Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
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George Berkeley >> Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous,
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HYL. One great oversight I take to be this--that I did not sufficiently
distinguish the OBJECT from the SENSATION. Now, though this latter
may not exist without the mind, yet it will not thence follow that the
former cannot.
PHIL. What object do you mean? the object of the senses?
HYL. The same.
PHIL. It is then immediately perceived?
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Make me to understand the difference between what is immediately
perceived and a sensation.
HYL. The sensation I take to be an act of the mind perceiving; besides
which, there is something perceived; and this I call the OBJECT. For
example, there is red and yellow on that tulip. But then the act of
perceiving those colours is in me only, and not in the tulip.
PHIL. What tulip do you speak of? Is it that which you see?
HYL. The same.
PHIL. And what do you see beside colour, figure, and extension?
HYL. Nothing.
PHIL. What you would say then is that the red and yellow are coexistent
with the extension; is it not?
HYL. That is not all; I would say they have a real existence without
the mind, in some unthinking substance.
PHIL. That the colours are really in the tulip which I see is manifest.
Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist independent of your
mind or mine; but, that any immediate object of the senses,--that is, any
idea, or combination of ideas--should exist in an unthinking substance,
or exterior to ALL minds, is in itself an evident contradiction. Nor
can I imagine how this follows from what you said just now, to wit, that
the red and yellow were on the tulip you SAW, since you do not pretend
to SEE that unthinking substance.
HYL. You have an artful way, Philonous, of diverting our inquiry from
the subject.
PHIL. I see you have no mind to be pressed that way. To return then to
your distinction between SENSATION and OBJECT; if I take you right,
you distinguish in every perception two things, the one an action of the
mind, the other not.
HYL. True.
PHIL. And this action cannot exist in, or belong to, any unthinking
thing; but, whatever beside is implied in a perception may?
HYL. That is my meaning.
PHIL. So that if there was a perception without any act of the mind, it
were possible such a perception should exist in an unthinking substance?
HYL. I grant it. But it is impossible there should be such a
perception.
PHIL. When is the mind said to be active?
HYL. When it produces, puts an end to, or changes, anything.
PHIL. Can the mind produce, discontinue, or change anything, but by an
act of the will?
HYL. It cannot.
PHIL. The mind therefore is to be accounted ACTIVE in its perceptions
so far forth as VOLITION is included in them?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. In plucking this flower I am active; because I do it by the
motion of my hand, which was consequent upon my volition; so likewise in
applying it to my nose. But is either of these smelling?
HYL. NO.
PHIL. I act too in drawing the air through my nose; because my
breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my volition. But
neither can this be called SMELLING: for, if it were, I should smell
every time I breathed in that manner?
HYL. True.
PHIL. Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. But I do not find my will concerned any farther. Whatever more
there is--as that I perceive such a particular smell, or any smell at
all--this is independent of my will, and therein I am altogether passive.
Do you find it otherwise with you, Hylas?
HYL. No, the very same.
PHIL. Then, as to seeing, is it not in your power to open your eyes, or
keep them shut; to turn them this or that way?
HYL. Without doubt.
PHIL. But, doth it in like manner depend on YOUR will that in looking
on this flower you perceive WHITE rather than any other colour? Or,
directing your open eyes towards yonder part of the heaven, can you avoid
seeing the sun? Or is light or darkness the effect of your volition?
HYL. No, certainly.
PHIL. You are then in these respects altogether passive? HYL.
I am.
PHIL. Tell me now, whether SEEING consists in perceiving light and
colours, or in opening and turning the eyes?
HYL. Without doubt, in the former.
PHIL. Since therefore you are in the very perception of light and
colours altogether passive, what is become of that action you were
speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation? And, doth it not follow
from your own concessions, that the perception of light and colours,
including no action in it, may exist in an unperceiving substance? And is
not this a plain contradiction?
HYL. I know not what to think of it.
PHIL. Besides, since you distinguish the ACTIVE and PASSIVE in
every perception, you must do it in that of pain. But how is it possible
that pain, be it as little active as you please, should exist in an
unperceiving substance? In short, do but consider the point, and then
confess ingenuously, whether light and colours, tastes, sounds, &c. are
not all equally passions or sensations in the soul. You may indeed call
them EXTERNAL OBJECTS, and give them in words what subsistence you
please. But, examine your own thoughts, and then tell me whether it be
not as I say?
