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A Treatise of Human Nature

D >> David Hume >> A Treatise of Human Nature



A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE:
BY DAVID HUME



CONTENTS


VOLUME I

INTRODUCTION BY THE AUTHOR.

BOOK I OF THE UNDERSTANDING

PART I OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION,
ABSTRACTION, ETC.

SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.
SECT. II. DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT.
SECT. III. OF THE IDEAS OF THE MEMORY AND IMAGINATION.
SECT. IV. OF THE CONNECTION OR ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
SECT. V. OF RELATIONS.
SECT. VI. OF MODES AND SUBSTANCES
SECT. VII. OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

PART II. OF THE IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME,

SECT. I. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF OUR IDEAS OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. II. OF THE INFINITE DIVISIBILITY OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. III. OF THE OTHER QUALITIES OF OUR IDEA OF SPACE AND TIME.
SECT. IV. OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.
SECT. V. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED.
SECT. VI. OF THE IDEA OF EXISTENCE, AND OF EXTERNAL EXISTENCE.

PART III. OF KNOWLEDGE AND PROBABILITY.

SECT. I. OF KNOWLEDGE.
SECT. II. OF PROBABILITY, AND OF THE IDEA OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.
SECT. III. WHY A CAUSE IS ALWAYS NECESSARY.
SECT. IV. OF THE COMPONENT PARTS OF OUR REASONINGS CONCERNING CAUSE
AND EFFECT.
SECT. V. OF THE IMPRESSIONS OF THE SENSES AND MEMORY.
SECT. VI. OF THE INFERENCE FROM THE IMPRESSION TO THE IDEA.
SECT. VII. OF THE NATURE OF THE IDEA OR BELIEF.
SECT. VIII. OF THE CAUSES OF BELIEF.
SECT. IX. OF THE EFFECTS OF OTHER RELATIONS AND OTHER HABITS.
SECT. X. OF THE INFLUENCE OF BELIEF.
SECT. XI. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CHANCES.
SECT. XII. OF THE PROBABILITY OF CAUSES.
SECT. XIII. OF UNPHILOSOPHICAL PROBABILITY.
SECT. XIV. OF THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNECTION.
SECT. XV. RULES BY WHICH TO JUDGE OF CAUSES AND EFFECTS.
SECT. XVI OF THE REASON OF ANIMALS

PART IV. OF THE SCEPTICAL AND OTHER SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

SECT. I. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO REASON.
SECT. II. OF SCEPTICISM WITH REGARD TO THE SENSES.
SECT. III. OF THE ANTIENT PHILOSOPHY.
SECT. IV. OF THE MODERN PHILOSOPHY.
SECT. V. OF THE IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL.
SECT. VI. OF PERSONAL IDENTITY
SECT. VII. CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK.

VOLUME II

BOOK II OF THE PASSIONS

PART I OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY

SECT. I DIVISION OF THE SUBJECT
SECT. II OF PRIDE AND HUMILITY, THEIR OBJECTS AND CAUSES
SECT. III WHENCE THESE OBJECTS AND CAUSES ARE DERIVED
SECT. IV OF THE RELATIONS OF IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS
SECT. V OF THE INFLUENCE OF THESE RELATIONS ON PRIDE AND HUMILITY
SECT. VI LIMITATIONS OF THIS SYSTEM
SECT. VII OF VICE AND VIRTUE
SECT. VIII OF BEAUTY AND DEFORMITY
SECT. IX OF EXTERNAL ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES
SECT. X OF PROPERTY AND RICHES
SECT. XI OF THE LOVE OF FAME
SECT. XII OF THE PRIDE AND HUMILITY OF ANIMALS

PART II OF LOVE AND HATRED

SECT. I OF THE OBJECT AND CAUSES OF LOVE AND HATRED
SECT. II EXPERIMENTS TO CONFIRM THIS SYSTEM
SECT. III DIFFICULTIES SOLVED
SECT. IV OF THE LOVE OF RELATIONS
SECT. V OF OUR ESTEEM FOR THE RICH AND POWERFUL
SECT. VI OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER
SECT. VII OF COMPASSION
SECT. VIII OF MALICE AND ENVY
SECT. IX OF THE MIXTURE OF BENEVOLENCE AND ANGER WITH COMPASSION
AND MALICE
SECT. X OF RESPECT AND CONTEMPT
SECT. XI OF THE AMOROUS PASSION, OR LOVE BETWIXT THE SEXES
SECT. XII OF THE LOVE AND HATRED OF ANIMALS

