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Two Treatises of Government
J >> John Locke >> Two Treatises of Government Pages: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT by JOHN LOCKE
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Treatise of Government" was published in 1690. The complete
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"John Locke Second Treatise of Government", Edited, with an
Introduction, By C.B. McPherson, Hackett Publishing Company,
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TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT
BY IOHN LOCKE
SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX ESTO
LONDON PRINTED MDCLXXXVIII
REPRINTED, THE SIXTH TIME, BY A. MILLAR, H. WOODFALL, 1. WHISTON AND
B. WHITE, 1. RIVINGTON, L. DAVIS AND C. REYMERS, R. BALDWIN, HAWES CLARKE
AND COLLINS; W. IOHNSTON, W. OWEN, 1. RICHARDSON, S. CROWDER, T. LONGMAN,
B. LAW, C. RIVINGTON, E. DILLY, R. WITHY, C. AND R. WARE, S. BAKER, T.
PAYNE, A. SHUCKBURGH, 1. HINXMAN
MDCCLXIII
TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER THE FALSE PRINCIPLES AND
FOUNDATION OF SIR ROBERT FILMER AND HIS FOLLOWERS ARE DETECTED AND
OVERTHROWN. THE LATTER IS AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL EXTENT
AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT.
1764 EDITOR'S NOTE The present Edition of this Book has not only
been collated with the first three Editions, which were published during
the Author's Life, but also has the Advantage of his last Corrections and
Improvements, from a Copy delivered by him to Mr. Peter Coste,
communicated to the Editor, and now lodged in Christ College, Cambridge.
PREFACE
Reader, thou hast here the beginning and end of a discourse concerning
government; what fate has otherwise disposed of the papers that should
have filled up the middle, and were more than all the rest, it is not
worth while to tell thee. These, which remain, I hope are sufficient to
establish the throne of our great restorer, our present King William; to
make good his title, in the consent of the people, which being the only
one of all lawful governments, he has more fully and clearly, than any
prince in Christendom; and to justify to the world the people of England,
whose love of their just and natural rights, with their resolution to
preserve them, saved the nation when it was on the very brink of slavery
and ruin. If these papers have that evidence, I flatter myself is to be
found in them, there will be no great miss of those which are lost, and
my reader may be satisfied without them: for I imagine, I shall have
neither the time, nor inclination to repeat my pains, and fill up the
wanting part of my answer, by tracing Sir Robert again, through all the
windings and obscurities, which are to be met with in the several
branches of his wonderful system. The king, and body of the nation, have
since so thoroughly confuted his Hypothesis, that I suppose no body
hereafter will have either the confidence to appear against our common
safety, and be again an advocate for slavery; or the weakness to be
deceived with contradictions dressed up in a popular stile, and
well-turned periods: for if any one will be at the pains, himself, in
those parts, which are here untouched, to strip Sir Robert's discourses
of the flourish of doubtful expressions, and endeavour to reduce his
words to direct, positive, intelligible propositions, and then compare
them one with another, he will quickly be satisfied, there was never so
much glib nonsense put together in well-sounding English. If he think it
not worth while to examine his works all thro', let him make an
experiment in that part, where he treats of usurpation; and let him try,
whether he can, with all his skill, make Sir Robert intelligible, and
consistent with himself, or common sense. I should not speak so plainly
of a gentleman, long since past answering, had not the pulpit, of late
years, publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the current divinity of
the times. It is necessary those men, who taking on them to be teachers,
have so dangerously misled others, should be openly shewed of what
authority this their Patriarch is, whom they have so blindly followed,
that so they may either retract what upon so ill grounds they have
vented, and cannot be maintained; or else justify those principles which
they preached up for gospel; though they had no better an author than an
English courtier: for I should not have writ against Sir Robert, or taken
the pains to shew his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of (what he so
much boasts of, and pretends wholly to build on) scripture-proofs, were
there not men amongst us, who, by crying up his books, and espousing his
doctrine, save me from the reproach of writing against a dead adversary.