HYL. I acknowledge, Philonous, that, upon a fair observation of what
passes in my mind, I can discover nothing else but that I am a thinking
being, affected with variety of sensations; neither is it possible to
conceive how a sensation should exist in an unperceiving substance. But
then, on the other hand, when I look on sensible things in a different
view, considering them as so many modes and qualities, I find it
necessary to suppose a MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM, without which they cannot
be conceived to exist.
PHIL. MATERIAL SUBSTRATUM call you it? Pray, by which of your senses
came you acquainted with that being?
HYL. It is not itself sensible; its modes and qualities only being
perceived by the senses.
PHIL. I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you obtained
the idea of it?
HYL. I do not pretend to any proper positive IDEA of it. However, I
conclude it exists, because qualities cannot be conceived to exist
without a support.
PHIL. It seems then you have only a relative NOTION of it, or that
you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the relation it bears to
sensible qualities?
HYL. Right.
PHIL. Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that relation
consists.
HYL. Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term SUBSTRATUM, or
SUBSTANCE?
PHIL. If so, the word SUBSTRATUM should import that it is spread
under the sensible qualities or accidents?
HYL. True.
PHIL. And consequently under extension?
HYL. I own it.
PHIL. It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely distinct
from extension?
HYL. I tell you, extension is only a mode, and Matter is something that
supports modes. And is it not evident the thing supported is different
from the thing supporting?
PHIL. So that something distinct from, and exclusive of, extension is
supposed to be the SUBSTRATUM of extension?
HYL. Just so.
PHIL. Answer me, Hylas. Can a thing be spread without extension? or is
not the idea of extension necessarily included in SPREADING?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under anything must have
in itself an extension distinct from the extension of that thing under
which it is spread?
HYL. It must.
PHIL. Consequently, every corporeal substance, being the SUBSTRATUM
of extension, must have in itself another extension, by which it is
qualified to be a SUBSTRATUM: and so on to infinity. And I ask whether
this be not absurd in itself, and repugnant to what you granted just now,
to wit, that the SUBSTRATUM was something distinct from and exclusive
of extension?
HYL. Aye but, Philonous, you take me wrong. I do not mean that Matter
is SPREAD in a gross literal sense under extension. The word
SUBSTRATUM is used only to express in general the same thing with
SUBSTANCE.
PHIL. Well then, let us examine the relation implied in the term
SUBSTANCE. Is it not that it stands under accidents?
HYL. The very same.
PHIL. But, that one thing may stand under or support another, must it
not be extended?
HYL. It must.
PHIL. Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same absurdity
with the former?
HYL. You still take things in a strict literal sense. That is not fair,
Philonous.
PHIL. I am not for imposing any sense on your words: you are at liberty
to explain them as you please. Only, I beseech you, make me understand
something by them. You tell me Matter supports or stands under accidents.
How! is it as your legs support your body?
HYL. No; that is the literal sense.
PHIL. Pray let me know any sense, literal or not literal, that you
understand it in.--How long must I wait for an answer, Hylas?
HYL. I declare I know not what to say. I once thought I understood well
enough what was meant by Matter's supporting accidents. But now, the more
I think on it the less can I comprehend it: in short I find that I know
nothing of it.
PHIL. It seems then you have no idea at all, neither relative nor
positive, of Matter; you know neither what it is in itself, nor what
relation it bears to accidents?
HYL. I acknowledge it.
PHIL. And yet you asserted that you could not conceive how qualities or
accidents should really exist, without conceiving at the same time a
material support of them?
HYL. I did.
PHIL. That is to say, when you conceive the real existence of
qualities, you do withal conceive Something which you cannot conceive?
HYL. It was wrong, I own. But still I fear there is some fallacy or
other. Pray what think you of this? It is just come into my head that the
ground of all our mistake lies in your treating of each quality by
itself. Now, I grant that each quality cannot singly subsist without the
mind. Colour cannot without extension, neither can figure without some
other sensible quality. But, as the several qualities united or blended
together form entire sensible things, nothing hinders why such things may
not be supposed to exist without the mind.
