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Politics

A >> Aristotle >> Politics




We have already said, that all the members of the community will
dispute with each other for the offices of the state; and in some
particulars justly, but not so in general; the rich, for instance,
because they have the greatest landed property, and the ultimate right
to the soil is vested in the community; and also because their
fidelity is in general most to be depended on. The freemen and men of
family will dispute the point with each other, as nearly on an
equality; for these latter have a right to a higher regard as citizens
than obscure persons, for honourable descent is everywhere of great
esteem: nor is it an improper conclusion, that the descendants of men
of worth will be men of worth themselves; for noble birth is the
fountain of virtue to men of family: for the same reason also we
justly say, that virtue has a right to put in her pretensions.
Justice, for instance, is a virtue, and so necessary to society, that
all others must yield her the precedence.

Let us now see what the many have to urge on their side against the
few; and they may say, that if, when collectively taken, they are
compared with them, they are stronger, richer, and better than they
are. But should it ever happen that all these should inhabit the
[1283b] same city, I mean the good, the rich, the noble, as well as
the many, such as usually make up the community, I ask, will there
then be any reason to dispute concerning who shall govern, or will
there not? for in every community which we have mentioned there is no
dispute where the supreme power should be placed; for as these differ
from each other, so do those in whom that is placed; for in one state
the rich enjoy it, in others the meritorious, and thus each according
to their separate manners. Let us however consider what is to be done
when all these happen at the same time to inhabit the same city. If
the virtuous should be very few in number, how then shall we act?
shall we prefer the virtuous on account of their abilities, if they
are capable of governing the city? or should they be so many as almost
entirely to compose the state?

There is also a doubt concerning the pretensions of all those who
claim the honours of government: for those who found them either on
fortune or family have nothing which they can justly say in their
defence; since it is evident upon their principle, that if any one
person can be found richer than all the rest, the right of governing
all these will be justly vested in this one person. In the same
manner, one man who is of the best family will claim it from those who
dispute the point upon family merit: and probably in an aristocracy
the same dispute might arise on the score of virtue, if there is one
man better than all the other men of worth who are in the same
community; it seems just, by the same reasoning, that he should enjoy
the supreme power. And upon this principle also, while the many
suppose they ought to have the supreme command, as being more powerful
than the few, if one or more than one, though a small number should be
found stronger than themselves, these ought rather to have it than
they.

All these things seem to make it plain, that none of these principles
are justly founded on which these persons would establish their right
to the supreme power; and that all men whatsoever ought to obey them:
for with respect to those who claim it as due to their virtue or their
fortune, they might have justly some objection to make; for nothing
hinders but that it may sometimes happen, that the many may be better
or richer than the few, not as individuals, but in their collective
capacity.

As to the doubt which some persons have proposed and objected, we may
answer it in this manner; it is this, whether a legislator, who would
establish the most perfect system of laws, should calculate them for
the use of the better part of the citizens, or the many, in the
circumstances we have already mentioned? The rectitude of anything
consists in its equality; that therefore which is equally right will
be advantageous to the whole state, and to every member of it in
common.

