The Gatlings at Santiago
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John H. Parker >> The Gatlings at Santiago
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I acted on Col. Derby's advice, and he promised to send me word when
the moment for proper action came. This was necessary, as I knew only
part of the plan of battle and might have jeopardized other parts of
prematurely exposing our strength at this point. The gun crews lay
down under their guns and steadily remained at this posts. The fire
finally grew so hot that I moved about 100 yards back. This was about
12, noon. At 1 p. m., or about that time, I received a message sent by
Col. Derby, I think, as follows: "Gen. Shafter directs that you give
one of your guns to Lieut. Miley, take the others forward beyond the
ford where the dynamite gun is, and go into action at the best point
you can find." I obeyed the order, giving Lieut. Miley Sergeant
Weigle's gun and crew and moving the rest forward at a gallop to the
point beyond the ford, which I had already selected as a good place.
The battery opened with three guns simultaneously at ranges of 600 to
800 yards at 1:15 p. m. The enemy at first concentrated his fire upon
us, but soon weakened and in five minutes was clambering from his
trenches and running to the rear. We fired as rapidly as possible upon
the groups thus presented until I saw a white handkerchief waved by
some one of my own regiment, the 13th Infantry, and at the same moment
Capt. Landis, 1st Cavalry, who had voluntarily assisted me throughout,
said: "Better stop; our own men are climbing up the ridge." I ordered
the fire to cease at 1:23 1/2 p.m., and a moment later saw our own
troops occupy the crest of the hill. The firing had been, continued by
the battery until our own troops were within 150 yards of the enemy's
trench, a fact made possible by the steep slope of the hill upon which
the enemy had been.
At the time when my battery went into action I had no support, and the
position I took was at least 100 yards in front of any of our troops
along this part of the line. About the time I ceased firing
Lieut.-Col. Baldwin, 10th Cavalry, put two troops in support of my
battery.
I have advanced in a letter to the Adjutant General from Fort
Leavenworth, dated January 1st, 1898, the theory that such guns as
these can be used offensively. The conditions of this assault were
favorable, the morale of my men superb, and the use made of the guns
followed the theory therein set forth with the exactness of a
mathematical demonstration. The infantry and cavalry had been pounding
away for two hours on these positions; in eight and one-half minutes
after the Gatlings opened the works were ours. Inspired by the
friendly rattle of the machine guns, our own troops rose to the
charge; while the enemy amazed by our sudden and tremendous increase
of fire, first diverted his fire to my battery, and then, unable to
withstand the hail of bullets, augmented by the moral effect of our
battery fire and the charging line, broke madly from his safe trenches
and was mercilessly cut by fire from these guns during his flight.
I at once limbered up and took stock of my losses. One man was killed,
one badly wounded, one mule hit twice, but not much injured, and
several men were missing.
Suddenly the fire was resumed at the front. I moved my three pieces
forward again at a gallop, and went into action on the skirmish line
on top of the captured position, with two pieces to the right and one
to the left of the main road from El Poso to Santiago. I was compelled
to make the skirmishers give way to the right and left in order to get
room for my guns on the firing-line, and to impress stragglers to
carry ammunition. Capt. Ayres, 10th Cavalry, gave me a detail of one
sergeant and two privates, all of whom did fine service. It seemed to
me that the enemy was trying to retake the position. About 4 to 4:14
p. m. I saw a body, apparently about 400, of the enemy to the right
front of my position, apparently in front of the position occupied by
Lieut.-Col. Roosevelt with the 1st Volunteer Cavalry. I turned a
Gatling gun on them, using 600-yard range, and they disappeared. Soon
after the firing sensibly slackened.
In the rapid fire on this last body of the enemy I had overheated one
piece, and it went temporarily out of action. I went over to Col.
Roosevelt's position, about a quarter of a mile to the right of a
salient, and reconnoitered. While there Sergeant Weigle reported to me
with his piece, informing me that Lieut. Miley had not put it into
action, and asked for instructions. This was about the hour of 5 p.
m., and the fire became warmer at that moment. I directed Sergeant
Weigle to run his piece up on the firing-line and to report to the
officer in charge thereof. He did so and went into action at once.
