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The Gatlings at Santiago

J >> John H. Parker >> The Gatlings at Santiago




In sharp contrast to the 34th Michigan was the 1st U. S. Volunteer
Cavalry, the Rough Riders. This was an organization the peer of any in
the Regular Army in morale, in fighting, and in every quality that
goes to make up a fine body of soldiers. They were picked men; all
classes were shown in that organization. The tennis champion was a
private, the champion oarsman of Harvard a corporal. On the 2d of July
a stock-broker of Wall Street who can sign his check for $3,000,000
was seen haggling with a cow-puncher from the Indian Territory over a
piece of hardtack. Both were privates and both were fine soldiers. The
whole regiment was just such a medley, but fought like Regulars, and
endured like Spartans. They hung on like bull-dogs, and charged like
demons. They were as strict about the camp police as Regular Army
surgeons, and as punctilious about saluting as a K. O. on "official
relations." Withal, they were a clean-mouthed, clean-clad,
clean-camped lot of gentlemen, each in his way, from the "Hello,
pard!" of the cowboy to the frozen stare of the monocled dude from
Broadway. And they fought--like Regulars; there is no other just
comparison. Roosevelt said: "They are the 11th Cavalry." He found
enthusiastic endorsers of this remark in every Regular who saw them
fight. They were the finest body of Volunteers who ever wore uniform,
and they were stamped indelibly with the personality of Theodore
Roosevelt. Pushing, aggressive, resolute, tenacious, but self-contained,
cool, and restrained, they represented the very best type of what the
Volunteer ought to be--but often was not.

[Illustration: Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in
Spanish Fort, Silenced by Gatlings July 1, '98. 2. Rear Sight of same
Gun. 3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge
used by the Spanish Volunteers, the so-called "Explosive" Brass-covered
Bullet. 5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish Spurs.]

Above them all, however, shone out three types.

Theodore Roosevelt. He needs no eulogy from my pen. He has done
everything, and in each occupation has been conspicuously successful.
He is, however, a born soldier. His virile frame contains the vigorous
mind, the keen intellect, the cool judgment, and the unswerving,
never-hesitating courage of the natural soldier. He is affable and
courteous, or stern and scathing, as circumstances demand. One instant
genial smiles overspread his expressive countenance, whereon the
faintest emotion writes its legend with instantaneous and responsive
touch; the next, on occasion, a Jove-like sternness settles on his
face, and, with a facility of expression bewildering to less gifted
tongues, scathing invective, cutting sarcasm, or bitter irony impress
upon an offender the gravity of a breach of discipline. Withal, he is
modest. He appreciates his own power, but there is no undue display of
that appreciation, no vainglorious boasting over achievements which
read like a fairy-tale. Fittest to lead or follow, idol of every true
soldier. Who, that knows him as those who fought beside him, does not
wish to see him at the head of that army and that nation of which he
is the brightest ornament in every position, civil, military, or
political?

Woodbury Kane--social leader, Fortune's favorite, aristocratic,
refined, cultured, wealthy, _haut ton de haut ton_, and _sabreur sans
peur et sans reproche_--how shall I paint him to you as I learned to
know him in those dreadful, delightful seventeen days in which we
lived only from instant to instant, and every man unconsciously bared
his soul to his comrades because he could not help it?

