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Sociology and Modern Social Problems

C >> Charles A. Ellwood >> Sociology and Modern Social Problems




It is evident that higher standards of taste and higher standards of
morality may also operate under certain circumstances to render the
family life unstable in a similar way.

(7) Directly connected with these last mentioned causes is another
cause,--the higher age of marriage. Some have thought that a low age of
marriage was more prolific in divorces than a relatively high age of
marriage. But a low age of marriage cannot be a cause of the increase of
divorce in the United States, because the proportion of immature
marriages in this country is steadily lessening, that is, the age of
marriage is steadily increasing, and all must admit that along with the
higher age of marriage has gone increasing divorce; and there may
possibly be some connection between the two facts. As we have already
seen, the higher standards of living make later marriage necessary. Men
in the professions do not think of marriage nowadays until thirty, or
until they have an independent income. Now, how may the higher age of
marriage possibly increase the instability of the family? It may do so
in this way. After thirty, psychologists tell us, one's habits are
relatively fixed and hard to change. People who marry after thirty,
therefore, usually find greater difficulty in adjusting themselves to
each other than people who marry somewhat younger; and every marriage
necessarily involves an adjustment of individuals to each other. This
being so, we can readily understand that late marriages are more apt to
result in faulty adjustments in the family relation than marriages that
take place in early maturity.

(8) Another cause of the increase of divorce in the United States that
has been given is the popularization of law which has accompanied the
growth of democratic institutions. Law was once the prerogative of
special classes, and courts were rarely appealed to except by the noble
or wealthy classes; but with the growth of democratic institutions there
has been a great spread of legal education, especially through the
modern newspaper, and consequently a greater participation in the
remedies offered by the courts for all sorts of wrongs, real or
imagined. Many people, for example, who would not have thought of
divorce a generation ago, now know how divorce may be secured and are
ready to secure it. However, it would seem as though this cause of the
increase of divorce might have operated to a greater extent twenty-five
or thirty years ago than it has during the last two decades, for it
cannot be said that since the nineties there has been much increase of
legal education among the masses, or much greater popularization of the
law.

(9) Increasing laxity of the laws regarding divorce and increasing
laxity in the administration of the laws has certainly been a cause of
increasing divorce in the United States, though back of these causes
doubtless lie all the other causes just mentioned, and also increasing
laxity in public opinion regarding marriage and divorce. To assume that
laxity of the laws and of legal administration has no influence upon the
increase of divorce in a population is to go contrary to all human
experience. The people of Canada and of England, for example, are not
very different from ourselves in culture and in institutions, yet there
is almost no divorce in England and in Canada as compared with the
United States. Canada has a few dozen divorces annually, while we have
over seventy thousand. Unquestionably the main cause of this great
difference between Canada and the United States is to be found in the
difference of their laws. This is not saying, however, that instability
of the family does not characterize Canada and England as well as the
United States, even though such instability does not express itself in
the divorce courts.

Interesting statistics have been collected in numerous places in the
country to show the laxity of the administration of the divorce laws. In
many of the divorce courts of our large cities, for example, it has
repeatedly been shown that the average time occupied by the court in
granting a divorce is not more than fifteen minutes. In other words,
divorce cases are frequently rushed through our divorce courts without
solemnity, without adequate investigation, with every opportunity for
collusion between the parties, so as to favor a very free granting of
divorces. On the other hand, about one fourth of all the applications
for divorce which come to trial are refused by the courts, showing that
the courts are not so lax in all cases as they are sometimes pictured to
be.

Moreover, the divorce courts have two excuses for their laxity. First,
the divorce courts are always greatly overburdened with the number of
cases before them; and, secondly, public opinion, which the courts as
well as other phases of our government largely reflect, favors this
laxity. This is shown by the fact that public opinion stands back of the
lax divorce statutes of many states, all efforts to radically change
these statutes having failed of recent years.

(10) Our study of the family has accustomed us to the thought that the
family is an institution which, like all other human institutions,
undergoes constant changes. Now at periods of change in any institution,
periods of transition from one type to another, there is apt to be a
period of confusion. The old type of institution is never replaced at
once by a new type of institution ready-made and adjusted to the social
life, but only gradually does the new institution emerge from the
elements of the old. In the meantime, however, there may be a
considerable period of confusion and anarchy. This social principle, we
may note, rests upon a deeper psychological principle, that old habits
are usually not replaced by new habits without an intervening period of
confusion and uncertainty. In other words, in the transition from the
old habit to the new habit there is much opportunity for disorganization
and disintegration. It is exactly so in human society, because social
institutions are but expressions of habit.

