so scattered, it is, except at a few
points, almost impregnable against attack, if its forces are well
organised. It includes among its population representatives of
almost every human race and religion, and every grade of
civilisation, from the Australian Bushman to the subtle and
philosophic Brahmin, from the African dwarf to the master of
modern industry or the scholar of universities. Almost every form
of social organisation and of government known to man is
represented in its complex and many-hued fabric. It embodies five
of the most completely self-governing communities which the world
has known, and four of these control the future of the great empty
spaces that remain for the settlement of white men. It finds place
for the highly organised caste system by which the teeming
millions of India are held together. It preserves the simple
tribal organisation of the African clans. To different elements
among its subjects this empire appears in different aspects. To
the self-governing Dominions it is a brotherhood of free nations,
co-operating for the defence and diffusion of common ideas and of
common institutions. To the ancient civilisations of India or of
Egypt it is a power which, in spite of all its mistakes and
limitations, has brought peace instead of turmoil, law instead of
arbitrary might, unity instead of chaos, justice instead of
oppression, freedom for the development of the capacities and
characteristic ideas of their peoples, and the prospect of a
steady growth of national unity and political responsibility. To
the backward races it has meant the suppression of unending
slaughter, the disappearance of slavery, the protection of the
rights and usages of primitive and simple folk against reckless
exploitation, and the chance of gradual improvement and
emancipation from barbarism. But to all alike, to one quarter of
the inhabitants of the world, it has meant the establishment of
the Reign of Law, and of the Liberty which can only exist under
its shelter. In some degree, though imperfectly as yet, it has
realised within its own body all the three great political ideas
of the modern world. It has fostered the rise of a sense of
nationhood in the young communities of the new lands, and in the
old and decaying civilisations of the most ancient historic
countries. It has given a freedom of development to self-
government such as history has never before known. And by linking
together so many diverse and contrasted peoples in a common peace,
it has already realised, for a quarter of the globe, the ideal of
internationalism on a scale undreamt of by the most sanguine
prophets of Europe.
Truly this empire is a fabric so wonderful, so many-sided, and so
various in its aspects, that it may well escape the rigid
categories of a German professor, and seem to him 'wholly a sham.'
Now is the crisis of its fate: and if the wisdom of its leaders
can solve the riddle of the Sphinx which is being put to them, the
Great War will indeed have brought, for a quarter of the world,
the culmination of modern history.
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