A gentleman--he always looked that in the fullest sense of the word.
Well groomed; in those days when our bed was a mud-puddle and our
canopy the stars, when the music which lulled us to sleep was the hum
of the Mauser bullets and the vicious popping of the Remingtons, when
water to drink had to be brought at the peril of life for every
mouthful, Kane turned up every morning clean-shaved and neatly
groomed, shoes duly polished, neat khaki, fitting like a glove and
brushed to perfection, nails polished, and hair parted as nicely as if
he were dressed by his valet in his New York apartments. How did he do
it? We never knew. He kept no servant; he took his regular turn in the
ditches, in the mud, or torrid sun, or smothering rain. No night alarm
came that did not find Kane first to spring to the trench--and yet he
did it, somehow. The courteous phrases of politest speech fell ever
from his ready lips, as easily as they would have done in the
_boudoir_ of any belle in the metropolis. The shrieking of a shell or
tingling hiss of a sharpshooter's close-aimed bullet never came so
near as to interrupt whatever polished expression of thanks, regret,
or comment he might be uttering. And it was the real thing, too. The
gentle heart was there. No man was readier to bind a wound or aid a
sun-struck soldier in the ranks; none more ready to deny himself a
comfort or a luxury to help a more needy comrade. A braver man, a
surer or more reliable officer, never trod in shoe-leather. A grand
example to our pessimistic, socialistic friends and cheap demagogues
of the sterling worth and noble, chivalric character of a "society man
of wealth." He is a living type of _"Bel a faire peur,"_ without the
idiotic sentimentality of that maudlin hero, and with all his other
characteristics.

Greenway and Tiffany. The one a Harvard football-player, just out,
plunging into the great game of war with all the zest he formerly
found in the great college game. The other the petted son of wealthy
parents, also a college graduate, and the idolized fiance of his
childhood's sweetheart. Equally ready for fight or fun, they were the
finest type of youthful manhood to be found. Endowed by Nature with
every gift, educated at the best of colleges, bred in the best of
society, ready to enter upon the most desirable of careers, they threw
all upon the altar of country's love. They entered battle as one might
go to a game or begin a play. All of unbounded zeal, youthful
enthusiasm, restless energy, keen enjoyment--everything seemed to be
equally acceptable to them, and no discomfort ever assumed any guise
other than that of a novel and untried sensation.

They are the type of our young manhood--our representative American
youth--as Roosevelt is of its vigorous manhood. They are the salt of
the earth, and Kane--is both salt and spice. All were comrades in
arms, types of American manhood unspoiled by Fortune's favors, capable
of anything and everything. Such men mould the destiny of this great
nation, and in their hands it is safe.

But neither of these two regiments is a fair type of the Volunteers;
they are the two extremes. For a type, take the 1st Illinois. They
were a Chicago regiment with fifteen years' service, and they enlisted
in a body to a man. They reached the firing line on the 10th and
participated in the fight with two battalions, with distinguished
gallantry. The third battalion was detailed on the necessary but
unpleasant duty of caring for the yellow fever hospital at Siboney.
These city-bred Volunteers peeled off their coats, buried yellow fever
corpses, policed the hospital and hospital grounds, and nursed the
victims of the scourge. They did not utter a complaint nor ask for a
"soft" detail; they did their duty as they found it. Another battalion
was detailed immediately after the surrender to guard the Spanish
prisoners. This most thankless duty was performed by them with
fidelity and care. The commander of the battalion and half his
officers were proficient in the Spanish language as a part of their
preparation for the campaign, and they soon established cordial
relations with the prisoners they were set to guard. It was a trying
duty, but they performed it faithfully. Sickness visited this
battalion, and sometimes guard duty had to be performed with only one
day off, but they never whimpered. The other battalion was detailed
after the surrender to do stevedore work at the commissary depot. The
slender clerks and soft-handed city men slung boxes of hardtack and
sacks of bacon and barrels of coffee, and performed manual labor with
all the faithfulness that would be expected of men accustomed to such
work, and with never a complaint. The sanitary measures of this
regiment were perfect, and they bore themselves like Regulars. It is
now recognized that this is a compliment to any Volunteer
organization.




CHAPTER X.

THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.


In such a campaign as that of Santiago, a certain amount of suffering
is inevitable. In such a climate as that of southern Cuba, a certain
amount of disease is unavoidable. In the very hot-bed of yellow fever
and malaria, no army could hope to escape without contracting these
diseases; and in a campaign conducted with the marvelous celerity of
the one at Santiago, some difficulty in forwarding supplies must
necessarily be encountered.