PHIL. Either, Hylas, you are jesting, or have a very bad memory. Though
indeed we went through all the qualities by name one after another, yet
my arguments or rather your concessions, nowhere tended to prove that the
Secondary Qualities did not subsist each alone by itself; but, that they
were not AT ALL without the mind. Indeed, in treating of figure
and motion we concluded they could not exist without the mind, because it
was impossible even in thought to separate them from all secondary
qualities, so as to conceive them existing by themselves. But then this
was not the only argument made use of upon that occasion. But (to pass by
all that hath been hitherto said, and reckon it for nothing, if you will
have it so) I am content to put the whole upon this issue. If you can
conceive it possible for any mixture or combination of qualities, or any
sensible object whatever, to exist without the mind, then I will grant it
actually to be so.
HYL. If it comes to that the point will soon be decided. What more easy
than to conceive a tree or house existing by itself, independent of, and
unperceived by, any mind whatsoever? I do at this present time conceive
them existing after that manner.
PHIL. How say you, Hylas, can you see a thing which is at the same time
unseen?
HYL. No, that were a contradiction.
PHIL. Is it not as great a contradiction to talk of CONCEIVING a
thing which is UNCONCEIVED?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. The, tree or house therefore which you think of is conceived by
you?
HYL. How should it be otherwise?
PHIL. And what is conceived is surely in the mind?
HYL. Without question, that which is conceived is in the mind.
PHIL. How then came you to say, you conceived a house or tree existing
independent and out of all minds whatsoever?
HYL. That was I own an oversight; but stay, let me consider what led me
into it.--It is a pleasant mistake enough. As I was thinking of a tree in
a solitary place, where no one was present to see it, methought that was
to conceive a tree as existing unperceived or unthought of; not
considering that I myself conceived it all the while. But now I plainly
see that all I can do is to frame ideas in my own mind. I may indeed
conceive in my own thoughts the idea of a tree, or a house, or a
mountain, but that is all. And this is far from proving that I can
conceive them EXISTING OUT OF THE MINDS OF ALL SPIRITS.
PHIL. You acknowledge then that you cannot possibly conceive how any
one corporeal sensible thing should exist otherwise than in the mind?
HYL. I do.
PHIL. And yet you will earnestly contend for the truth of that which
you cannot so much as conceive?
HYL. I profess I know not what to think; but still there are some
scruples remain with me. Is it not certain I SEE THINGS at a distance?
Do we not perceive the stars and moon, for example, to be a great way
off? Is not this, I say, manifest to the senses?
PHIL. Do you not in a dream too perceive those or the like objects?
HYL. I do.
PHIL. And have they not then the same appearance of being distant?
HYL. They have.
PHIL. But you do not thence conclude the apparitions in a dream to be
without the mind?
HYL. By no means.
PHIL. You ought not therefore to conclude that sensible objects are
without the mind, from their appearance, or manner wherein they are
perceived.
HYL. I acknowledge it. But doth not my sense deceive me in those cases?
PHIL. By no means. The idea or thing which you immediately perceive,
neither sense nor reason informs you that it actually exists without the
mind. By sense you only know that you are affected with such certain
sensations of light and colours, &c. And these you will not say are
without the mind.
HYL. True: but, beside all that, do you not think the sight suggests
something of OUTNESS OR DISTANCE?
PHIL. Upon approaching a distant object, do the visible size and figure
change perpetually, or do they appear the same at all distances?
HYL. They are in a continual change.
PHIL. Sight therefore doth not suggest, or any way inform you, that the
visible object you immediately perceive exists at a distance, or will be
perceived when you advance farther onward; there being a continued series
of visible objects succeeding each other during the whole time of your
approach.
HYL. It doth not; but still I know, upon seeing an object, what object
I shall perceive after having passed over a certain distance: no
matter whether it be exactly the same or no: there is still something of
distance suggested in the case.
PHIL. Good Hylas, do but reflect a little on the point, and then tell
me whether there be any more in it than this: from the ideas you actually
perceive by sight, you have by experience learned to collect what other
ideas you will (according to the standing order of nature) be affected
with, after such a certain succession of time and motion.
HYL. Upon the whole, I take it to be nothing else.
