Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,

G >> George Berkeley >> Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,

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HYL. It is in vain to dispute about a point so clear. I am content to
refer it to your own conscience. Are you not satisfied there is some
peculiar repugnancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and your
notions?

PHIL. If all possible sense which can be put on the first chapter of
Genesis may be conceived as consistently with my principles as any other,
then it has no peculiar repugnancy with them. But there is no sense you
may not as well conceive, believing as I do. Since, besides spirits, all
you conceive are ideas; and the existence of these I do not deny. Neither
do you pretend they exist without the mind.

HYL. Pray let me see any sense you can understand it in.

PHIL. Why, I imagine that if I had been present at the creation, I
should have seen things produced into being--that is become
perceptible--in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever
before believed the Mosaic account of the creation, and now find no
alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or
end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but
His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the
same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind: but when things,
before imperceptible to creatures, are, by a decree of God, perceptible
to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence, with respect
to created minds. Upon reading therefore the Mosaic account of the
creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became
gradually perceivable to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties;
so that, whoever such were present, they were in truth perceived by them.
This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of the
Holy Scripture: in which is included no mention, or no thought, either of
SUBSTRATUM, INSTRUMENT, OCCASION, or ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. And, upon
inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain honest men, who
believe the creation, never think of those things any more than I. What
metaphysical sense you may understand it in, you only can tell.

HYL. But, Philonous, you do not seem to be aware that you allow created
things, in the beginning, only a relative, and consequently hypothetical
being: that is to say, upon supposition there were MEN to perceive
them; without which they have no actuality of absolute existence, wherein
creation might terminate. Is it not, therefore, according to you, plainly
impossible the creation of any inanimate creatures should precede that of
man? And is not this directly contrary to the Mosaic account?

PHIL. In answer to that, I say, first, created beings might begin to
exist in the mind of other created intelligences, beside men. You will
not therefore be able to prove any contradiction between Moses and my
notions, unless you first shew there was no other order of finite created
spirits in being, before man. I say farther, in case we conceive the
creation, as we should at this time, a parcel of plants or vegetables of
all sorts produced, by an invisible Power, in a desert where nobody was
present--that this way of explaining or conceiving it is consistent with
my principles, since they deprive you of nothing, either sensible or
imaginable; that it exactly suits with the common, natural, and
undebauched notions of mankind; that it manifests the dependence of all
things on God; and consequently hath all the good effect or influence,
which it is possible that important article of our faith should have in
making men humble, thankful, and resigned to their great Creator. I
say, moreover, that, in this naked conception of things, divested
of words, there will not be found any notion of what you call the
ACTUALITY OF ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE. You may indeed raise a dust with those
terms, and so lengthen our dispute to no purpose. But I entreat you
calmly to look into your own thoughts, and then tell me if they are not a
useless and unintelligible jargon.

HYL. I own I have no very clear notion annexed to them. But what say
you to this? Do you not make the existence of sensible things consist in
their being in a mind? And were not all things eternally in the mind of
God? Did they not therefore exist from all eternity, according to you?
And how could that which was eternal be created in time? Can anything be
clearer or better connected than this?

PHIL. And are not you too of opinion, that God knew all things from
eternity?

HYL. I am.

PHIL. Consequently they always had a being in the Divine intellect.

HYL. This I acknowledge.

PHIL. By your own confession, therefore, nothing is new, or begins to
be, in respect of the mind of God. So we are agreed in that point.

HYL. What shall we make then of the creation?

PHIL. May we not understand it to have been entirely in respect of
finite spirits; so that things, with regard to us, may properly be said
to begin their existence, or be created, when God decreed they should
become perceptible to intelligent creatures, in that order and manner
which He then established, and we now call the laws of nature? You may
call this a RELATIVE, or HYPOTHETICAL EXISTENCE if you please. But,
so long as it supplies us with the most natural, obvious, and literal
sense of the Mosaic history of the creation; so long as it answers all
the religious ends of that great article; in a word, so long as you can
assign no other sense or meaning in its stead; why should we reject this?
Is it to comply with a ridiculous sceptical humour of making everything
nonsense and unintelligible? I am sure you cannot say it is for the glory
of God. For, allowing it to be a thing possible and conceivable that the
corporeal world should have an absolute existence extrinsical to the mind
of God, as well as to the minds of all created spirits; yet how could
this set forth either the immensity or omniscience of the Deity, or the
necessary and immediate dependence of all things on Him? Nay, would
it not rather seem to derogate from those attributes?