Now, the old semipatriarchal type of the family, which prevailed down to
the beginning of the nineteenth century, the type of the family which we
might perhaps properly call the monarchical type, has been disappearing
for the past one hundred years,--is in fact already practically extinct,
at least in America, but we have not yet built up a new type of the
family to take its place. The old semipatriarchal family of our
forefathers has gone, but no new type of the family has yet become
general. A democratic type of the family in harmony with our democratic
civilization must be evolved. But such a democratic type of the family
can be stable only upon the condition that its stability is within
itself and not without. Authority in various coercive forms made the old
type of the family stable, but a stable basis for a new type of the
family has not yet been found, or rather it has not been found by large
elements of our population. Unquestionably a democratic ethical type of
the family in which the rights of every one are respected and all
members are bound together, not through fear or through force of
authority, but through love and affection, is being evolved in certain
classes of our society. The problem before our civilization is whether
such a democratic ethical type of the family can become generalized and
offer a stable family life to our whole population. It is evident that
in order to do this there must be a considerable development, not only
of the spirit of equality, but even more, a considerable development of
social intelligence and ethical character in the minds of the people. To
construct a stable family life of this character, however, which is
apparently the only type which will meet the demands of modern
civilization,--is not an impossibility, but is a delicate and difficult
task which will require all the resources of the state, the school, and
the church. There is, however, no ground as yet for pessimism regarding
the future of our family life; rather all its instability and
demoralization of the present are simply incident, we must believe, to
the achievement of a higher type of the family than the world has yet
seen. Such a higher type, however, will not come about without effort
and forethought on the part of society's leaders.

Remedies for the Divorce Evil.--That the instability of the family and
divorce, so far as it is an expression of that instability, is an evil
in society is implied in all that has thus far been said concerning the
origin, development, and functions of the family as an institution. We
shall not stop, therefore, to argue this point since all preceding
chapters amount to an argument upon this question. It may be added,
however, that in so far as observations have been made of the results of
divorce upon children, that the argument has been substantiated, for
apparently the children of separated or divorced parents are much more
apt to drift into poverty, vice, or crime, that is, into the
unsocialized classes, than children who do not come from such disrupted
homes. Assuming, then, without further argument that divorce, or rather
the instability of the family, is an evil in modern society, the
question arises, how can it be remedied?

If, as has already been implied, the real evil is not so much divorce as
the decay of the family life, then it at once becomes evident that
legislation can do little to correct the real evil. That it can do
nothing, and that an attitude of _laissez-faire_ is justified upon
this question, is, of course, not implied. As we have already noted, the
difference between the few divorces of the Dominion of Canada and the
many divorces of the United States is largely due to a difference of
laws; nevertheless, we cannot assume from this that there is a like
difference in the state of the family life of the two countries.
Unquestionably, however, legislation can do something even in the way of
setting moral ideals before a people. Divorce laws should not be too lax
if we do not wish a state to set low moral standards for its citizens.
It is not too much to say, therefore, that the lax divorce laws of many
of our states are a crime against civilization, even though making these
laws much stricter might not of itself greatly check the decay of the
family. Again, reasonable restrictions upon the remarriage of divorced
parties might very well be insisted upon by law for the sake of public
decency if nothing more. Present laws in many states permit the
remarriage of divorced parties immediately upon granting of divorce. It
would seem that a law requiring the innocent party to wait at least six
months, and the guilty party to wait from two to five years and then
give evidence of good conduct before being permitted to remarry, would
work a hardship upon no one. Again, a uniform federal divorce and
marriage law might have some good effects upon the family life of the
nation. Divorce and marriage are of such general importance that they
should be controlled by federal statutes rather than by state laws. If
such an amendment to our present federal constitution were enacted, it
might not result in greatly decreasing the number of divorces in this
country, but it would result in bringing about uniformity in the
different states in the matter of marriage as well as in the matter of
divorce, which, from many points of view, is desirable. Moreover, if
divorce were under federal control this would throw all divorce cases
into the federal courts, and would, perhaps, secure a stricter
administration of divorce laws.