PART III OF THE WILL AND DIRECT PASSIONS

SECT. I OF LIBERTY AND NECESSITY
SECT. II THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED
SECT. III OF THE INFLUENCING MOTIVES OF THE WILL
SECT. IV OF THE CAUSES OF THE VIOLENT PASSIONS
SECT. V OF THE EFFECTS OF CUSTOM
SECT. VI OF THE INFLUENCE OF THE IMAGINATION ON THE PASSIONS
SECT. VII OF CONTIGUITY AND DISTANCE IN SPACE AND TIME
SECT. VIII THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED
SECT. IX OF THE DIRECT PASSIONS
SECT. X OF CURIOSITY, OR THE LOVE OF TRUTH

BOOK III OF MORALS

PART I OF VIRTUE AND VICE IN GENERAL

SECT. I MORAL DISTINCTIONS NOT DERIVED FROM REASON
SECT. II MORAL DISTINCTIONS DERIVED FROM A MORAL SENSE

PART II OF JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE

SECT. I JUSTICE, WHETHER A NATURAL OR ARTIFICIAL VIRTUE?
SECT. II OF THE ORIGIN OF JUSTICE AND PROPERTY
SECT. III OF THE RULES WHICH DETERMINE PROPERTY
SECT. IV OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF PROPERTY BY CONSENT
SECT. V OF THE OBLIGATION OF PROMISES
SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
SECT. VII OF THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT
SECT. VIII OF THE SOURCE OF ALLEGIANCE
SECT. IX OF THE MEASURES OF ALLEGIANCE
SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE
SECT. XI OF THE LAWS OF NATIONS
SECT. XII OF CHASTITY AND MODESTY

PART III OF THE OTHER VIRTUES AND VICES

SECT. I OF THE ORIGIN OF THE NATURAL VIRTUES AND VICES
SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND
SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE
SECT. IV OF NATURAL ABILITIES
SECT. V SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING THE NATURAL VIRTUES
SECT. VI CONCLUSION OF THIS BOOK

APPENDIX TO THE TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE



* * * * * * * * * *





VOL. I OF THE UNDERSTANDING.



ADVERTISEMENT.



My design in the present work is sufficiently explained in the
Introduction. The reader must only observe, that all the subjects I have
there planned out to myself, are not treated of in these two volumes. The
subjects of the Understanding and Passions make a compleat chain of
reasoning by themselves; and I was willing to take advantage of this
natural division, in order to try the taste of the public. If I have the
good fortune to meet with success, I shall proceed to the examination of
Morals, Politics, and Criticism; which will compleat this Treatise of
Human Nature. The approbation of the public I consider as the greatest
reward of my labours; but am determined to regard its judgment, whatever
it be, as my best instruction.




INTRODUCTION.



Nothing is more usual and more natural for those, who pretend to discover
anything new to the world in philosophy and the sciences, than to
insinuate the praises of their own systems, by decrying all those, which
have been advanced before them. And indeed were they content with
lamenting that ignorance, which we still lie under in the most important
questions, that can come before the tribunal of human reason, there are
few, who have an acquaintance with the sciences, that would not readily
agree with them. It is easy for one of judgment and learning, to perceive
the weak foundation even of those systems, which have obtained the
greatest credit, and have carried their pretensions highest to accurate
and profound reasoning. Principles taken upon trust, consequences lamely
deduced from them, want of coherence in the parts, and of evidence in the
whole, these are every where to be met with in the systems of the most
eminent philosophers, and seem to have drawn disgrace upon philosophy
itself.

Nor is there required such profound knowledge to discover the present
imperfect condition of the sciences, but even the rabble without doors
may, judge from the noise and clamour, which they hear, that all goes not
well within. There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in
which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. The most trivial
question escapes not our controversy, and in the most momentous we are
not able to give any certain decision. Disputes are multiplied, as if
every thing was uncertain; and these disputes are managed with the
greatest warmth, as if every thing was certain. Amidst all this bustle
it is not reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence; and no man
needs ever despair of gaining proselytes to the most extravagant
hypothesis, who has art enough to represent it in any favourable colours.
The victory is not gained by the men at arms, who manage the pike and the
sword; but by the trumpeters, drummers, and musicians of the army.