Col. Roosevelt, who was and remained present, informs me that the gun
was very effectively used. I rejoined my other two guns and put both
of them on the line at the left of the El Poso road. At sundown the
enemy made a sharp attack, and all three of my guns were effectively
used. During the fight a battery in the city opened on my two guns,
firing 16 cm. shells. I at once turned my guns on it and kept up so
warm a fire that the cannoneers left their battery and did not return.
In all they had fired three shells at us, all of which broke just over
or beyond the battery. I secured the fuse of one, still warm, and
after the surrender visited the battery which had fired at us and
examined the gun. It is a 16 cm. (6.2992 inches) bronze rifle gun in
barbette on a pintle. This is probably the first time in land fighting
that such a piece was ever silenced by machine-gun fire. The range I
used was 2,000 yards (estimated).
The guns were used during the remainder of the fighting in the
trenches. I took off the wheels and put the guns on the carriages in
emplacements, erecting a sandbag parapet in front as cover during the
night of July 4th. The disabled gun was brought up and repaired,
subsequently participating in the fighting. The dynamite gun, under
Sergeant Borrowe, 1st Volunteer Cavalry, cooperated with the battery
thus formed, and the whole battery, including the two Colt automatic
rapid-fire guns under Lieut. Tiffany, 1st United States Volunteer
Cavalry, did good work in all the subsequent fighting. I supplied
about eight thousand rounds of captured Mauser cartridges to Tiffany,
which had been captured by my battery, and which he used effectively
in his Colt's guns. I had a strong fire directed upon a battery of
seven pieces of the enemy's artillery at a distance of 1,500 yards in
front every time any attempt was made to use this battery. The result
was that only three shots were fired from these guns after July 4th. I
visited this battery after the surrender and found every gun in
working order, the 16 cm. gun being actually loaded. As no
organization, except my battery, of which I had general direction, had
such orders, so far as I can learn, the conclusion is that this
battery of machine guns kept out of action seven pieces of the enemy's
artillery by making it too warm for his gunners to stay in their
batteries.
I have made certain recommendations in hasty reports for gallantry,
which I personally witnessed. They were as follows:
Capt. J. R. F. Landis, 1st Cavalry, medal of honor. Volunteered to
assist observation of fire July 1st, and rendered great service at
imminent peril of his life made necessary in order to render such
service.
Sergeant John N. Weigle, 9th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S. Army
(regulars). For conspicuous daring, intelligence, and coolness in
action, July 1st.
Corporal Charles C. Steigenwald, 13th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant U. S.
Army (regulars). For coolness and judgment in keeping his gun in
action with only one man to help on July 1st.
Private Fred C. Elkins, 17th Infantry, 2d Lieutenant United States
Volunteers. For conspicuous daring and courage in action. Although
wounded, he remained at his post until he fell from exhaustion, July
1st.
Corporal Matthew Doyle, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous
gallantry and coolness in action. When, two men had been shot down by
his side he continued to work his gun effectively alone until
assistance arrived, July 1st.
Sergt. Green, Company H, 13th Infantry, medal of honor. Conspicuous
coolness and steadiness in handling his piece under hot fire, July
1st.
Sergt. John Graham, 10th Cavalry, medal of honor. Conspicuous coolness
and steadiness under fire, July 1st.
Sergt. Weischaar, Company A, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit.
Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being put on
outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having been
alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy's
approach, he coolly reserved his fire for personal investigation and
prevented a violation of the truce.
Sergt. Ryder, Company G, 13th Infantry, certificate of merit.
Particularly meritorious steadiness, night of July 6th. Being on
outpost duty with a Gatling gun in time of truce, and having been
alarmed by a sentinel, whose duty it was to warn him of the enemy's
approach, he coolly held his fire for personal investigation and
prevented a violation of the truce.
In making these recommendations, I have limited myself to those which
I personally observed. If I recommended for every deserving act, there
is not a man in my whole detachment who has not deserved a certificate
of merit. They were selected in the beginning from an army corps for
what I knew of them, and they have abundantly justified my confidence
in them. With a less efficient personnel it would have been absolutely
impossible to organize, equip and instruct the first battery of
Gatling guns ever used in the history of war, in the short space of
time allotted me, and put it in efficient fighting shape. They fought
their guns on the skirmish line and in advance of it, standing boldly
up to do it when the skirmishers themselves lay down close for cover.