PHIL. Now, is it not plain that if we suppose a man born blind was on a
sudden made to see, he could at first have no experience of what may be
SUGGESTED by sight?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. He would not then, according to you, have any notion of distance
annexed to the things he saw; but would take them for a new set of
sensations, existing only in his mind?
HYL. It is undeniable.
PHIL. But, to make it still more plain: is not DISTANCE a line turned
endwise to the eye?
HYL. It is.
PHIL. And can a line so situated be perceived by sight?
HYL. It cannot.
PHIL. Doth it not therefore follow that distance is not properly and
immediately perceived by sight?
HYL. It should seem so.
PHIL. Again, is it your opinion that colours are at a distance?
HYL. It must be acknowledged they are only in the mind.
PHIL. But do not colours appear to the eye as coexisting in the same
place with extension and figures?
HYL. They do.
PHIL. How can you then conclude from sight that figures exist without,
when you acknowledge colours do not; the sensible appearance being the
very same with regard to both?
HYL. I know not what to answer.
PHIL. But, allowing that distance was truly and immediately perceived
by the mind, yet it would not thence follow it existed out of the mind.
For, whatever is immediately perceived is an idea: and can any idea exist
out of the mind?
HYL. To suppose that were absurd: but, inform me, Philonous, can we
perceive or know nothing beside our ideas?
PHIL. As for the rational deducing of causes from effects, that
is beside our inquiry. And, by the senses you can best tell whether you
perceive anything which is not immediately perceived. And I ask you,
whether the things immediately perceived are other than your own
sensations or ideas? You have indeed more than once, in the course of
this conversation, declared yourself on those points; but you seem, by
this last question, to have departed from what you then thought.
HYL. To speak the truth, Philonous, I think there are two kinds of
objects:--the one perceived immediately, which are likewise called
IDEAS; the other are real things or external objects, perceived by the
mediation of ideas, which are their images and representations. Now, I
own ideas do not exist without the mind; but the latter sort of objects
do. I am sorry I did not think of this distinction sooner; it would
probably have cut short your discourse.
PHIL. Are those external objects perceived by sense or by some other
faculty?
HYL. They are perceived by sense.
PHIL. Howl Is there any thing perceived by sense which is not
immediately perceived?
HYL. Yes, Philonous, in some sort there is. For example, when I look on
a picture or statue of Julius Caesar, I may be said after a manner to
perceive him (though not immediately) by my senses.
PHIL. It seems then you will have our ideas, which alone are
immediately perceived, to be pictures of external things: and that these
also are perceived by sense, inasmuch as they have a conformity or
resemblance to our ideas?
HYL. That is my meaning.
PHIL. And, in the same way that Julius Caesar, in himself invisible, is
nevertheless perceived by sight; real things, in themselves
imperceptible, are perceived by sense.
HYL. In the very same.
PHIL. Tell me, Hylas, when you behold the picture of Julius Caesar, do
you see with your eyes any more than some colours and figures, with a
certain symmetry and composition of the whole?
HYL. Nothing else.
PHIL. And would not a man who had never known anything of Julius Caesar
see as much?
HYL. He would.
PHIL. Consequently he hath his sight, and the use of it, in as perfect
a degree as you?
HYL. I agree with you.
PHIL. Whence comes it then that your thoughts are directed to the Roman
emperor, and his are not? This cannot proceed from the sensations or
ideas of sense by you then perceived; since you acknowledge you have no
advantage over him in that respect. It should seem therefore to proceed
from reason and memory: should it not?
HYL. It should.
PHIL. Consequently, it will not follow from that instance that anything
is perceived by sense which is not, immediately perceived. Though I grant
we may, in one acceptation, be said to perceive sensible things mediately
by sense: that is, when, from a frequently perceived connexion, the
immediate perception of ideas by one sense SUGGESTS to the mind others,
perhaps belonging to another sense, which are wont to be connected with
them. For instance, when I hear a coach drive along the streets,
immediately I perceive only the sound; but, from the experience I have
had that such a sound is connected with a coach, I am said to hear the
coach. It is nevertheless evident that, in truth and strictness, nothing
can be HEARD BUT SOUND; and the coach is not then properly perceived by
sense, but suggested from experience. So likewise when we are said to see
a red-hot bar of iron; the solidity and heat of the iron are not the
objects of sight, but suggested to the imagination by the colour and
figure which are properly perceived by that sense. In short, those things
alone are actually and strictly perceived by any sense, which would have
been perceived in case that same sense had then been first conferred on
us. As for other things, it is plain they are only suggested to the mind
by experience, grounded on former perceptions. But, to return to your
comparison of Caesar's picture, it is plain, if you keep to that, you
must hold the real things, or archetypes of our ideas, are not perceived
by sense, but by some internal faculty of the soul, as reason or memory.