HYL. Well, but as to this decree of God's, for making things
perceptible, what say you, Philonous? Is it not plain, God did either
execute that decree from all eternity, or at some certain time began to
will what He had not actually willed before, but only designed to will?
If the former, then there could be no creation, or beginning of
existence, in finite things. If the latter, then we must acknowledge
something new to befall the Deity; which implies a sort of change: and
all change argues imperfection.

PHIL. Pray consider what you are doing. Is it not evident this
objection concludes equally against a creation in any sense; nay, against
every other act of the Deity, discoverable by the light of nature? None
of which can WE conceive, otherwise than as performed in time, and
having a beginning. God is a Being of transcerident and unlimited
perfections: His nature, therefore, is incomprehensible to finite
spirits. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any man, whether
Materialist or Immaterialist, should have exactly just notions of the
Deity, His attributes, and ways of operation. If then you would infer
anything against me, your difficulty must not be drawn from the
inadequateness of our conceptions of the Divine nature, which is
unavoidable on any scheme; but from the denial of Matter, of which there
is not one word, directly or indirectly, in what you have now objected.

HYL. I must acknowledge the difficulties you are concerned to clear are
such only as arise from the non-existence of Matter, and are peculiar to
that notion. So far you are in the right. But I cannot by any means bring
myself to think there is no such peculiar repugnancy between the creation
and your opinion; though indeed where to fix it, I do not distinctly
know.

PHIL. What would you have? Do I not acknowledge a twofold state of
things--the one ectypal or natural, the other archetypal and eternal? The
former was created in time; the latter existed from everlasting in the
mind of God. Is not this agreeable to the common notions of divines? or,
is any more than this necessary in order to conceive the creation? But
you suspect some peculiar repugnancy, though you know not where it lies.
To take away all possibility of scruple in the case, do but consider this
one point. Either you are not able to conceive the Creation on any
hypothesis whatsoever; and, if so, there is no ground for dislike or
complaint against any particular opinion on that score: or you are able
to conceive it; and, if so, why not on my Principles, since thereby
nothing conceivable is taken away? You have all along been allowed the
full scope of sense, imagination, and reason. Whatever, therefore, you
could before apprehend, either immediately or mediately by your senses,
or by ratiocination from your senses; whatever you could perceive,
imagine, or understand, remains still with you. If, therefore, the notion
you have of the creation by other Principles be intelligible, you have it
still upon mine; if it be not intelligible, I conceive it to be no notion
at all; and so there is no loss of it. And indeed it seems to me very
plain that the supposition of Matter, that is a thing perfectly unknown
and inconceivable, cannot serve to make us conceive anything. And, I hope
it need not be proved to you that if the existence of Matter doth not
make the creation conceivable, the creation's being without it
inconceivable can be no objection against its non-existence.

HYL. I confess, Philonous, you have almost satisfied me in this point
of the creation.

PHIL. I would fain know why you are not quite satisfied. You tell me
indeed of a repugnancy between the Mosaic history and Immaterialism: but
you know not where it lies. Is this reasonable, Hylas? Can you expect I
should solve a difficulty without knowing what it is? But, to pass by all
that, would not a man think you were assured there is no repugnancy
between the received notions of Materialists and the inspired writings?

HYL. And so I am.

PHIL. Ought the historical part of Scripture to be understood in a
plain obvious sense, or in a sense which is metaphysical and out of the
way?

HYL. In the plain sense, doubtless.

PHIL. When Moses speaks of herbs, earth, water, &c. as having been
created by God; think you not the sensible things commonly signified by
those words are suggested to every unphilosophical reader?

HYL. I cannot help thinking so.

PHIL. And are not all ideas, or things perceived by sense, to be denied
a real existence by the doctrine of the Materialist?

HYL. This I have already acknowledged.

PHIL. The creation, therefore, according to them, was not the
creation of things sensible, which have only a relative being, but of
certain unknown natures, which have an absolute being, wherein creation
might terminate?

HYL. True.

PHIL. Is it not therefore evident the assertors of Matter destroy the
plain obvious sense of Moses, with which their notions are utterly
inconsistent; and instead of it obtrude on us I know not what; something
equally unintelligible to themselves and me?