Now, in general, a citizen is one who both shares in the government
and also in his turn submits to be governed; [1284a] their condition,
it is true, is different in different states: the best is that in
which a man is enabled to choose and to persevere in a course of
virtue during his whole life, both in his public and private state.
But should there be one person, or a very few, eminent for an uncommon
degree of virtue, though not enough to make up a civil state, so that
the virtue of the many, or their political abilities, should be too
inferior to come in comparison with theirs, if more than one; or if
but one, with his only; such are not to be considered as part of the
city; for it would be doing them injustice to rate them on a level
with those who are so far their inferiors in virtue and political
abilities, that they appear to them like a god amongst men. From
whence it is evident, that a system of laws must be calculated for
those who are equal to each other in nature and power. Such men,
therefore, are not the object of law; for they are themselves a law:
and it would be ridiculous in any one to endeavour to include them in
the penalties of a law: for probably they might say what Antisthenes
tells us the lions did to the hares when they demanded to be admitted
to an equal share with them in the government. And it is on this
account that democratic states have established the ostracism; for an
equality seems the principal object of their government. For which
reason they compel all those who are very eminent for their power,
their fortune, their friendships, or any other cause which may give
them too great weight in the government, to submit to the ostracism,
and leave the city for a stated time; as the fabulous histories relate
the Argonauts served Hercules, for they refused to take him with them
in the ship Argo on account of his superior valour. For which reason
those who hate a tyranny and find fault with the advice which
Periander gave to Thrasybulus, must not think there was nothing to be
said in its defence; for the story goes, that Periander said nothing
to the messenger in answer to the business he was consulted about, but
striking off those ears of corn which were higher than the rest,
reduced the whole crop to a level; so that the messenger, without
knowing the cause of what was done, related the fact to Thrasybulus,
who understood by it that he must take off all the principal men in
the city. Nor is this serviceable to tyrants only; nor is it tyrants
only who do it; for the same thing is practised both in oligarchies
and democracies: for the ostracism has in a manner nearly the same
power, by restraining and banishing those who are too great; and what
is done in one city is done also by those who have the supreme power
in separate states; as the Athenians with respect to the Samians, the
Chians, and the Lesbians; for when they suddenly acquired the
superiority over all Greece, they brought the other states into
subjection, contrary to the treaties which subsisted between them. The
King of Persia also very often reduces the Medes and Babylonians when
they assume upon their former power: [1284b] and this is a principle
which all governments whatsoever keep in their eye; even those which
are best administered, as well as those which are not, do it; these
for the sake of private utility, the others for the public good.

The same thing is to be perceived in the other arts and sciences; for
a painter would not represent an animal with a foot disproportionally
large, though he had drawn it remarkably beautiful; nor would the
shipwright make the prow or any other part of the vessel larger than
it ought to be; nor will the master of the band permit any who sings
louder and better than the rest to sing in concert with them. There is
therefore no reason that a monarch should not act in agreement with
free states, to support his own power, if they do the same thing for
the benefit of their respective communities; upon which account when
there is any acknowledged difference in the power of the citizens, the
reason upon which the ostracism is founded will be politically just;
but it is better for the legislator so to establish his state at the
beginning as not to want this remedy: but if in course of time such an
inconvenience should arise, to endeavour to amend it by some such
correction. Not that this was the use it was put to: for many did not
regard the benefit of their respective communities, but made the
ostracism a weapon in the hand of sedition.

It is evident, then, that in corrupt governments it is partly just and
useful to the individual, though probably it is as clear that it is
not entirely just: for in a well-governed state there may be great
doubts about the use of it, not on account of the pre-eminence which
one may have in strength, riches, or connection: but when the
pre-eminence is virtue, what then is to be done? for it seems not
right to turn out and banish such a one; neither does it seem right to
govern him, for that would be like desiring to share the power with
Jupiter and to govern him: nothing then remains but what indeed seems
natural, and that is for all persons quietly to submit to the
government of those who are thus eminently virtuous, and let them be
perpetually kings in the separate states.




CHAPTER XIV


What has been now said, it seems proper to change our subject and to
inquire into the nature of monarchies; for we have already admitted
them to be one of those species of government which are properly
founded. And here let us consider whether a kingly government is
proper for a city or a country whose principal object is the happiness
of the inhabitants, or rather some other. But let us first determine
whether this is of one kind only, or more; [1285a] and it is easy to
know that it consists of many different species, and that the forms of
government are not the same in all: for at Sparta the kingly power
seems chiefly regulated by the laws; for it is not supreme in all
circumstances; but when the king quits the territories of the state he
is their general in war; and all religious affairs are entrusted to
him: indeed the kingly power with them is chiefly that of a general
who cannot be called to an account for his conduct, and whose command
is for life: for he has not the power of life and death, except as a
general; as they frequently had in their expeditions by martial law,
which we learn from Homer; for when Agamemnon is affronted in council,
he restrains his resentment, but when he is in the field and armed
with this power, he tells the Greeks:

"Whoe'er I know shall shun th' impending fight, To dogs and
vultures soon shall be a prey; For death is mine. . . ."

This, then, is one species of monarchical government in which the
kingly power is in a general for life; and is sometimes hereditary,
sometimes elective: besides, there is also another, which is to be met
with among some of the barbarians, in which the kings are invested
with powers nearly equal to a tyranny, yet are, in some respects,
bound by the laws and the customs of their country; for as the
barbarians are by nature more prone to slavery than the Greeks, and
those in Asia more than those in Europe, they endure without murmuring
a despotic government; for this reason their governments are
tyrannies; but yet not liable to be overthrown, as being customary and
according to law. Their guards also are such as are used in a kingly
government, not a despotic one; for the guards of their kings are his
citizens, but a tyrant's are foreigners. The one commands, in the
manner the law directs, those who willingly obey; the other,
arbitrarily, those who consent not. The one, therefore, is guarded by
the citizens, the other against them.

