The Gatlings at Santiago
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John H. Parker >> The Gatlings at Santiago
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HISTORY OF THE GATLING GUN DETACHMENT
FIFTH ARMY CORPS, AT SANTIAGO,
With a Few Unvarnished Truths Concerning that Expedition.
(Short Title: The Gatlings at Santiago)
BY JOHN H. PARKER,
1st Lieut. 13th Inf.
(Late) Commanding Gatling Gun Detachment,
Fifth Army Corps, at Santiago.
DEDICATION.
To the Enlisted Members of the Detachment, Who, by Their Devotion,
Courage and Endurance, Made Its Success Possible, this Volume is
Dedicated as a Token of Esteem by the Author.
CONTENTS
I. L'envoi.
II. Inception Of The Scheme.
III. The Ordnance Depot.
IV. The Voyage And Disembarkation.
V. The March.
VI. The Battery In Camp Wheeler.
VII. The Battle.
VIII. Tactical Analysis Of The Battles At Santiago.
IX. The Volunteers.
X. The Sufferings Of The Fifth Army Corps.
XI. Home Again.
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III
Index
The photographic illustrations in this work are due to the courage and
kindness of Mr. John N. Weigle, of Gettysburg, Pa. This young man was
first sergeant of the Gatling Gun Detachment, and took with him a
large supply of material. It was his delight to photograph everything
that occurred, and his pleasure to furnish a set of photographs for
the use of the author. Mr. Weigle was recommended for a commission in
the Regular Army of the United States, for his extreme gallantry in
action, and is a magnificent type of the American youth. The thanks of
the author are tendered to him for the photographic illustrations so
generously supplied.
ILLUSTRATIONS
Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th US Infantry, Late Commanding Gatling Guns
at Santiago. (_Frontispiece_)
Map--Santiago and Surrounding Area.
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
Skirmish Drill at Tampa.
Field Bakery.
Awaiting Turn to Embark.
Baiquiri.
The "Hornet."
Waiting.
Wrecked Locomotives and Machine Shops at Baiquiri.
The Landing.
Pack Train.
Calvary Picket Line.
San Juan Hill.
Cuban Soldiers as They Were.
Wagon Train.
Gatling Battery under Artillery Fire at El Poso.
Gatling Gun on Firing-Line July 1st. (Taken under fire by Sergeant
Weigle).
Fort Roosevelt.
Sergeant Greene's Gun at Fort Roosevelt.
Skirmish Line in Battle.
Fort Roosevelt.
A Fighting Cuban, and Where He Fought.
Map--Siege Lines at Santiago.
Gatling Camp and Bomb-Proofs at Fort Roosevelt.
Tree Between Lines Showing Bullet Holes. This Tree Grew on Low Ground.
Spanish Block-House.
Spanish Fort of Three-Inch Guns.
Tentage in Cuba.
After the Rain.
Native Industry.
Charge on San Juan Hill.
Gatlings at Baiquiri Just Before Starting For the Front.
Cuban Cart used by Gatling Gun Detachment, Priv. J. Shiffer Driving.
Tiffany at his Gun in the Trench.
Relics of the Battle. 1. Range Table of 16-cm. Gun in Spanish Fort,
Silenced by Gatlings July 1, '98. 2. Rear Sight of same Gun.
3. Fuse picked up by J. Shiffer July 1. 4. Remington Cartridge used
by the Spanish Volunteers, the so-called "Explosive" Brass-covered
Bullet. 5. Piece of Coral dug up in the Trenches. 6. Spanish
Spurs.
Cieba Tree, under Which General Toral Surrendered.
Undergrowth in Cuba.
Cuban Residence.
"Reina Mercedes" Sunk by the "Iowa" near Mouth of Harbor of Santiago.
PREFACE.
On the morning of July 1st, the dismounted cavalry, including my
regiment, stormed Kettle Hill, driving the Spaniards from their
trenches. After taking the crest, I made the men under me turn and
begin volley-firing at the San Juan Blockhouse and intrenchments
against which Hawkins' and Kent's Infantry were advancing. While thus
firing, there suddenly smote on our ears a peculiar drumming sound.