They have been so zealous in this point, that, if I have done him any
wrong, I cannot hope they should spare me. I wish, where they have done
the truth and the public wrong, they would be as ready to redress it, and
allow its just weight to this reflection, viz. that there cannot be done
a greater mischief to prince and people, than the propagating wrong
notions concerning government; that so at last all times might not have
reason to complain of the Drum Ecclesiastic. If any one, concerned
really for truth, undertake the confutation of my Hypothesis, I promise
him either to recant my mistake, upon fair conviction; or to answer his
difficulties. But he must remember two things.
First, That cavilling here and there, at some expression, or little
incident of my discourse, is not an answer to my book.
Secondly, That I shall not take railing for arguments, nor think
either of these worth my notice, though I shall always look on myself as
bound to give satisfaction to any one, who shall appear to be
conscientiously scrupulous in the point, and shall shew any just grounds
for his scruples.
I have nothing more, but to advertise the reader, that Observations
stands for Observations on Hobbs, Milton, &c. and that a bare quotation
of pages always means pages of his Patriarcha, Edition 1680.
OF CIVIL-GOVERNMENT
Book II
Chap. I. Sect. 1. It having been shewn in the foregoing discourse,
1. That Adam had not, either by natural right of fatherhood, or by
positive donation from God, any such authority over his children, or
dominion over the world, as is pretended:
2. That if he had, his heirs, yet, had no right to it:
3. That if his heirs had, there being no law of nature nor positive
law of God that determines which is the right heir in all cases that may
arise, the right of succession, and consequently of bearing rule, could
not have been certainly determined:
4. That if even that had been determined, yet the knowledge of which
is the eldest line of Adam's posterity, being so long since utterly lost,
that in the races of mankind and families of the world, there remains not
to one above another, the least pretence to be the eldest house, and to
have the right of inheritance:
All these premises having, as I think, been clearly made out, it is
impossible that the rulers now on earth should make any benefit, or
derive any the least shadow of authority from that, which is held to be
the fountain of all power, Adam's private dominion and paternal
jurisdiction; so that he that will not give just occasion to think that
all government in the world is the product only of force and violence,
and that men live together by no other rules but that of beasts, where
the strongest carries it, and so lay a foundation for perpetual disorder
and mischief, tumult, sedition and rebellion, (things that the followers
of that hypothesis so loudly cry out against) must of necessity find out
another rise of government, another original of political power, and
another way of designing and knowing the persons that have it, than what
Sir Robert Filmer hath taught us.
Sect. 2. To this purpose, I think it may not be amiss, to set down
what I take to be political power; that the power of a MAGISTRATE over a
subject may be distinguished from that of a FATHER over his children, a
MASTER over his servant, a HUSBAND over his wife, and a LORD over his
slave. All which distinct powers happening sometimes together in the
same man, if he be considered under these different relations, it may
help us to distinguish these powers one from wealth, a father of a
family, and a captain of a galley.
Sect. 3. POLITICAL POWER, then, I take to be a RIGHT of making laws
with penalties of death, and consequently all less penalties, for the
regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the
community, in the execution of such laws, and in the defence of the
common-wealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the public
good.
C H A P. II.
Of the State of Nature.
Sect. 4. TO understand political power right, and derive it from its
original, we must consider, what state all men are naturally in, and that
is, a state of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of
any other man. A state also of equality, wherein all the power and
jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another; there being
nothing more evident, than that creatures of the same species and rank,
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of nature, and the use of
the same faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without
subordination or subjection, unless the lord and master of them all
should, by any manifest declaration of his will, set one above another,
and confer on him, by an evident and clear appointment, an undoubted
right to dominion and sovereignty.