From hence in my opinion arises that common prejudice against
metaphysical reasonings of all kinds, even amongst those, who profess
themselves scholars, and have a just value for every other part of
literature. By metaphysical reasonings, they do not understand those on
any particular branch of science, but every kind of argument, which is
any way abstruse, and requires some attention to be comprehended. We have
so often lost our labour in such researches, that we commonly reject them
without hesitation, and resolve, if we must for ever be a prey to errors
and delusions, that they shall at least be natural and entertaining. And
indeed nothing but the most determined scepticism, along with a great
degree of indolence, can justify this aversion to metaphysics. For if
truth be at all within the reach of human capacity, it is certain it must
lie very deep and abstruse: and to hope we shall arrive at it without
pains, while the greatest geniuses have failed with the utmost pains,
must certainly be esteemed sufficiently vain and presumptuous. I pretend
to no such advantage in the philosophy I am going to unfold, and would
esteem it a strong presumption against it, were it so very easy and
obvious.

It is evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to
human nature: and that however wide any of them may seem to run from it,
they still return back by one passage or another. Even. Mathematics,
Natural Philosophy, and Natural Religion, are in some measure dependent
on the science of MAN; since the lie under the cognizance of men, and are
judged of by their powers and faculties. It is impossible to tell what
changes and improvements we might make in these sciences were we
thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding,
and could explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the
operations we perform in our reasonings. And these improvements are the
more to be hoped for in natural religion, as it is not content with
instructing us in the nature of superior powers, but carries its views
farther, to their disposition towards us, and our duties towards them;
and consequently we ourselves are not only the beings, that reason, but
also one of the objects, concerning which we reason.

If therefore the sciences of Mathematics, Natural Philosophy, and Natural
Religion, have such a dependence on the knowledge of man, what may be
expected in the other sciences, whose connexion with human nature is more
close and intimate? The sole end of logic is to explain the principles
and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of our ideas:
morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments: and politics
consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. In these
four sciences of Logic, Morals, Criticism, and Politics, is comprehended
almost everything, which it can any way import us to be acquainted with,
or which can tend either to the improvement or ornament of the human
mind.

Here then is the only expedient, from which we can hope for success in
our philosophical researches, to leave the tedious lingering method,
which we have hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then a
castle or village on the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or
center of these sciences, to human nature itself; which being once
masters of, we may every where else hope for an easy victory. From this
station we may extend our conquests over all those sciences, which more
intimately concern human life, and may afterwards proceed at leisure to
discover more fully those, which are the objects of pore curiosity. There
is no question of importance, whose decision is not comprised in the
science of man; and there is none, which can be decided with any
certainty, before we become acquainted with that science. In pretending,
therefore, to explain the principles of human nature, we in effect
propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost
entirely new, and the only one upon which they can stand with any
security.

And as the science of man is the-only solid foundation for the other
sciences, so the only solid foundation we can give to this science
itself must be laid on experience and observation. It is no astonishing
reflection to consider, that the application of experimental philosophy
to moral subjects should come after that to natural at the distance of
above a whole century; since we find in fact, that there was about the
same interval betwixt the origins of these sciences; and that reckoning
from THALES to SOCRATES, the space of time is nearly equal to that
betwixt, my Lord Bacon and some late philosophers [Mr. Locke, my Lord
Shaftesbury, Dr. Mandeville, Mr. Hutchinson, Dr. Butler, etc.] in England,
who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing, and have
engaged the attention, and excited the curiosity of the public. So true it
is, that however other nations may rival us in poetry, and excel us in
some other agreeable arts, the improvements in reason and philosophy can
only be owing to a land of toleration and of liberty.

Nor ought we to think, that this latter improvement in the science of man
will do less honour to our native country than the former in natural
philosophy, but ought rather to esteem it a greater glory, upon account
of the greater importance of that science, as well as the necessity it
lay under of such a reformation. For to me it seems evident, that the
essence of the mind being equally unknown to us with that of external
bodies, it must be equally impossible to form any notion of its powers
and qualities otherwise than from careful and exact experiments, and the
observation of those particular effects, which result from its different
circumstances and situations. And though we must endeavour to render all
our principles as universal as possible, by tracing up our experiments to
the utmost, and explaining all effects from the simplest and fewest
causes, it is still certain we cannot go beyond experience; and any
hypothesis, that pretends to discover the ultimate original qualities of
human nature, ought at first to be rejected as presumptuous and
chimerical.