One or two of the men cried out, "The Spanish machine guns!" but,
after listening a moment, I leaped to my feet and called, "It's the
Gatlings, men! It's our Gatlings!" Immediately the troopers began to
cheer lustily, for the sound was most inspiring. Whenever the drumming
stopped, it was only to open again a little nearer the front. Our
artillery, using black powder, had not been able to stand within range
of the Spanish rifles, but it was perfectly evident that the Gatlings
were troubled by no such consideration, for they were advancing all
the while.
Soon the infantry took San Juan Hill, and, after one false start, we
in turn rushed the next line of block-houses and intrenchments, and
then swung to the left and took the chain of hills immediately
fronting Santiago. Here I found myself on the extreme front, in
command of the fragments of all six regiments of the cavalry division.
I received orders to halt where I was, but to hold the hill at all
hazards. The Spaniards were heavily reinforced and they opened a
tremendous fire upon us from their batteries and trenches. We laid
down just behind the gentle crest of the hill, firing as we got the
chance, but, for the most part, taking the fire without responding. As
the afternoon wore on, however, the Spaniards became bolder, and made
an attack upon the position. They did not push it home, but they did
advance, their firing being redoubled. We at once ran forward to the
crest and opened on them, and, as we did so, the unmistakable drumming
of the Gatlings opened abreast of us, to our right, and the men
cheered again. As soon as the attack was definitely repulsed, I
strolled over to find out about the Gatlings, and there I found Lieut.
Parker with two of his guns right on our left, abreast of our men, who
at that time were closer to the Spaniards than any others.
From thence on, Parker's Gatlings were our inseparable companions
throughout the siege. They were right up at the front. When we dug our
trenches, he took off the wheels of his guns and put them in the
trenches. His men and ours slept in the same bomb-proofs and shared
with one another whenever either side got a supply of beans or coffee
and sugar. At no hour of the day or night was Parker anywhere but
where we wished him to be, in the event of an attack. If a troop of my
regiment was sent off to guard some road or some break in the lines,
we were almost certain to get Parker to send a Gatling along, and,
whether the change was made by day or by night, the Gatling went.
Sometimes we took the initiative and started to quell the fire of the
Spanish trenches; sometimes they opened upon us; but, at whatever hour
of the twenty-four the fighting began, the drumming of the Gatlings
was soon heard through the cracking of our own carbines.
[Illustration: Map--Santiago and Surrounding Area.]
I have had too little experience to make my judgment final; but
certainly, if I were to command either a regiment or a brigade,
whether of cavalry or infantry, I would try to get a Gatling
battery--under a good man--with me. I feel sure that the greatest
possible assistance would be rendered, under almost all circumstances,
by such a Gatling battery, if well handled; for I believe that it
could be pushed fairly to the front of the firing-line. At any rate,
this is the way that Lieut. Parker used his battery when he went into
action at San Juan, and when he kept it in the trenches beside the
Rough Riders before Santiago.
Theodore Roosevelt.
CHAPTER I.
L'ENVOI.
The history of the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, is to a
certain extent the history of the Santiago campaign. The detachment
was organized on the spur of the moment, to utilize material which
would otherwise have been useless, and was with the Fifth Corps in all
the campaign. It participated in all the fighting of that campaign,
except the fight at La Guasimas, and was disbanded upon the return of
the Fifth Corps to Montauk. Whatever hardships were endured by the
Fifth Corps were shared by this detachment; whatever dangers were
faced by the Fifth Corps were faced by it also; where the hottest
fighting occurred this detachment went in and stayed; and at the
surrender it was paraded, to use the words of General Shafter, "Upon
that portion of the line which it occupied so promptly and defended so
well."
But this memoir is not intended as a history of that campaign nor of
the Fifth Corps. The author has not the data available to cover so
large a field, nor the ability to do justice to the courage,
fortitude, and endurance so heroically displayed by that gallant army.
That story will be written by abler pens, and will be the wonder of
the world when it is told.
This story is that of an experiment. It is told to lay before the
general public, as well as the military critic, the work of a little
detachment of thirty-seven men, armed with an untried weapon,
organized in the short space of four days preceding July 1, 1898, and
which without proper equipment, adequate instruction, or previous
training, in the face of discouragements and sneers, and in spite of
obstacles enough to make the mere retrospect sickening, still achieved
for itself a warm place in the hearts of all true soldiers, and
covered itself with glory upon the hardest fought battle-field of the
Hispano-American War.