The root of all our difficulties lay in the fact that the commanding
general had under him supply departments whose officers reported to
heads of bureaus not under control of the corps commander. This caused
unnecessary delays in obtaining supplies, entailed confusion in their
distribution, and led to suffering beyond what was necessarily the
result of the climate and the campaign.

A brief description of the method of obtaining supplies will make this
point more clear. When a given article was wanted, whether it was
soap, quinine, tentage, or transportation, a requisition upon the
chief of the proper bureau at Washington had to be made, with full
statement of the reasons for the request; this requisition had to be
approved by all intermediate commanders and go through military
channels to the chief of the bureau, who might or might not be
convinced of the necessity for the article wanted. His action being
endorsed thereon, the requisition returned through the same devious
route, and possibly might be followed in course of time, either by
invoices from some distant purchasing agent of the required articles,
or by directions of the bureau chief to make further explanations. The
usual length of time allowed for an official communication through
military channels, in time of peace at home, from any regimental
headquarters to Washington and return, is from ten to thirty days.
Here was the first cause of suffering.

If the heads of the supply departments in the field, beginning at
Tampa, could have acted promptly upon the orders of their respective
commanding officers, without the action of any other authority,
unnecessary delay would have been avoided.

To illustrate this point: The Gatling Gun Detachment was ordered to be
equipped with revolvers upon reporting to the detachment commander,
and this order was issued on the 11th of June, before sailing from
Port Tampa. They did not so report, and it devolved upon the
detachment commander to make requisition for the necessary equipment.
This was done, but no revolvers arrived. The invoices for revolvers
reached the detachment commander on the 15th of September, at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, where he was then, on leave of absence, sick, ten
days after the detachment was disbanded.

This is an extreme case, but the same difficulty was experienced in
obtaining supplies of all descriptions. It was, therefore, very
difficult for a quartermaster, a commissary, a medical officer, or any
other officer whose duty it was to obtain supplies, to have the same
when emergency demanded it. The necessity for supplies could not
always be foreseen, the quantity desired could not always be estimated
for with precision, and it followed that sometimes there was a
deficiency when the articles were needed.

[Illustration: Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.]

Again, the transportation of the 5th Army Corps could not be made
available at first to carry supplies up from the landing-place. The
troops had drawn travel rations, which lasted them until they
disembarked. The first supply problem, upon landing, was that of
issuing rations; and, at the moment when every available boat was
engaged in carrying troops ashore, it became necessary to put rations
ashore also. The exigency demanded the speedy disembarkation of the
greatest possible number of men. The fight of La Guasimas emphasized
the necessity of getting men to the front. It was no time to delay the
movement of troops for the purpose of waiting on wagons, tentage, or
rations. The safety of the expedition, the fate of the whole campaign,
depended upon energetic and rapid movement to the front. Consequently
regiments were put forth with only such amounts of rations and tentage
as they could carry upon their backs. It will be readily seen that
this amount was very limited, and the only tentage possible was the
shelter tent.