Sect. 5. This equality of men by nature, the judicious Hooker looks
upon as so evident in itself, and beyond all question, that he makes it
the foundation of that obligation to mutual love amongst men, on which he
builds the duties they owe one another, and from whence he derives the
great maxims of justice and charity. His words are, The like natural
inducement hath brought men to know that it is no less their duty, to
love others than themselves; for seeing those things which are equal,
must needs all have one measure; if I cannot but wish to receive good,
even as much at every man's hands, as any man can wish unto his own soul,
how should I look to have any part of my desire herein satisfied, unless
myself be careful to satisfy the like desire, which is undoubtedly in
other men, being of one and the same nature? To have any thing offered
them repugnant to this desire, must needs in all respects grieve them as
much as me; so that if I do harm, I must look to suffer, there being no
reason that others should shew greater measure of love to me, than they
have by me shewed unto them: my desire therefore to be loved of my equals
in nature as much as possible may be, imposeth upon me a natural duty of
bearing to them-ward fully the like affection; from which relation of
equality between ourselves and them that are as ourselves, what several
rules and canons natural reason hath drawn, for direction of life, no man
is ignorant, Eccl. Pol. Lib. 1.
Sect. 6. But though this be a state of liberty, yet it is not a state
of licence: though man in that state have an uncontroulable liberty to
dispose of his person or possessions, yet he has not liberty to destroy
himself, or so much as any creature in his possession, but where some
nobler use than its bare preservation calls for it. The state of nature
has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that
being all equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his
life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship
of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order, and about his
business; they are his property, whose workmanship they are, made to last
during his, not one another's pleasure: and being furnished with like
faculties, sharing all in one community of nature, there cannot be
supposed any such subordination among us, that may authorize us to
destroy one another, as if we were made for one another's uses, as the
inferior ranks of creatures are for our's. Every one, as he is bound to
preserve himself, and not to quit his station wilfully, so by the like
reason, when his own preservation comes not in competition, ought he, as
much as he can, to preserve the rest of mankind, and may not, unless it
be to do justice on an offender, take away, or impair the life, or what
tends to the preservation of the life, the liberty, health, limb, or
goods of another.
Sect. 7. And that all men may be restrained from invading others
rights, and from doing hurt to one another, and the law of nature be
observed, which willeth the peace and preservation of all mankind, the
execution of the law of nature is, in that state, put into every man's
hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that
law to such a degree, as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature
would, as all other laws that concern men in this world 'be in vain, if
there were no body that in the state of nature had a power to execute
that law, and thereby preserve the innocent and restrain offenders. And
if any one in the state of nature may punish another for any evil he has
done, every one may do so: for in that state of perfect equality, where
naturally there is no superiority or jurisdiction of one over another,
what any may do in prosecution of that law, every one must needs have a
right to do.
Sect. 8. And thus, in the state of nature, one man comes by a power
over another; but yet no absolute or arbitrary power, to use a criminal,
when he has got him in his hands, according to the passionate heats, or
boundless extravagancy of his own will; but only to retribute to him, so
far as calm reason and conscience dictate, what is proportionate to his
transgression, which is so much as may serve for reparation and
restraint: for these two are the only reasons, why one man may lawfully
do harm to another, which is that we call punishment. In transgressing
the law of nature, the offender declares himself to live by another rule
than that of reason and common equity, which is that measure God has set
to the actions of men, for their mutual security; and so he becomes
dangerous to mankind, the tye, which is to secure them from injury and
violence, being slighted and broken by him. Which being a trespass
against the whole species, and the peace and safety of it, provided for
by the law of nature, every man upon this score, by the right he hath to
preserve mankind in general, may restrain, or where it is necessary,
destroy things noxious to them, and so may bring such evil on any one,
who hath transgressed that law, as may make him repent the doing of it,
and thereby deter him, and by his example others, from doing the like
mischief. And in the case, and upon this ground, EVERY MAN HATH A RIGHT
TO PUNISH THE OFFENDER, AND BE EXECUTIONER OF THE LAW OF NATURE.
Sect. 9. 1 doubt not but this will seem a very strange doctrine to
some men: but before they condemn it, I desire them to resolve me, by
what right any prince or state can put to death, or punish an alien, for
any crime he commits in their country. It is certain their laws, by
virtue of any sanction they receive from the promulgated will of the
legislative, reach not a stranger: they speak not to him, nor, if they
did, is he bound to hearken to them. The legislative authority, by which
they are in force over the subjects of that commonwealth, hath no power
over him. Those who have the supreme power of making laws in England,
France or Holland, are to an Indian, but like the rest of the world, men
without authority: and therefore, if by the law of nature every man hath
not a power to punish offences against it, as he soberly judges the case
to require, I see not how the magistrates of any community can punish an
alien of another country; since, in reference to him, they can have no
more power than what every man naturally may have over another.