This story is to commemorate the gallantry of the enlisted men who
helped to make history and revolutionize tactics at Santiago. It will
tell of the heroism of the plain American Regular, who, without hope
of preferment or possibility of reward, boldly undertook to confute
the erroneous theories of military compilers, who, without originality
or reason, have unblushingly cribbed the labored efforts of foreign
officers, and foisted these compilations of second-hand opinions upon
the American Army as military text-books of authority and weight.
These literary soldiers declared, following the lead of their foreign
guides, that "The value of machine guns on the battle-field is
doubtful," and that "Their offensive value is probably very small."
They also agreed, with most touching unanimity, that "A direct assault
upon a fortified position, occupied by good, unshaken infantry, armed
with the modern rifle and plentifully supplied with ammunition is sure
to fail, unless made by overwhelming numbers and prepared by strong
and accurate fire by artillery."
These servile imitators of foreign pen soldiers were destined to see
all their pet theories exploded by the grim old mountain puma from
California and his brave Fifth Corps. They were to learn, so far as
they are capable of learning, that the American Regular makes tactics
as he needs them; that the rules of war established by pen soldiers do
not form the basis of actual operations in the field; that theories
must go to the wall before the stern logic of irrefutable facts; and
that deductions based on the drill-made automatons of European armies
are not applicable to an army composed of American Volunteer Regulars,
led by our trained officers.
We shall see that an army destitute of cavalry, and hence without
"eyes"; not supported by artillery; in the most difficult country over
which soldiers ever operated, and without maps or reconnaissance--in
twenty days shut up and captured an army of twice its own effective
strength, in a strongly fortified city, with better served and more
numerous artillery.
We shall find that when the "sledge" was not at hand, American
ingenuity was able to use the "mallet" instead, making light machine
guns perform all the function of artillery, and dispensing altogether,
so far as any practical results were concerned, with that expensive
and much overrated arm; that the Regular private is capable of meeting
all demands upon his intelligence, and that the American non. com. is
the superior of foreign officers.
It is also hoped to place before the intelligent American public some
correct ideas of the new arm which was tried thoroughly at Santiago
for the first time in the history of the world. The machine gun is the
latest practical product of American inventive genius applied to war.
The first form of this weapon tried, the mitrailleuse, was not very
successful. It failed, not on account of faults of construction, or
imperfect mechanism, but because its proper tactical employment had
not been thought out by the French army. Since that time machine guns
have been greatly improved, but no one has succeeded in making their
great value appreciated by military authorities. The failures of the
French brought the gun into disfavor, and created a prejudice against
its employment.
The Artillery of the world, which poses in every country as an
elite body of scientific fighters, and is often found on the
battle-field to be an aggregation of abstruse theorists, were jealous
and contemptuous. They said, "See how easily the artillery knocked out
machine guns at Gravelotte." The Cavalry of the world, famous
everywhere for an _esprit-du-corps_ which looks haughtily down on
all other arms of the service, were too deeply absorbed in the merits
of saber vs. revolver, and in the proper length of their
spectacular plumes, to give a second thought to this new, untried, and
therefore worthless weapon. The world's Infantry, resting upon the
assumption that it is the backbone of all armies, and the only real,
reliable fighting body under all conditions, left the consideration of
these vague dreams of mechanical destructiveness to lunatics, cranks,
and philanthropists.
In our own country the Ordnance Department, which is the trial court
before which all military inventions must appear, scouted the idea of
usefulness of machine guns even after war was declared, and adhered to
the view that machine guns, in the very nature of things, could never
be useful except in the defense of fortified positions; that they
never could be brought up on the battlefield, nor used if they were
brought up. This view was that of a prominent young officer of that
department who wrote a report on the subject, and it seemed to express
the views of the department.
This view must have been that of our War Department, for it did not
even acknowledge the receipt of drawings and specifications for a
machine gun carriage, offered freely to the Government as a gift by
the inventor six months before the war, together with the first
correct tactical outline of the proper use of machine guns ever filed
in any War Office in the world. This invention was designed to
facilitate the use of the machine gun by making its advance with the
skirmish line possible on the offensive, and was recommended by the
whole staff of the Infantry and Cavalry School as a meritorious
device, worthy of trial. The discussion filed with the invention
pointed out, for the first time, the correct tactical employment of
the weapon, and staked the military reputation and ability of the
author and inventor on the correctness of his views.