There were 118 wagons in the hold of the Cherokee, but it was not
practicable to delay the disembarkation of the corps and hazard the
fate of the whole campaign by utilizing the only wharf and all the
boats two or three days to land these wagons. By the time they could
be taken off, the rains had made the roads almost impassable, and they
could not all be used. It was therefore a daily struggle to get enough
rations forward to feed the fighting-line from day to day. Greatly to
the credit of those who performed the duty, it can be said that, with
rare exceptions, all the soldiers of the 5th Army Corps had every day,
when they could possibly cook the same, hardtack and bacon, roast
beef, and coffee. This much was accomplished in the face of
insurmountable obstacles by the heroic exertions of the pack-train.
When the 1st of July arrived, and the battle began, it was ordered
that all soldiers carry three days' rations. The heat was intense, the
fight exceedingly hot, and marching through the jungle extremely
difficult. The consequence was that the soldiers threw aside all
impedimenta in order to fight more effectively, and, of course, the
rations went with the blankets and the overcoats. The man who held on
to a canteen and haversack was fortunate; very many abandoned the
haversack, and a considerable number abandoned everything except rifle
and ammunition. That was what won the fight; but it made hungry men,
and it caused men to sleep on the wet ground under the open sky,
without blankets or tentage. The pack-train continued its magnificent
work. During the fighting it had to bring ammunition. The men were
supposed to have three days' rations. As soon as the deficiency became
known to the higher officials, the pack-train began to bring food.
Commissary depots were established immediately in rear of the
firing-line, and issues of hardtack, bacon, and coffee, which were
about the only components of the ration that could be brought forward
in sufficient quantities, were made without formality or red tape. It
was almost impossible to get a sufficient quantity of even these
components to the front. Sometimes the ration was a little short.
Bacon and hardtack for seventeen consecutive days, after three weeks
of travel ration, do not form the most appetizing diet in the world.
The exposure consequent upon the fighting and lack of tentage had its
inevitable result in sickness.

The same difficulties which had beset the quartermaster and commissary
departments were also encountered by the surgeons. Hospital
accommodations were scanty, the quantity of medicines available was
very limited, the number of wounded men disproportionately large, and,
when sickness was added to the wounds, the small number of surgeons
available at the front were not able to give the individual attention
and scientific treatment which forms a part of our admirable medical
system in time of peace. There were only three or four ambulances
available until after the 11th of July. A considerable number of the
surgeons were on duty at the general hospitals far in the rear; the
number at the front was not sufficient to attend to all the duties
which devolved upon them. This deplorable condition reacted, causing a
greater amount of illness. To add to this difficulty, the Volunteers
began to suffer excessively from the results of their own ignorance
and carelessness; and when the yellow fever scourge was added to all
the other difficulties which beset the 5th Corps, the outlook became
gloomy.

The attempt has been made in the foregoing exposition of the
conditions at Santiago to represent fairly the difficulties under
which all parts of the army labored. The fact remains, nevertheless,
that there was an appalling amount of suffering due to causes which
might have been foreseen and which were easily preventable.

[Illustration: Undergrowth in Cuba.]

On the 18th day of July the transports entered the harbor of Santiago.
From that day forward there was unlimited wharfage at disposal, and
there were excellent macadamized roads leading to all parts of the
command. The fall of Santiago had been foreseen more than a week, and
if there was not a sufficient quantity of wagons present on board the
ships, there had been ample time to make telegraphic requisition for
them to Washington. Up to the surrender, the suffering from sickness
had been exceedingly light. There was something stimulating about the
nervous strain and excitement of the time which kept the men up to
their work; but the inadequacy of the medical supplies on hand had
been amply demonstrated by the 10th. and it had become fully apparent
that the medical corps was unable to handle the number of patients on
hand. The previous remark about the practicability of telegraphing to
headquarters for additional force applies to this department also.

The principal sufferings after the surrender were due to four causes:
first, improper clothes; second, improper food; third, lack of
shelter; fourth, lack of proper medical attention.

In regard to clothing and these other necessaries, it should be borne
in mind that the corps which went to Santiago was virtually the
Regular Army. Every regiment which went to Tampa went there ready for
service. Its equipment was just as complete on the 26th of April as it
was on the 6th of June. There should have been no problems to solve in
regard to them--and yet there were many.


First--Clothing.

The troops wore the same clothing to Cuba they had brought from
Sheridan, Assinniboine, and Sherman. They wore winter clothing for
their service in the torrid zone, and those who received summer
clothing at all received it late in August, just in time to return to
the bracing breezes of Montauk Point, where, in their enfeebled
condition, winter clothing would have been more suitable. It did not
require a professor of hygiene to foresee that the winter clothing
used in northern Michigan would not be suitable for campaigning in
southern Cuba in July; or that summer clothing suitable for southern
Cuba would be too light for men returning to the northern part of Long
Island. Is it to be concluded that it was impossible to obtain summer
clothing for 18,000 men between the 26th of April and the 6th of June?