These, then, are the two different sorts of these monarchies, and
another is that which in ancient Greece they called _aesumnetes_;
which is nothing more than an elective tyranny; and its difference
from that which is to be found amongst the barbarians consists not in
its' not being according to law, but only in its not being according
to the ancient customs of the country. Some persons possessed this
power for life, others only for a particular time or particular
purpose, as the people of Mitylene elected Pittacus to oppose the
exiles, who were headed by Antimenides and Alcaeus the poet, as we
learn from a poem of his; for he upbraids the Mitylenians for having
chosen Pittacus for their tyrant, and with one [1285b] voice extolling
him to the skies who was the ruin of a rash and devoted people. These
sorts of government then are, and ever were, despotic, on account of
their being tyrannies; but inasmuch as they are elective, and over a
free people, they are also kingly.

A fourth species of kingly government is that which was in use in the
heroic times, when a free people submitted to a kingly government,
according to the laws and customs of their country. For those who were
at first of benefit to mankind, either in arts or arms, or by
collecting them into civil society, or procuring them an
establishment, became the kings of a willing people, and established
an hereditary monarchy. They were particularly their generals in war,
and presided over their sacrifices, excepting such only as belonged to
the priests: they were also the supreme judges over the people; and in
this case some of them took an oath, others did not; they did, the
form of swearing was by their sceptre held out.

In ancient times the power of the kings extended to everything
whatsoever, both civil, domestic, and foreign; but in after-times they
relinquished some of their privileges, and others the people assumed,
so that, in some states, they left their kings only the right of
presiding over the sacrifices; and even those whom it were worth while
to call by that name had only the right of being commander-in-chief in
their foreign wars.

These, then, are the four sorts of kingdoms : the first is that of the
heroic times; which was a government over a free people, with its
rights in some particulars marked out; for the king was their general,
their judge, and their high priest. The second, that of the
barbarians; which is an hereditary despotic government regulated by
laws: the third is that which they call aesumnetic, which is an
elective tyranny. The fourth is the Lacedaemonian; and this, in few
words, is nothing more than an hereditary generalship: and in these
particulars they differ from each other. There is a fifth species of
kingly government, which is when one person has a supreme power over
all things whatsoever, in the manner that every state and every city
has over those things which belong to the public: for as the master of
a family is king in his own house, so such a king is master of a
family in his own city or state.




CHAPTER XV


But the different sorts of kingly governments may, if I may so say, be
reduced to two; which we will consider more particularly. The last
spoken of, and the Lacedaemonian, for the chief of the others are
placed between these, which are as it were at the extremities, they
having less power than an absolute government, and yet more than the
Lacedaemonians; so that the whole matter in question may be reduced to
these two points; the one is, whether it is advantageous to the
citizens to have the office of general continue in one person for
life, and whether it should be confined to any particular families or
whether every one should be eligible: the other, whether [1286a] it is
advantageous for one person to have the supreme power over everything
or not. But to enter into the particulars concerning the office of a
Lacedaemonian general would be rather to frame laws for a state than
to consider the nature and utility of its constitution, since we know
that the appointing of a general is what is done in every state.
Passing over this question then, we will proceed to consider the other
part of their government, which is the polity of the state; and this
it will be necessary to examine particularly into, and to go through
such questions as may arise.