I do not think a philosopher, who would apply himself so earnestly to the
explaining the ultimate principles of the soul, would show himself a
great master in that very science of human nature, which he pretends to
explain, or very knowing in what is naturally satisfactory to the mind of
man. For nothing is more certain, than that despair has almost the same
effect upon us with enjoyment, and that we are no sooner acquainted with
the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself
vanishes. When we see, that we have arrived at the utmost extent of human
reason, we sit down contented, though we be perfectly satisfied in the
main of our ignorance, and perceive that we can give no reason for our
most general and most refined principles, beside our experience of their
reality; which is the reason of the mere vulgar, and what it required no
study at first to have discovered for the most particular and most
extraordinary phaenomenon. And as this impossibility of making any
farther progress is enough to satisfy the reader, so the writer may
derive a more delicate satisfaction from the free confession of his
ignorance, and from his prudence in avoiding that error, into which so
many have fallen, of imposing their conjectures and hypotheses on the
world for the most certain principles. When this mutual contentment and
satisfaction can be obtained betwixt the master and scholar, I know not
what more we can require of our philosophy.

But if this impossibility of explaining ultimate principles should be
esteemed a defect in the science of man, I will venture to affirm, that
it is a defect common to it with all the sciences, and all the arts, in
which we can employ ourselves, whether they be such as are cultivated in
the schools of the philosophers, or practised in the shops of the meanest
artizans. None of them can go beyond experience, or establish any
principles which are not founded on that authority. Moral philosophy has,
indeed, this peculiar disadvantage, which is not found in natural, that
in collecting its experiments, it cannot make them purposely, with
premeditation, and after such a manner as to satisfy itself concerning
every particular difficulty which may be. When I am at a loss to know the
effects of one body upon another in any situation, I need only put them
in that situation, and observe what results from it. But should I
endeavour to clear up after the same manner any doubt in moral
philosophy, by placing myself in the same case with that which I
consider, it is evident this reflection and premeditation would so disturb
the operation of my natural principles, as must render it impossible to
form any just conclusion from the phenomenon. We must therefore glean up
our experiments in this science from a cautious observation of human
life, and take them as they appear in the common course of the world, by
men's behaviour in company, in affairs, and in their pleasures. Where
experiments of this kind are judiciously collected and compared, we may
hope to establish on them a science which will not be inferior in
certainty, and will be much superior in utility to any other of human
comprehension.





BOOK I. OF THE UNDERSTANDING




PART I. OF IDEAS, THEIR ORIGIN, COMPOSITION, CONNEXION, ABSTRACTION, ETC.



SECT. I. OF THE ORIGIN OF OUR IDEAS.


All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into two
distinct kinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The difference
betwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which
they strike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or
consciousness. Those perceptions, which enter with most force and
violence, we may name impressions: and under this name I comprehend all
our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first
appearance in the soul. By ideas I mean the faint images of these in
thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, are all the perceptions
excited by the present discourse, excepting only those which arise from
the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasure or uneasiness
it may occasion. I believe it will not be very necessary to employ many
words in explaining this distinction. Every one of himself will readily
perceive the difference betwixt feeling and thinking. The common degrees
of these are easily distinguished; though it is not impossible but in
particular instances they may very nearly approach to each other. Thus in
sleep, in a fever, in madness, or in any very violent emotions of soul,
our ideas may approach to our impressions, As on the other hand it
sometimes happens, that our impressions are so faint and low, that we
cannot distinguish them from our ideas. But notwithstanding this near
resemblance in a few instances, they are in general so very different,
that no-one can make a scruple to rank them under distinct heads, and
assign to each a peculiar name to mark the difference [Footnote 1.].

[Footnote 1. I here make use of these terms, impression and idea, in a
sense different from what is usual, and I hope this liberty will be
allowed me. Perhaps I rather restore the word, idea, to its original
sense, from which Mr LOCKE had perverted it, in making it stand for all
our perceptions. By the terms of impression I would not be understood to
express the manner, in which our lively perceptions are produced in the
soul, but merely the perceptions themselves; for which there is no
particular name either in the English or any other language, that I know
of.]

There is another division of our perceptions, which it will be convenient
to observe, and which extends itself both to our impressions and ideas.
This division is into SIMPLE and COMPLEX. Simple perceptions or
impressions and ideas are such as admit of no distinction nor separation.
The complex are the contrary to these, and may be distinguished into
parts. Though a particular colour, taste, and smell, are qualities all
united together in this apple, it is easy to perceive they are not the
same, but are at least distinguishable from each other.