My loss, as footed up on the night of July 1st, was 33 1-3 per cent,
killed, wounded, and missing. The efficiency of the work of my guns
was attested to me by numerous Spanish officers and prisoners. Their
favorite expression was: "It was terrible when your guns opened,
always. They went b-r-r-r-r, like a lawn mower cutting the grass over
our trenches. We could not stick a finger up when you fired without
getting it cut off--so!"
The work of this experimental battery proves that in this weapon we
have a new arm supplementary to infantry and cavalry, independent of
both as one arm is of another, and more nearly capable of independent
action than any other arm of the service. It is equally demonstrated
that this new arm is entirely different from artillery in its
functions, and can live where the latter is compelled to retire.
It should, therefore, be organized as a separate arm. I have, at the
request of General Wheeler, drawn up a scheme of such an organization
and submitted it to him.
Experience shows me that the carriage is too heavy. I can only renew
the representations contained in my letter of January 1, 1898, to the
Adjutant General, accompanying drawing, etc., of my proposed carriage
for machine guns. I would now, based on experience, modify my theory
of organization as then proposed, and would make several changes in
the model of carriage then proposed without departing from the general
principles.
If any expression of such views is desired, I shall be very glad to
submit them when called upon by the War Department to do so.
Very respectfully,
John H. Parker,
2d Lieut., 13th Infantry,
Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment, 5th Corps.
INDEX.
CHAPTER I.
L'ENVOI.
Record of the Detachment
The New Arm of the Service
CHAPTER II.
INCEPTION OF THE SCHEME.
Conditions at Tampa
Florida Climate and its Effects
Description of the Gatling Gun
Difficulties Encountered
Politics at Tampa
First Efforts to obtain Authority
Original Plan of Organization
Tactical Employment of Machine Guns
A Lucky Accident
The First Detail
CHAPTER III.
THE ORDNANCE DEPOT.
Defects in the Guns
Instruction of the Detachment
Status of the Detachment
Interview with General Wheeler
General Wheeler's Views
Interview with General Lee
Issues of Ordnance
Fire in the Magazine
Embarkation
CHAPTER IV.
THE VOYAGE AND DISEMBARKATION.
A Night Alarm on Transport
Decisive Interview with General Shafter
The Official Authority at Last
Condition of Transports
Disembarkation
Private J. Shiffer--Corral Boss
The Missouri Mule
The First March
CHAPTER V.
THE MARCH.
The 13th Infantry Detail
The Cuban Guide
The Cuban as He Is
Roads in Cuba
Private Jones and the Scorpion
The Medical Department
The Newspaper Fraternity
Chaplain Springer
Arrival at the Front
CHAPTER VI.
THE BATTERY IN CAMP WHEELER.
Theory and Practice of Artillery and Machine Gun
The Problem Presented to this Detachment
Personnel of the Detachment
Roster on July 1st
Captain Marcotte
Oil for an Army
Futile Plans
CHAPTER VII.
THE BATTLE.
The Plan of Battle by General Shafter
Did General Shafter Capture Santiago? HE DID
The Night Before the Battle
El Poso
The Final Instructions
The 71st New York
Waiting for the Decisive Moment
In Action at Last
The Killed and Wounded
On the Skirmish Line
Reconnaissance
Weigle Gets His Opportunity
The Gatlings Knock out a Heavy Battery
The Brunettes
The Artillery
CHAPTER VIII.
TACTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLES AT SANTIAGO.
El Caney
San Juan
Movements of Lawton's Division
The Gatlings as a Tactical Reserve
Sergeant William Tiffany
The Night Alarm
The Dynamite Gun
The Mortar Battery
Summary of Tactical Deductions on use of Machine Guns as
Demonstrated in Battle
CHAPTER IX.
THE VOLUNTEERS.
The Surrender
General Observations upon the Volunteers
The 34th Michigan
The Rough Riders
The 1st Illinois
CHAPTER X.
THE SUFFERINGS OF THE FIFTH ARMY CORPS.
The Difficulties of the Campaign
Unnecessary Sufferings; the Causes
The Case of Private Elkins
The Sick Left by Kent's Division
Some Staff--and Some Others
The Lesson to be Derived
The General Staff--Proper
CHAPTER XI.
HOME AGAIN.
The Home Voyage
The End of the Detachment
APPENDIX I
APPENDIX II
APPENDIX III
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