I would therefore fain know what arguments you can draw from reason for
the existence of what you call REAL THINGS OR MATERIAL OBJECTS. Or,
whether you remember to have seen them formerly as they are in
themselves; or, if you have heard or read of any one that did.
HYL. I see, Philonous, you are disposed to raillery; but that will
never convince me.
PHIL. My aim is only to learn from you the way to come at the knowledge
of MATERIAL BEINGS. Whatever we perceive is perceived immediately or
mediately: by sense, or by reason and reflexion. But, as you have
excluded sense, pray shew me what reason you have to believe their
existence; or what MEDIUM you can possibly make use of to prove it,
either to mine or your own understanding.
HYL. To deal ingenuously, Philonous, now I consider the point, I do not
find I can give you any good reason for it. But, thus much seems pretty
plain, that it is at least possible such things may really exist. And, as
long as there is no absurdity in supposing them, I am resolved to believe
as I did, till you bring good reasons to the contrary.
PHIL. What! Is it come to this, that you only BELIEVE the existence
of material objects, and that your belief is founded barely on the
possibility of its being true? Then you will have me bring reasons
against it: though another would think it reasonable the proof should lie
on him who holds the affirmative. And, after all, this very point which
you are now resolved to maintain, without any reason, is in effect what
you have more than once during this discourse seen good reason to give
up. But, to pass over all this; if I understand you rightly, you say our
ideas do not exist without the mind, but that they are copies, images, or
representations, of certain originals that do?
HYL. You take me right.
PHIL. They are then like external things?
HYL. They are.
PHIL. Have those things a stable and permanent nature, independent of
our senses; or are they in a perpetual change, upon our producing any
motions in our bodies--suspending, exerting, or altering, our faculties
or organs of sense?
HYL. Real things, it is plain, have a fixed and real nature, which
remains the same notwithstanding any change in our senses, or in the
posture and motion of our bodies; which indeed may affect the ideas in
our minds, but it were absurd to think they had the same effect on things
existing without the mind.
PHIL. How then is it possible that things perpetually fleeting and
variable as our ideas should be copies or images of anything fixed and
constant? Or, in other words, since all sensible qualities, as
size, figure, colour, &c., that is, our ideas, are continually changing,
upon every alteration in the distance, medium, or instruments of
sensation; how can any determinate material objects be properly
represented or painted forth by several distinct things, each of which is
so different from and unlike the rest? Or, if you say it resembles some
one only of our ideas, how shall we be able to distinguish the true copy
from all the false ones?
HYL. I profess, Philonous, I am at a loss. I know not what to say to
this.
PHIL. But neither is this all. Which are material objects in
themselves--perceptible or imperceptible?
HYL. Properly and immediately nothing can be perceived but ideas. All
material things, therefore, are in themselves insensible, and to be
perceived only by our ideas.
PHIL. Ideas then are sensible, and their archetypes or originals
insensible?
HYL. Right.
PHIL. But how can that which is sensible be like that which is
insensible? Can a real thing, in itself INVISIBLE, be like a COLOUR;
or a real thing, which is not AUDIBLE, be like a SOUND? In a word,
can anything be like a sensation or idea, but another sensation or idea?
HYL. I must own, I think not.
PHIL. Is it possible there should be any doubt on the point? Do. you
not perfectly know your own ideas?
HYL. I know them perfectly; since what I do not perceive or know can be
no part of my idea.
PHIL. Consider, therefore, and examine them, and then tell me if there
be anything in them which can exist without the mind: or if you can
conceive anything like them existing without the mind.
HYL. Upon inquiry, I find it is impossible for me to conceive or
understand how anything but an idea can be like an idea. And it is most
evident that NO IDEA CAN EXIST WITHOUT THE MIND.
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