HYL. I cannot contradict you.

PHIL. Moses tells us of a creation. A creation of what? of unknown
quiddities, of occasions, or SUBSTRATUM? No, certainly; but of things
obvious to the senses. You must first reconcile this with your notions,
if you expect I should be reconciled to them.

HYL. I see you can assault me with my own weapons.

PHIL. Then as to ABSOLUTE EXISTENCE; was there ever known a more
jejune notion than that? Something it is so abstracted and unintelligible
that you have frankly owned you could not conceive it, much less explain
anything by it. But allowing Matter to exist, and the notion of absolute
existence to be clear as light; yet, was this ever known to make the
creation more credible? Nay, hath it not furnished the atheists and
infidels of all ages with the most plausible arguments against a
creation? That a corporeal substance, which hath an absolute existence
without the minds of spirits, should be produced out of nothing, by the
mere will of a Spirit, hath been looked upon as a thing so contrary to
all reason, so impossible and absurd! that not only the most celebrated
among the ancients, but even divers modern and Christian philosophers
have thought Matter co-eternal with the Deity. Lay these things together,
and then judge you whether Materialism disposes men to believe the
creation of things.

HYL. I own, Philonous, I think it does not. This of the CREATION is
the last objection I can think of; and I must needs own it hath been
sufficiently answered as well as the rest. Nothing now remains to be
overcome but a sort of unaccountable backwardness that I find in myself
towards your notions.

PHIL. When a man is swayed, he knows not why, to one side of' the
question, can this, think you, be anything else but the effect of
prejudice, which never fails to attend old and rooted notions? And
indeed in this respect I cannot deny the belief of Matter to have very
much the advantage over the contrary opinion, with men of a learned,
education.

HYL. I confess it seems to be as you say.

PHIL. As a balance, therefore, to this weight of prejudice, let us
throw into the scale the great advantages that arise from the belief of
Immaterialism, both in regard to religion and human learning. The being
of a God, and incorruptibility of the soul, those great articles of
religion, are they not proved with the clearest and most immediate
evidence? When I say the being of a God, I do not mean an obscure general
Cause of things, whereof we have no conception, but God, in the strict
and proper sense of the word. A Being whose spirituality, omnipresence,
providence, omniscience, infinite power and goodness, are as conspicuous
as the existence of sensible things, of which (notwithstanding the
fallacious pretences and affected scruples of Sceptics) there is no more
reason to doubt than of our own being.--Then, with relation to human
sciences. In Natural Philosophy, what intricacies, what obscurities, what
contradictions hath the belief of Matter led men into! To say nothing of
the numberless disputes about its extent, continuity, homogeneity,
gravity, divisibility, &c.--do they not pretend to explain all things by
bodies operating on bodies, according to the laws of motion? and yet, are
they able to comprehend how one body should move another? Nay, admitting
there was no difficulty in reconciling the notion of an inert being with
a cause, or in conceiving how an accident might pass from one body to
another; yet, by all their strained thoughts and extravagant
suppositions, have they been able to reach the MECHANICAL production of
any one animal or vegetable body? Can they account, by the laws of
motion, for sounds, tastes, smells, or colours; or for the regular course
of things? Have they accounted, by physical principles, for the aptitude
and contrivance even of the most inconsiderable parts of the universe?
But, laying aside Matter and corporeal, causes, and admitting only the
efficiency of an All-perfect Mind, are not all the effects of nature easy
and intelligible? If the PHENOMENA are nothing else but IDEAS; God is
a SPIRIT, but Matter an unintelligent, unperceiving being. If they
demonstrate an unlimited power in their cause; God is active and
omnipotent, but Matter an inert mass. If the order, regularity, and
usefulness of them can never be sufficiently admired; God is
infinitely wise and provident, but Matter destitute of all contrivance
and design. These surely are great advantages in PHYSICS. Not to
mention that the apprehension of a distant Deity naturally disposes men
to a negligence in their moral actions; which they would be more cautious
of, in case they thought Him immediately present, and acting on their
minds, without the interposition of Matter, or unthinking second
causes.--Then in METAPHYSICS: what difficulties concerning entity in
abstract, substantial forms, hylarchic principles, plastic natures,
substance and accident, principle of individuation, possibility of
Matter's thinking, origin of ideas, the manner how two independent
substances so widely different as SPIRIT AND MATTER, should mutually
operate on each other? what difficulties, I say, and endless
disquisitions, concerning these and innumerable other the like points, do
we escape, by supposing only Spirits and ideas?--Even the MATHEMATICS
themselves, if we take away the absolute existence of extended things,
become much more clear and easy; the most shocking paradoxes and
intricate speculations in those sciences depending on the. infinite
divisibility of finite extension; which depends on that supposition--But
what need is there to insist on the particular sciences? Is not that
opposition to all science whatsoever, that frenzy of the ancient and
modern Sceptics, built on the same foundation? Or can you produce so much
as one argument against the reality of corporeal things, or in behalf of
that avowed utter ignorance of their natures, which doth not suppose
their reality to consist in an external absolute existence? Upon this
supposition, indeed, the objections from the change of colours in a
pigeon's neck, or the appearance of the broken oar in the water, must be
allowed to have weight. But these and the like objections vanish, if we
do not maintain the being of absolute external originals, but place the
reality of things in ideas, fleeting indeed, and changeable;--however,
not changed at random, but according to the fixed order of nature. For,
herein consists that constancy and truth of things which secures all the
concerns of life, and distinguishes that which is real from the
IRREGULAR VISIONS of the fancy.