Sect, 10. Besides the crime which consists in violating the law, and
varying from the right rule of reason, whereby a man so far becomes
degenerate, and declares himself to quit the principles of human nature,
and to be a noxious creature, there is commonly injury done to some
person or other, and some other man receives damage by his transgression:
in which case he who hath received any damage, has, besides the right of
punishment common to him with other men, a particular right to seek
reparation from him that has done it: and any other person, who finds it
just, may also join with him that is injured, and assist him in
recovering from the offender so much as may make satisfaction for the
harm he has suffered.
Sect. 11. From these two distinct rights, the one of punishing the
crime for restraint, and preventing the like offence, which right of
punishing is in every body; the other of taking reparation, which belongs
only to the injured party, comes it to pass that the magistrate, who by
being magistrate hath the common right of punishing put into his hands,
can often, where the public good demands not the execution of the law,
remit the punishment of criminal offences by his own authority, but yet
cannot remit the satisfaction due to any private man for the damage he
has received. That, he who has suffered the damage has a right to demand
in his own name, and he alone can remit: the damnified person has this
power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender,
by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the
crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of
preserving all mankind, and doing all reasonable things he can in order
to that end: and thus it is, that every man, in the state of nature, has
a power to kill a murderer, both to deter others from doing the like
injury, which no reparation can compensate, by the example of the
punishment that attends it from every body, and also to secure men from
the attempts of a criminal, who having renounced reason, the common rule
and measure God hath given to mankind, hath, by the unjust violence and
slaughter he hath committed upon one, declared war against all mankind,
and therefore may be destroyed as a lion or a tyger, one of those wild
savage beasts, with whom men can have no society nor security: and upon
this is grounded that great law of nature, Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by
man shall his blood be shed. And Cain was so fully convinced, that every
one had a right to destroy such a criminal, that after the murder of his
brother, he cries out, Every one that findeth me, shall slay me; so plain
was it writ in the hearts of all mankind.
Sect. 12. By the same reason may a man in the state of nature punish
the lesser breaches of that law. It will perhaps be demanded, with
death? I answer, each transgression may be punished to that degree, and
with so much severity, as will suffice to make it an ill bargain to the
offender, give him cause to repent, and terrify others from doing the
like. Every offence, that can be committed in the state of nature, may
in the state of nature be also punished equally, and as far forth as it
may, in a commonwealth: for though it would be besides my present
purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the law of nature, or its
measures of punishment; yet, it is certain there is such a law, and that
too, as intelligible and plain to a rational creature, and a studier of
that law, as the positive laws of commonwealths; nay, possibly plainer;
as much as reason is easier to be understood, than the fancies and
intricate contrivances of men, following contrary and hidden interests
put into words; for so truly are a great part of the municipal laws of
countries, which are only so far right, as they are founded on the law of
nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted.
Sect. 13. To this strange doctrine, viz. That in the state of nature
every one has the executive power of the law of nature, I doubt not but
it will be objected, that it is unreasonable for men to be judges in
their own cases, that self-love will make men partial to themselves and
their friends: and on the other side, that ill nature, passion and
revenge will carry them too far in punishing others; and hence nothing
but confusion and disorder will follow, and that therefore God hath
certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of
men. I easily grant, that civil government is the proper remedy for the
inconveniencies of the state of nature, which must certainly be great,
where men may be judges in their own case, since it is easy to be
imagined, that he who was so unjust as to do his brother an injury, will
scarce be so just as to condemn himself for it: but I shall desire those
who make this objection, to remember, that absolute monarchs are but men;
and if government is to be the remedy of those evils, which necessarily
follow from men's being judges in their own cases, and the state of
nature is therefore not to how much better it is than the state of
nature, where one man, commanding a multitude, has the liberty to be
judge in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever he
pleases, without the least liberty to any one to question or controul
those who execute his pleasure and in whatsoever he cloth, whether led
by reason, mistake or passion, must be submitted to7 much better it is in
the state of nature, wherein men are not bound to submit to the unjust
will of another: and if he that judges, judges amiss in his own, or any
other case, he is answerable for it to the rest of mankind.