From these facts it may be gathered that there was required a certain
degree of originality and energy to get together and organize a
machine gun battery for the Santiago campaign.
The project was conceived and executed. The service rendered by this
battery has forever set at rest the question of the proper tactical
use of the machine gun arm, both on the offensive and defensive. These
things are now beyond the realm of theory. They are a demonstrated
problem. The solution is universally acknowledged to be correct.
This is the history of that detachment.
CHAPTER II.
INCEPTION.
From the 26th of April until the 6th of June, Tampa and Port Tampa
were the military centers of greatest interest in the United States.
Troops were rushed into these places on special trains and camped on
available sites, pending the organization of a proposed expedition
to--somewhere. Supplies of every description came pouring in on long
trains of express and freight cars; mounted officers and orderlies
ploughed their rushing way through great heaps and dunes of
ever-shifting sand, leaving behind them stifling clouds of
scintillating particles, which filtered through every conceivable
crevice and made the effort to breathe a suffocating nightmare. Over
all the tumultuous scene a torrid sun beat down from a cloudless sky,
while its scorching rays, reflected from the fierce sand under foot,
produced a heat so intolerable that even the tropical vegetation
looked withered and dying. In this climate officers and men, gathered
mostly from Northern posts, were to "acclimate" themselves for a
tropical campaign--somewhere.
[Illustration: Skirmish Drill at Tampa.]
They never encountered as deadly a heat, nor a more pernicious
climate, in Cuba nor in Porto Rico, than that of southern Florida. Its
first effect upon men just emerging from a bracing Northern winter was
akin to prostration. Then began to follow a decided tendency to
languor; after this one was liable to sudden attacks of bowel
troubles. The deadly malaria began to insidiously prepare the way for
a hospital cot; the patient lost flesh, relish of food became a
reminiscence, and an hour's exertion in the sun was enough to put a
man on his back for the rest of the day. Exposure to the direct action
of the sun's rays was frequently followed by nausea, a slight chill,
and then a high fever. The doctors subsequently called this "thermal
fever," which is suspected to be a high-sounding name calculated to
cover up a very dense ignorance of the nature of the disease, because
no one ever obtained any relief from it from them. Recurrence of the
exposure brought recurrence of the fever, and, if persisted in,
finally produced a severe illness.
One reason for this was that the troops continued to wear the winter
clothing they had worn on their arrival. The promised "khaki" did not
materialize. Some regiments drew the brown canvas fatigue uniform, but
the only use made of it was to put the white blanket-roll through the
legs of the trousers, thereby adding to the weight of the roll,
without perceptible benefit to the soldier.
Such a climate, under such surroundings, was not conducive to original
thought, prolonged exertion, or sustained study. Everybody felt "mean"
and was eager for a change. Nobody wanted to listen to any new
schemes. The highest ambition seemed to be to get out of it to
somewhere with just as little delay and exertion as possible. It was
at this juncture that the plan of organizing a Gatling gun battery was
conceived, and the attempt to obtain authority began.
The Gatling gun is one of the two machine guns adopted in the land
service of the United States. Not to enter into a technical
description, but merely to convey a general idea of its working and
uses, it may be described as follows:
The gun is a cluster of rifle barrels, without stocks, arranged around
a rod, and parallel to it. Each barrel has its own lock or bolt, and
the whole cluster can be made to revolve by turning a crank. The bolts
are all covered in a brass case at the breech, and the machine is
loaded by means of a vertical groove in which cartridges are placed,
twenty at a time, and from which they fall into the receivers one at a
time. As the cluster of barrels revolves each one is fired at the
lowest point, and reloaded as it completes the revolution. The gun is
mounted on a wye-shaped trunnion; the lower end of the wye passes down
into a socket in the axle. The gun is pointed by a lever just as one
points a garden hose or sprinkler, with the advantage that the gun can
be clamped at any instant, and will then continue to sprinkle its
drops of death over the same row of plants until the clamps are
released. The axle is hollow and will hold about a thousand
cartridges. It is horizontal, and on its ends are heavy Archibald
wheels. There is also a heavy hollow trail, in which tools and
additional ammunition can be stored. The limber resembles that used by
the Artillery, and is capable of carrying about 9600 rounds of
cartridges. The whole gun, thus mounted, can be drawn by two mules,
and worked to good advantage by from six to eight men. It is built of
various calibers, and can fire from 300 to 900 shots per minute. The
guns used by the Gatling Gun Detachment, Fifth Army Corps, were built
by the Colt's Arms Co., were the latest improved model, long
ten-barrel gun, and fired the Krag-Jorgenson ammunition used by the
Regular Army.