HYL. I agree to all you have now said, and must own that nothing can
incline me to embrace your opinion more than the advantages I see it is
attended with. I am by nature lazy; and this would be a mighty abridgment
in knowledge. What doubts, what hypotheses, what labyrinths of amusement,
what fields of disputation, what an ocean of false learning, may be
avoided by that single notion of IMMATERIALISM!

PHIL. After all, is there anything farther remaining to be done? You
may remember you promised to embrace that opinion which upon examination
should appear most agreeable to Common Sense and remote from Scepticism.
This, by your own confession, is that which denies Matter, or the
ABSOLUTE existence of corporeal things. Nor is this all; the same
notion has been proved several ways, viewed in different lights, pursued
in its consequences, and all objections against it cleared. Can there be
a greater evidence of its truth? or is it possible it should have all the
marks of a true opinion and yet be false?

HYL. I own myself entirely satisfied for the present in all respects.
But, what security can I have that I shall still continue the same full
assent to your opinion, and that no unthought-of objection or difficulty
will occur hereafter?

PHIL. Pray, Hylas, do you in other cases, when a point is once
evidently proved, withhold your consent on account of objections or
difficulties it may be liable to? Are the difficulties that attend the
doctrine of incommensurable quantities, of the angle of contact, of the
asymptotes to curves, or the like, sufficient to make you hold out
against mathematical demonstration? Or will you disbelieve the Providence
of God, because there may be some particular things which you know not
how to reconcile with it? If there are difficulties ATTENDING
IMMATERIALISM, there are at the same time direct and evident proofs of
it. But for the existence of Matter there is not one proof, and far more
numerous and insurmountable objections lie against it. But where are
those mighty difficulties you insist on? Alas! you know not where or what
they are; something which may possibly occur hereafter. If this be a
sufficient pretence for withholding your full assent, you should never
yield it to any proposition, how free soever from exceptions, how clearly
and solidly soever demonstrated.

HYL. You have satisfied me, Philonous.