Sect. 14. It is often asked as a mighty objection, where are, or ever
were there any men in such a state of nature? To which it may suffice as
an answer at present, that since all princes and rulers of independent
governments all through the world, are in a state of nature, it is plain
the world never was, nor ever will be, without numbers of men in that
state. I have named all governors of independent communities, whether
they are, or are not, in league with others: for it is not every compact
that puts an end to the state of nature between men, but only this one of
agreeing together mutually to enter into one community, and make one body
politic; other promises, and compacts, men may make one with another, and
yet still be in the state of nature. The promises and bargains for
truck, &c. between the two men in the desert island, mentioned by
Garcilasso de la Vega, in his history of Peru; or between a Swiss and an
Indian, in the woods of America, are binding to them, though they are
perfectly in a state of nature, in reference to one another: for truth
and keeping of faith belongs to men, as men, and not as members of
society.
Sect. 15. To those that say, there were never any men in the state of
nature, I will not only oppose the authority of the judicious Hooker,
Eccl. Pol. lib. i. sect. 10, where he says, The laws which have been
hitherto mentioned, i.e. the laws of nature, do bind men absolutely, even
as they are men, although they have never any settled fellowship, never
any solemn agreement amongst themselves what to do, or not to do: but
forasmuch as we are not by ourselves sufficient to furnish ourselves with
competent store of things, needful for such a life as our nature doth
desire, a life fit for the dignity of man; therefore to supply those
defects and imperfections which are in us, as living single and solely by
ourselves, we are naturally induced to seek communion and fellowship with
others: this was the cause of men's uniting themselves at first in
politic societies. But I moreover affirm, that all men are naturally in
that state, and remain so, till by their own consents they make
themselves members of some politic society; and I doubt not in the sequel
of this discourse, to make it very clear.
C H A P. III.
Of the State of War.
Sec. 16. THE state of war is a state of enmity and destruction: and
therefore declaring by word or action, not a passionate and hasty, but a
sedate settled design upon another man's life, puts him in a state of war
with him against whom he has declared such an intention, and so has
exposed his life to the other's power to be taken away by him, or any one
that joins with him in his defence, and espouses his quarrel; it being
reasonable and just, I should have a right to destroy that which
threatens me with destruction: for, by the fundamental law of nature, man
being to be preserved as much as possible, when all cannot be preserved,
the safety of the innocent is to be preferred: and one may destroy a man
who makes war upon him, or has discovered an enmity to his being, for the
same reason that he may kill a wolf or a lion; because such men are not
under the ties of the commonlaw of reason, have no other rule, but that
of force and violence, and so may be treated as beasts of prey, those
dangerous and noxious creatures, that will be sure to destroy him
whenever he falls into their power.
Sec. 17. And hence it is, that he who attempts to get another man into
his absolute power, does thereby put himself into a state of war with
him; it being to be understood as a declaration of a design upon his
life: for I have reason to conclude, that he who would get me into his
power without my consent, would use me as he pleased when he had got me
there, and destroy me too when he had a fancy to it; for no body can
desire to have me in his absolute power, unless it be to compel me by
force to that which is against the right of my freedom, i.e. make me a
slave. To be free from such force is the only security of my
preservation; and reason bids me look on him, as an enemy to my
preservation, who would take away that freedom which is the fence to it;
so that he who makes an attempt to enslave me, thereby puts himself into
a state of war with me. He that, in
the state of nature, would take away the freedom that belongs to any one
in that state, must necessarily be supposed to have a design to take away
every thing else, that freedom being the foundation of all the rest; as
he that, in the state of society, would take away the freedom belonging
to those of that society or commonwealth, must be supposed to design to
take away from them every thing else, and so be looked on as in a state
of war.