The attempt to obtain authority to organize a machine gun battery met
with many discouragements and repeated failures. No one seemed to have
thought anything about the subject, and Tampa was not a good place nor
climate in which to indulge in that form of exercise, apparently.
Perhaps the climate was one reason why so little thinking was done,
and everything went "at sixes and sevens."
[Illustration: Skirmish Drill at Tampa.]
The officer who had conceived the scheme was a young man, too. He was
only a second lieutenant ("Second lieutenants are fit for nothing
except to take reveille"), and had never, so far as his military
superiors knew, heard the whistle of a hostile bullet. He had made no
brilliant record at the Academy, had never distinguished himself in
the service, and was not anybody's "pet." He was, apparently, a safe
man to ignore or snub if occasion or bad temper made it desirable to
ignore or snub somebody, and, above all, had no political friends who
would be offended thereby.
"Politics" cut quite a figure in Tampa in some respects. An officer
who was known to be a personal friend of Senator Somebody, or protege
of this or that great man, was regarded with considerable awe and
reverence by the common herd. It was ludicrous to see the weight
attached to the crumbs of wisdom that fell from the friends of the
friends of somebody. They shone only by a reflected light, it is true;
but nobody there at Tampa had a lamp of his own, except the few who
had won renown in the Civil War, and reflected light was better than
none at all. A very young and green second lieutenant who was able to
boast that he had declined to be a major in a certain State was at
once an oracle to other lieutenants--and to some who were not
lieutenants. The policy which governed these appointments was not so
well understood at that date in the campaign as it is now.
When the court of a reigning favorite was established at the Tampa Bay
Hotel as a brigadier, and people began to get themselves a little
settled into the idea that they knew who was in command, they were
suddenly disillusioned by the appointment of another and senior
brigadier to the command. They settled down to get acquainted with the
new authority, and were just beginning to find out who was who, when
the telegraph flashed the news that the deposed potentate had been
made a major-general, and, of course, was now in command. The thing
was becoming interesting. Bets began to be made as to which would come
in ahead under the wire. The other also became a major-general. Then
came a period of uncertainty, because the question of rank hinged upon
some obscure and musty record of forgotten service some thirty-four
years before. From these facts will be apparent the difficulty under
which a subordinate labored in trying to create anything.
It is hardly worth while in any case of that sort to waste time with
subordinates. The projector of an enterprise had better go straight to
the one who has the necessary authority to order what is wanted; if
access to him can be had, and he can be brought to recognize the
merits of the plan--that settles it; if not--that also settles it. In
either case the matter becomes a settled thing, and one knows what to
depend upon.
But who was the man to see there at Tampa? Nobody knew.
The first officer approached was the one in direct line of
superiority, Col. A. T. Smith, 13th Infantry. The idea was to
ascertain his views and try to obtain from him a favorable endorsement
upon a written plan to be submitted through military channels to the
commanding general at Tampa. Perhaps it was the deadly climate; for
the reply to a request for a few minutes' audience on the subject of
machine guns was very gruff and curt: "I don't want to hear anything
about it. I don't believe in it, and I don't feel like hearing it. If
you want to see me about this subject, come to me in office hours."
That settled it. Any effort to get a written plan through would have
to carry the weight of official disapproval from the start, and even a
"shavey" knows that disapproval at the start is enough to kill a paper
in the official routine.
The next officers approached were Major William Auman and Capt. H.
Cavanaugh, of the 13th Infantry, who were asked for advice. These two
officers, both of whom rendered very distinguished services on the
battle-field, listened with interest and were convinced. Their advice
was: "Get your plan in tangible shape, typewritten, showing just what
you propose; then go straight to the commanding general himself. If he
listens to you, he will be the responsible party, and will have waived
the informality; if he will not receive you, no harm is done."
This advice was followed and the following plan prepared:
_Scheme for Organization of Division Galling Gun Detachment._
"Material:
"Three guns with limbers and caissons; 28 horses and 16 saddles; 6
sets double harness, wheel, and 6 lead; 1 escort wagon, team and
driver; and 100,000 rounds, .30 cal.
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