PHIL. But, to arm you against all future objections, do but consider:
That which bears equally hard on two contradictory opinions can be
proof against neither. Whenever, therefore, any difficulty occurs, try if
you can find a solution for it on the hypothesis of the MATERIALISTS.
Be not deceived by words; but sound your own thoughts. And in case you
cannot conceive it easier by the help of MATERIALISM, it is plain it
can be no objection against IMMATERIALISM. Had you proceeded all along
by this rule, you would probably have spared yourself abundance of
trouble in objecting; since of all your difficulties I challenge you to
shew one that is explained by Matter: nay, which is not more
unintelligible with than without that supposition; and consequently makes
rather AGAINST than FOR it. You should consider, in each particular,
whether the difficulty arises from the NON-EXISTENCE OF MATTER. If it
doth not, you might as well argue from the infinite divisibility of
extension against the Divine prescience, as from such a difficulty
against IMMATERIALISM. And yet, upon recollection, I believe you will
find this to have been often, if not always, the case. You should
likewise take heed not to argue on a PETITIO PRINCIPII. One is apt to
say--The unknown substances ought to be esteemed real things, rather than
the ideas in our minds: and who can tell but the unthinking external
substance may concur, as a cause or instrument, in the productions of our
ideas? But is not this proceeding on a supposition that there are such
external substances? And to suppose this, is it not begging the question?
But, above all things, you should beware of imposing on yourself by that
vulgar sophism which is called IGNORATIO ELENCHI. You talked often as
if you thought I maintained the non-existence of Sensible Things. Whereas
in truth no one can be more thoroughly assured of their existence than I
am. And it is you who doubt; I should have said, positively deny it.
Everything that is seen, felt, heard, or any way perceived by the senses,
is, on the principles I embrace, a real being; but not on yours.
Remember, the Matter you contend for is an Unknown Somewhat (if indeed it
may be termed SOMEWHAT), which is quite stripped of all sensible
qualities, and can neither be perceived by sense, nor apprehended by the
mind. Remember I say, that it is not any object which is hard or soft,
hot or cold, blue or white, round or square, &c. For all these things I
affirm do exist. Though indeed I deny they have an existence distinct
from being perceived; or that they exist out of all minds whatsoever.
Think on these points; let them be attentively considered and still kept
in view. Otherwise you will not comprehend the state of the question;
without which your objections will always be wide of the mark, and,
instead of mine, may possibly be directed (as more than once they have
been) against your own notions.

HYL. I must needs own, Philonous, nothing seems to have kept me from
agreeing with you more than this same MISTAKING THE QUESTION. In
denying Matter, at first glimpse I am tempted to imagine you deny the
things we see and feel: but, upon reflexion, find there is no ground for
it. What think you, therefore, of retaining the name MATTER, and
applying it to SENSIBLE THINGS? This may be done without any change in
your sentiments: and, believe me, it would be a means of reconciling them
to some persons who may be more shocked at an innovation in words than in
opinion.

PHIL. With all my heart: retain the word MATTER, and apply it to the
objects of sense, if you please; provided you do not attribute to them
any subsistence distinct from their being perceived. I shall never
quarrel with you for an expression. MATTER, or MATERIAL SUBSTANCE,
are terms introduced by philosophers; and, as used by them, imply a sort
of independency, or a subsistence distinct from being perceived by a
mind: but are never used by common people; or, if ever, it is to signify
the immediate objects of sense. One would think, therefore, so long as
the names of all particular things, with the TERMS SENSIBLE,
SUBSTANCE, BODY, STUFF, and the like, are retained, the word
MATTER should be never missed in common talk. And in philosophical
discourses it seems the best way to leave it quite out: since there is
not, perhaps, any one thing that hath more favoured and strengthened the
depraved bent of the mind towards Atheism than the use of that general
confused term.

HYL. Well but, Philonous, since I am content to give up the notion of
an unthinking substance exterior to the mind, I think you ought not to
deny me the privilege of using the word MATTER as I please, and
annexing it to a collection of sensible qualities subsisting only in the
mind. I freely own there is no other substance, in a strict sense, than
SPIRIT. But I have been so long accustomed to the term MATTER that I
know not how to part with it: to say, there is no MATTER in the world,
is still shocking to me. Whereas to say--There is no MATTER, if by that
term be meant an unthinking substance existing without the mind; but if
by MATTER is meant some sensible thing, whose existence consists in
being perceived, then there is MATTER:--THIS distinction gives it
quite another turn; and men will come into your notions with small
difficulty, when they are proposed in that manner. For, after all, the
controversy about MATTER in the strict acceptation of it, lies
altogether between you and the philosophers: whose principles, I
acknowledge, are not near so natural, or so agreeable to the common sense
of mankind, and Holy Scripture, as yours. There is nothing we either
desire or shun but as it makes, or is apprehended to make, some part of
our happiness or misery. But what hath happiness or misery, joy or grief,
pleasure or pain, to do with Absolute Existence; or with unknown
entities, ABSTRACTED FROM ALL RELATION TO US? It is evident, things
regard us only as they are pleasing or displeasing: and they can please
or displease only so far forth as they are perceived. Farther, therefore,
we are not concerned; and thus far you leave things as you found them.
Yet still there is something new in this doctrine. It is plain, I do not
now think with the Philosophers; nor yet altogether with the vulgar. I
would know how the case stands in that respect; precisely, what you have
added to, or altered in my former notions.

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