Having by these divisions given an order and arrangement to our objects,
we may now apply ourselves to consider with the more accuracy their
qualities and relations. The first circumstance, that strikes my eye, is
the great resemblance betwixt our impressions and ideas in every other
particular, except their degree of force and vivacity. The one seem to be
in a manner the reflexion of the other; so that all the perceptions of
the mind are double, and appear both as impressions and ideas. When I
shut my eyes and think of my chamber, the ideas I form are exact
representations of the impressions I felt; nor is there any circumstance
of the one, which is not to be found in the other. In running over my
other perceptions, I find still the same resemblance and representation.
Ideas and impressions appear always to correspond to each other. This
circumstance seems to me remarkable, and engages my attention for a
moment.

Upon a more accurate survey I find I have been carried away too far by
the first appearance, and that I must make use of the distinction of
perceptions into simple and complex, to limit this general decision, that
all our ideas and impressions are resembling. I observe, that many of our
complex ideas never had impressions, that corresponded to them, and that
many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas. I can
imagine to myself such a city as the New Jerusalem, whose pavement is
gold and walls are rubies, though I never saw any such. I have seen Paris;
but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will
perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just
proportions?

I perceive, therefore, that though there is in general a great,
resemblance betwixt our complex impressions and ideas, yet the rule is not
universally true, that they are exact copies of each other. We may next
consider how the case stands with our simple, perceptions. After the most
accurate examination, of which I am capable, I venture to affirm, that
the rule here holds without any exception, and that every simple idea has
a simple impression, which resembles it, and every simple impression a
correspondent idea. That idea of red, which we form in the dark, and that
impression which strikes our eyes in sun-shine, differ only in degree,
not in nature. That the case is the same with all our simple impressions
and ideas, it is impossible to prove by a particular enumeration of them.
Every one may satisfy himself in this point by running over as many as he
pleases. But if any one should deny this universal resemblance, I know no
way of convincing him, but by desiring him to shew a simple impression,
that has not a correspondent idea, or a simple idea, that has not a
correspondent impression. If he does not answer this challenge, as it is
certain he cannot, we may from his silence and our own observation
establish our conclusion.

Thus we find, that all simple ideas and impressions resemble each other;
and as the complex are formed from them, we may affirm in general, that
these two species of perception are exactly correspondent. Having
discovered this relation, which requires no farther examination, I am
curious to find some other of their qualities. Let us consider how. they
stand with regard to their existence, and which of the impressions and
ideas are causes, and which effects.

The full examination of this question is the subject of the present
treatise; and therefore we shall here content ourselves with establishing
one general proposition, THAT ALL OUR SIMPLE IDEAS IN THEIR FIRST
APPEARANCE ARE DERIVED FROM SIMPLE IMPRESSIONS, WHICH ARE CORRESPONDENT
TO THEM, AND WHICH THEY EXACTLY REPRESENT.

In seeking for phenomena to prove this proposition, I find only those of
two kinds; but in each kind the phenomena are obvious, numerous, and
conclusive. I first make myself certain, by a new, review, of what I have
already asserted, that every simple impression is attended with a
correspondent idea, and every simple idea with a correspondent
impression. From this constant conjunction of resembling perceptions I
immediately conclude, that there is a great connexion betwixt our
correspondent impressions and ideas, and that the existence of the one
has a considerable influence upon that of the other. Such a constant
conjunction, in such an infinite number of instances, can never arise
from chance; but clearly proves a dependence of the impressions on the
ideas, or of the ideas on the impressions. That I may know on which side
this dependence lies, I consider the order of their first appearance; and
find by constant experience, that the simple impressions always take the
precedence of their correspondent ideas, but never appear in the contrary
order. To give a child an idea of scarlet or orange, of sweet or bitter,
I present the objects, or in other words, convey to him these
impressions; but proceed not so absurdly, as to endeavour to produce the
impressions by exciting the ideas. Our ideas upon their appearance
produce not their correspondent impressions, nor do we perceive any
colour, or feel any sensation merely upon thinking of them. On the other
hand we find, that any impression either of the mind or body is
constantly followed by an idea, which resembles it, and is only different
in the degrees of force and liveliness, The constant conjunction of our
resembling perceptions, is a convincing proof, that the one are the
causes of the other; and this priority of the impressions is an equal
proof, that our impressions are the causes of our ideas, not our ideas
of our, impressions.

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