Second--Improper Food.

Most of the troops were embarked upon the transports by the 10th of
June. Their food on transport consisted of the travel ration: canned
roast beef, canned baked beans, canned tomatoes, and hardtack, with
coffee, were the components. They subsisted upon this food, imprisoned
in fetid holds of foul transports, unfit for the proper transportation
of convicts, until the 25th day of June, when they disembarked. On
drawing rations for the field it was found that the field ration would
be of the same components, with the addition of bacon and minus the
baked beans and tomatoes. During the emergency, up to include the 18th
day of July, this was the ration. Occasionally a few cans of tomatoes
found their way to camp, but rarely. The ration was always short,
such as it was, but this the soldiers could have endured and did
endure without a murmur.

But on the 18th of July, with unlimited wharfage at a distance of two
miles and a half, with excellent roads, and with abundance of
transportation (see Gen. Shafter's Official Report), and with
surrender foreknown for a sufficient length of time to have brought
any quantity of vegetables from New York City, the ration continued to
be bacon, canned beef, hardtack, and coffee. Finally, about the 25th
of July, small amounts of soft bread began to be doled out, and an
occasional issue of frozen fresh beef was made. It was soon
demonstrated that not sufficient fresh beef could be made available.
The vegetables which had been brought had nearly all spoiled on the
transports. Hundreds of barrels of potatoes and onions were unloaded
upon the docks and were so badly decayed as to make them useless.
These vegetables had been drifting about the Caribbean Sea and upon
the Atlantic Ocean since the 9th and 10th of June. Occasionally it was
practicable to get a quarter or a half ration of potatoes and half of
the usual allowance of canned tomatoes, but that was all.

It did not require a professor of hygienic dietetics to predict that
men fed in the tropics upon a diet suited to the icy shores of
Greenland would become ill, especially when they were clad in a manner
suited to the climate of Labrador. Are we to conclude that it was
impossible to get rice, beans, canned fruits, canned corn, and other
vegetables to take the place of potatoes and onions?

[Illustration: Cuban Residence.]


Third--Lack of Shelter.

The allowance of tentage was prescribed for each regiment. Granted
that it was impossible to get tentage up until after the surrender;
yet it should have been practicable to forward tentage over two and
one-half miles of macadamized roads. Yet whole regiments remained
without tentage until they embarked for the United States. The 13th
Infantry did not get tentage until the 5th of August. The 20th
Infantry and the 3d Infantry obtained a portion of their tentage about
the same time, but a large part of these regiments remained under
shelter tents until they reembarked. The 1st Illinois and the 34th
Michigan remained in shelter tents until the 15th of August, at which
time the author embarked for the United States. These regiments are
fair examples.

The Gatling Gun Detachment was provided with shelter-halves and
remained under them until the 10th of August. Repeated applications
for proper tentage were made, accompanied by medical certificates that
the issue of tentage was imperatively necessary for the health of the
command. Endorsements thereon by the chief quartermaster of the 5th
Corps as late as the 5th of August show that there was no available
tentage for issue. Application was made to the regimental commander,
13th Infantry, for a portion of regimental tentage for the detachment
of the 13th Infantry; but, in spite of the fact that the reduced
regiment had on hand all the canvas prescribed for the full regiment,
none could be obtained for the detachment. The detachment commander
was entirely without tentage from the 25th of June until the 5th of
August--forty-five days in the rainy season in Cuba, exposed to the
torrid sun by day, to chilling dews by night, and the drenching rains
of the afternoon, without shelter from any inclemencies of the
weather, and this in spite of repeated applications to proper
authorities for the suitable allowance of tentage. Is it any wonder
that men grew sick, and that death stalked broadcast through the camp
of the 5th Corps, under these conditions?