But it is evident that the main reliance in combating the evils which
have given rise to the present instability of our family life must be
placed upon education rather than upon legislation. Legislation, we may
here note, has many shortcomings as an instrument of social
reconstruction or reform. Legislation is necessarily external and
coercive. It fails oftentimes to change the habits of individuals, and
very generally fails to change their opinion. Education, on the other
hand, alters human nature directly, changing both the opinions and
habits of the individual. Neither education nor legislation can be
neglected in social reconstruction. Both are necessary, but supplement
each other. But from the time of Plato down all social thinkers have
perceived the fact that education is a surer and safer means of
reorganizing society than legislation. While, therefore, I would not
oppose education to legislation, I would say that emphasis in all social
reform should be laid upon education rather than coercive legislative
action, and especially in this case of relaying the foundations for a
stable family life in our country. The main reliance, then, in this
matter must be placed upon the education which the school, the church,
and the home can give to the rising generation. Until children are
taught to look upon the family as a socially necessary and therefore
sacred institution, until they are taught to look upon marriage as
something other than an act to suit their own convenience and pleasure,
we must expect that our family life will be unstable. The
reconstruction of our family life, indeed, practically involves the
reconstruction of our whole social life. Things in industry, in
business, in politics, in the conventions and ideals and general spirit
of our people, that are opposed to stability in family relations, must
be remedied before we can strike at the root of the evil. All of this
may be taken for granted; but it would seem that the moral education of
the young is the key to the situation in any event. The importance of a
pure and wholesome family life in society should, therefore, be
emphasized by our whole system of public education, while the
responsibility which rests upon the church in this connection is
especially obvious; but the home itself must, it may be admitted, be the
chief means of inculcating in the young the sacredness of the family.
Inasmuch as this cannot be done in homes that are already demoralized,
the main hope must be that such education will be given to children in
homes that are as yet relatively pure and stable. Movements toward such
education already exist in society, and, as we have already said, there
is no reason for pessimism, if we take a long view of the situation. But
it is nevertheless evident that the instability of the family must be
regarded as the greatest of our social problems to-day.

Summary Regarding the Influence of Industrial Conditions upon the
Present Instability of the Family.--As we have already seen, the
development of modern industry is one of the chief causes of the decay
of modern family life. Certain aspects of our industrialism, such as the
labor of women and children in factories, the growth of cities, and the
loss of the home through the slum and the tenement, the higher standards
of living and comfort, and the resulting higher age of marriage,--all of
these have had, to a certain extent at least, a disastrous effect upon
the family. Some of these things, like the growth of cities, seem
inseparable from modern industrial development. The problem must be,
therefore, how to overcome the evil effect of these tendencies in
industry upon the home. There is no reason for believing that such evil
effects cannot be overcome, although the problem is a difficult one. Our
aim should be, not to stop industrial development, but to guide it and
control it in the interest of the higher development of the family. That
this is entirely feasible may already be seen from what has been
accomplished in the way of regulating the labor of women and children
and in the way of providing better conditions in the homes of the
working population.

There is, however, nothing in evidence in the causes of increasing
divorce in the United States which warrants the belief that American
industrial development is alone responsible for the increasing
instability of our family life. The industrial development of America is
less peculiar in many ways than its political and social development.
Divorce and instability of the family, as we have seen, characterize the
American people more than any other civilized population. This fact,
then, cannot be explained entirely in terms of American industrial
development, but we must look also, as has already been emphasized, to
certain peculiarities in American character, American institutions, and
American ideas and ideals. The divorce movement in the United States
affords no proof of the theory of economic determinism.


SELECT REFERENCES


_For brief reading:_

WILLCOX, _The Divorce Problem: A Study in Statistics._
ADLER, _Marriage and Divorce_, Lecture II.
Special Report on _Marriage and Divorce_, 1867-1906, Bureau of the Census.


_For more extended reading:_

HOWARD, _History of Matrimonial Institutions._
LICHTENBERGER, _Divorce: A Study in Social Causation._
WOLSEY, _Divorce and Divorce Legislation._
WRIGHT, _First Special Report of United States Commissioner of Labor:
Marriage and Divorce_, 1891.







CHAPTER VIII


THE GROWTH OF POPULATION

Mass is a factor in the survival of a social group. Other things being
equal, that society will stand the best chance of surviving which has
the largest population. Moreover, the larger the mass of a given group
the greater can be the industrial and cultural division of labor in that
group. Hence, other things being equal, a large population favors the
growth not only of a higher type of industry, but also of a higher type
of culture or civilization in a given society. The questions which
center around the growth of population, therefore, are among the most
important questions which sociology has to deal with.

The growth of population is, of course, more or less indirectly
connected with the family life, since the growth of population in the
world as a whole is dependent upon the surplus of births over deaths.
But population has so long been looked at as a national question that
perhaps it will be best to study it from the standpoint of the national
group. The population of modern national groups, the influences which
augment and deter the growth of the population of these groups, and the
laws of population in general, will be what will concern us in this
chapter.

Population Statistics of Some Modern Nations.--The following table of
statistics will show the status of the populations of the largest
nations of Europe and America in the nineteenth century:


Population, Population, Increase per
1801. 1901. Year, per cent.