Sec. 18. This makes it lawful for a man to kill a thief, who has not
in the least hurt him, nor declared any design upon his life, any farther
than, by the use of force, so to get him in his power, as to take away
his money, or what he pleases, from him; because using force, where he
has no right, to get me into his power, let his pretence be what it will,
I have no reason to suppose, that he, who would take away my liberty,
would not, when he had me in his power, take away every thing else. And
therefore it is lawful for me to treat him as one who has put himself
into a state of war with me, i.e. kill him if I can; for to that hazard
does he justly expose himself, whoever introduces a state of war, and is
aggressor in it.
Sec. 19. And here we have the plain difference between the state of
nature and the state of war, which however some men have confounded, are
as far distant, as a state of peace, good will, mutual assistance and
preservation, and a state of enmity, malice, violence and mutual
destruction, are one from another. Men living together according to
reason, without a common superior on earth, with authority to judge
between them, is properly the state of nature. But force, or a declared
design of force, upon the person of another, where there is no common
superior on earth to appeal to for relief, is the state of war: and it is
the want of such an appeal gives a man the right of war even against an
aggressor, tho' he be in society and a fellow subject. Thus a thief,
whom I cannot harm, but by appeal to the law, for having stolen all that
I am worth, I may kill, when he sets on me to rob me but of my horse or
coat; because the law, which was made for my preservation, where it
cannot interpose to secure my life from present force, which, if lost, is
capable of no reparation, permits me my own defence, and the right of
war, a liberty to kill the aggressor, because the aggressor allows not
time to appeal to our common judge, nor the decision of the law, for
remedy in a case where the mischief may be irreparable. Want of a common
judge with authority, puts all men in a state of nature: force without
right, upon a man's person, makes a state of war, both where there is,
and is not, a common judge.
Sec. 20. But when the actual force is over, the state of war ceases
between those that are in society, and are equally on both sides
subjected to the fair determination of the law; because then there lies
open the remedy of appeal for the past injury, and to prevent future
harm: but where no such appeal is, as in the state of nature, for want of
positive laws, and judges with authority to appeal to, the state of war
once begun, continues, with a right to the innocent party to destroy the
other whenever he can, until the aggressor offers peace, and desires
reconciliation on such terms as may repair any wrongs he has already
done, and secure the innocent for the future; nay, where an appeal to the
law, and constituted judges, lies open, but the remedy is denied by a
manifest perverting of justice, and a barefaced wresting of the laws to
protect or indemnify the violence or injuries of some men, or party of
men, there it is hard to imagine any thing but a state of war: for
wherever violence is used, and injury done, though by hands appointed to
administer justice, it is still violence and injury, however coloured
with the name, pretences, or forms of law, the end whereof being to
protect and redress the innocent, by an unbiassed application of it, to
all who are under it; wherever that is not bona fide done, war is made
upon the sufferers, who having no appeal on earth to right them, they are
left to the only remedy in such cases, an appeal to heaven.
Sec. 21. To avoid this state of war (wherein there is no appeal but
to heaven, and wherein every the least difference is apt to end, where
there is no authority to decide between the contenders) is one great
reason of men's putting themselves into society, and quitting the state
of nature: for where there is an authority, a power on earth, from which
relief can be had by appeal, there the continuance of the state of war is
excluded, and the controversy is decided by that power. Had there been
any such court, any superior jurisdiction on earth, to determine the
right between Jephtha and the Ammonites, they had never come to a state
of war: but we see he was forced to appeal to heaven. The Lord the Judge
(says he) be judge this day between the children of Israel and the
children of Ammon, Judg. xi. 27. and then prosecuting, and relying on
his appeal, he leads out his army to battle: and therefore in such
controversies, where the question is put, who shall be judge? It cannot
be meant, who shall decide the controversy; every one knows what Jephtha
here tells us, that the Lord the Judge shall judge. Where there is no
judge on earth, the appeal lies to God in heaven. That question then
cannot mean, who shall judge, whether another hath put himself in a state
of war with me, and whether I may, as Jephtha did, appeal to heaven in
it? of that I myself can only be judge in my own conscience, as I will
answer it, at the great day, to the supreme judge of all men.
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