Fourth--Lack of Proper Medical Attendance.

The surgeons who were at the front with the firing-line worked
heroically, but were burdened beyond their physical powers. Owing to
the foregoing causes, great numbers of men became ill as soon as the
strain and tension of the battle were relieved. It was not uncommon to
find twenty or twenty-five per cent of a command on the sick-report,
and in some cases the sick-list went as high as fifty per cent. There
were no well men in the 5th Army Corps. Those who refused to go on the
sick-report were, nevertheless, sick. The author has yet to find a
single member of the expedition who did not suffer from the climatic
fever. The surgeons themselves were not exempt, and the very limited
supply of doctors was speedily decreased by sickness. Were there no
doctors in the United States who were willing to come to Cuba?

Up to the 25th of July the supply of medicines was very deficient.
There was never a sufficient supply of ambulances. The accommodations
in the hospitals were even worse than those on the firing-line. A sick
soldier on the firing-line could always find some comrade who would
cut green boughs or gather grass for a bed, but the one who went to
the hospital had to lie on the ground. The supply of hospital cots was
ridiculously inadequate, and this condition did not improve.

The difficulty of obtaining adequate medical attendance may be
illustrated by the case of Priv. Fred C. Elkins, of the 17th Infantry,
member of the Gatling Gun Detachment. Priv. Elkins had been hurt in
the fight on the 1st of July and had been sent to the hospital. He
found the accommodations so wretched that he feigned improvement and
returned to his detachment. He remained with the detachment until the
14th of July, improving so far as his injury was concerned, but
contracted the climatic fever. During this time he was prescribed for
twice by the assistant surgeon with the Rough Riders, Dr. Thorpe,
previous to the time this regiment was moved westward on the
firing-line. His condition became worse, and on the 12th of July Dr.
Brewer, 1st lieutenant and assistant surgeon with the 10th Cavalry,
was called upon to examine him. This surgeon had then under treatment
over 100 cases pertaining to his proper command, and was himself ill,
but he readily came and inspected the patient. He promised to send
medicines for him, but in the rush of overwork forgot to do so, and on
the 13th of July he was again summoned. This time he sent a hospital
attendant to take the patient's temperature, which was 104 degrees. No
medicines were sent. On the 14th of July the patient became delirious.
The detachment commander went in person to request the same surgeon to
attend to the case, he being the only one available at that time. The
hospital attendant was again ordered to take the temperature. At the
end of an hour even this had been neglected. The hospital man was
sick, and had been without sleep for fifty hours. Priv. Elkins was put
upon a board and carried to Brewer's tent, with his descriptive list
in his pocket. The surgeon was told the name of the patient and the
facts that he was related to a distinguished family and had been
recommended for a commission for gallantry upon the field of battle.
Dr. Brewer was himself suffering at the time, with a temperature of
103 degrees, but he rose from his own sick-bed and administered
remedies which relieved the patient. The following day, the third of
his illness, Dr. Brewer was found to be suffering from yellow fever,
and was carried back to the yellow fever hospital at Siboney along
with Priv. Elkins. He had been sick all the time, but had done his
best. Priv. Elkins improved sufficiently to write a letter to his
commanding officer from the hospital at Siboney, on the 25th of July,
which reached that officer at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on the 12th
day of September. In spite of the fact that the patient was furnished
with descriptive list, and was specially commended to the care of the
surgeon as a soldier marked for extreme gallantry, all trace of him
had been lost; and although two private detectives were searching for
him a month, no further clew had been found to his whereabouts or fate
as late as the 1st of October. Even if his descriptive list had not
been furnished with this man, the fact that he was alive and rational
enough on the 25th day of July to write a letter concerning his
approaching discharge should have made it easy for some record of his
case to have been kept.

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