Russia (in Europe) ... 40,000,000 106,159,000 1.36
Germany .............. 24,000,000 56,367,000 1.39
France ............... 26,800,000 38,961,000 0.12
Great Britain and
Ireland .............. 16,300,000 41,605,000 1.21
Austria .............. 25,000,000 45,310,000 0.91
Italy ................ 17,500,000 32,449,000 0.73
Spain ................ 10,500,000 18,000,000 0.32
United States ........ 5,308,000 76,303,000 2.09


This table shows, that while the population of nearly all of these
nations has increased rapidly within the nineteenth century, that the
increase is relatively unequal in some cases. If we project Russia's
increase of population to the year 2000 A.D., we shall find that its
probable population will be in the neighborhood of 300,000,000;
Germany's probable population, say 167,000,000; Great Britain and
Ireland's probable population, 135,000,000; while France's probable
population in the year two thousand, if it continues to increase only at
its present slow rate, will be but 45,000,000. While these forecasts of
population cannot be considered certain in any sense, still they are
sufficient to show that the growth of modern nations in population is
relatively unequal. Inasmuch as the mere element of numbers is one of
the greatest factors for the future greatness of any nation, this is a
highly important matter. A nation of only 40,000,000 a century hence, it
is safe to say, will be no more important than Holland and Belgium are
now. On the other hand, it is very probable that a century hence the
civilized nations that lead in population will also lead in industrial
and cultural development. Many other factors, of course, enter into the
situation, but the factor of mere numbers should not be neglected, as
all practical statesmen recognize.

A century hence it is probable that the population of continental United
States will be about 300,000,000. It would be considerably more than
this if the present annual rate of increase were to continue, but
inasmuch as that is not likely, an estimate of 300,000,000 is
sufficiently high. [Footnote: The official estimate by the Census Bureau
is 200,000,000; but this for many reasons seems too low.] We have
already seen that it is probable that Russia's population may equal
300,000,000 by the year 2000. It seems probable, therefore, that the
United States and Russia may be the two great world powers a century
hence, particularly if Russia emerges from its present social and
political troubles and takes on fully Western civilization, while the
other nations may tend to ally themselves with the one or the other of
these great world powers. Of course, China is the _X_--the unknown
quantity--in the world's future. Should its immense population become
civilized and absorb Western ideas, this would certainly bring into the
theater of the world's political evolution a new and important factor.

The population and vital statistics of the various civilized countries
show:--

(1) The population of all civilized countries, with one or two
exceptions, has been increasing rapidly since the beginning of the
nineteenth century. Previous to that time we have no statistics that are
reliable, but it seems probable that the population of Europe stood
practically stationary during the Middle Ages and increased only slowly
down to the nineteenth century; but during the nineteenth century the
population of the leading industrial nations has increased very rapidly.
This is due primarily, without doubt, to improved economic conditions,
which has made it possible for a larger population to subsist within a
given area. Back of these improved economic conditions, however, has
been increased scientific knowledge in ways of mastering physical
nature, and accompanying them has been a very greatly decreased death
rate, due in part at least to the advance of medical science.

(2) This increase in population has been due, not to an increase in
birth rate, but to a decreased death rate. During the nineteenth century
the death rate decreased markedly in practically all civilized
countries. As we have already noted, this is due primarily to improved
living conditions, particularly in the food, clothing, and shelter for
the masses, but it has also been due in no small part to the advance in
medical science, and especially that branch of it which we know as
"public sanitation." Because the death rate decreases with improved
material, and probably also with improved moral conditions, it is a
relatively good measure, at least of the material civilization or
progress of a people. We may note that the death rate is measured by the
number of deaths that occur annually per thousand in a given population.
The death rate of the countries most advanced in sanitary science and in
industrial improvement apparently tends to go down to about fifteen or
sixteen per thousand annually.

(3) The birth rate of civilized countries has also fallen markedly
during the nineteenth century, especially during the latter half. On the
whole, this is a good thing. The birth rate should decrease with the
death rate. This leaves more energy to be used in other things; but when
the birth rate falls more rapidly than the death rate or falls beyond a
certain point, it is evident that the normal growth of a nation is
hindered, and even its extinction may be threatened. While an
excessively high birth rate is a sign of low culture on the whole, on
the other hand an excessively low birth rate is a sign of physical and
probably moral degeneracy in the population. When the birth rate is
lower than the death rate in a given population, it is evident that the
population is on the way to extinction. In order that a birth rate be
normal, therefore, it must be sufficiently above the death rate to
provide for the normal growth of the population. On the whole, it seems
safe to conclude that we have no better index of the vitality of a
people, that is, of their capacity to survive, than the surplus of
births over deaths. Such a surplus of births over deaths is also a
fairly trustworthy index of the living conditions of a population,
because if the living conditions are poor, no matter how high the birth
rate may be, the death rate will be correspondingly high, and the
surplus of births over deaths, therefore, relatively low.

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