Now the first thing which presents itself to our consideration is
this, whether it is best to be governed by a good man, or by good
laws? Those who prefer a kingly government think that laws can only
speak a general language, but cannot adapt themselves to particular
circumstances; for which reason it is absurd in any science to follow
written rule; and even in Egypt the physician was allowed to alter the
mode of cure which the law prescribed to him, after the fourth day;
but if he did it sooner it was at his own peril: from whence it is
evident, on the very same account, that a government of written laws
is not the best; and yet general reasoning is necessary to all those
who are to govern, and it will be much more perfect in those who are
entirely free from passions than in those to whom they are natural.
But now this is a quality which laws possess; while the other is
natural to the human soul. But some one will say in answer to this,
that man will be a better judge of particulars. It will be necessary,
then, for a king to be a lawgiver, and that his laws should be
published, but that those should have no authority which are absurd,
as those which are not, should. But whether is it better for the
community that those things which cannot possibly come under the
cognisance of the law either at all or properly should be under the
government of every worthy citizen, as the present method is, when the
public community, in their general assemblies, act as judges and
counsellors, where all their determinations are upon particular cases,
for one individual, be he who he will, will be found, upon comparison,
inferior to a whole people taken collectively: but this is what a city
is, as a public entertainment is better than one man's portion: for
this reason the multitude judge of many things better than any one
single person. They are also less liable to corruption from their
numbers, as water is from its quantity: besides, the judgment of an
individual must necessarily be perverted if he is overcome by anger or
any other passion; but it would be hard indeed if the whole community
should be misled by anger. Moreover, let the people be free, and they
will do nothing but in conformity to the law, except only in those
cases which the law cannot speak to. But though what I am going to
propose may not easily be met with, yet if the majority of the state
should happen to be good men, should they prefer one uncorrupt
governor or many equally good, is it not evident that they should
choose the many? But there may be divisions among [1286b] these which
cannot happen when there is but one. In answer to this it may be
replied that all their souls will be as much animated with virtue as
this one man's.

If then a government of many, and all of them good men, compose an
aristocracy, and the government of one a kingly power, it is evident
that the people should rather choose the first than the last; and this
whether the state is powerful or not, if many such persons so alike
can be met with: and for this reason probable it was, that the first
governments were generally monarchies; because it was difficult to
find a number of persons eminently virtuous, more particularly as the
world was then divided into small communities; besides, kings were
appointed in return for the benefits they had conferred on mankind;
but such actions are peculiar to good men: but when many persons equal
in virtue appeared at the time, they brooked not a superiority, but
sought after an equality and established a free state; but after this,
when they degenerated, they made a property of the public; which
probably gave rise to oligarchies; for they made wealth meritorious,
and the honours of government were reserved for the rich: and these
afterwards turned to tyrannies and these in their turn gave rise to
democracies; for the power of the tyrants continually decreasing, on
account of their rapacious avarice, the people grew powerful enough to
frame and establish democracies: and as cities after that happened to
increase, probably it was not easy for them to be under any other
government than a democracy. But if any person prefers a kingly
government in a state, what is to be done with the king's children? Is
the family also to reign? But should they have such children as some
persons usually have, it will be very detrimental. It may be said,
that then the king who has it in his power will never permit such
children to succeed to his kingdom. But it is not easy to trust to
that; for it is very hard and requires greater virtue than is to be
met with in human nature. There is also a doubt concerning the power
with which a king should be entrusted: whether he should be allowed
force sufficient to compel those who do not choose to be obedient to
the laws, and how he is to support his government? for if he is to
govern according to law and do nothing of his own will which is
contrary thereunto, at the same time it will be necessary to protect
that power with which he guards the law, This matter however may not
be very difficult to determine; for he ought to have a proper power,
and such a one is that which will be sufficient to make the king
superior to any one person or even a large part of the community, but
inferior to the whole, as the ancients always appointed guards for
that person whom they created aesumnetes or tyrant; and some one
advised the Syracusians, when Dionysius asked for guards, to allow him
such.




CHAPTER XVI


[1287a] We will next consider the absolute monarch that we have just
mentioned, who does everything according to his own will: for a king
governing under the direction of laws which he is obliged to follow
does not of himself create any particular species of government, as we
have already said: for in every state whatsoever, either aristocracy
or democracy, it is easy to appoint a general for life; and there are
many who entrust the administration of affairs to one person only;
such is the government at Dyrrachium, and nearly the same at Opus. As
for an absolute monarchy as it is called, that is to say, when the
whole state is wholly subject to the will of one person, namely the
king, it seems to many that it is unnatural that one man should have
the entire rule over his fellow-citizens when the state consists of
equals: for nature requires that the same right and the same rank
should necessarily take place amongst all those who are equal by
nature: for as it would be hurtful to the body for those who are of
different constitutions to observe the same regimen, either of diet or
clothing, so is it with respect to the honours of the state as
hurtful, that those who are equal in merit should be unequal in rank;
for which reason it is as much a man's duty to submit to command as to
assume it, and this also by rotation; for this is law, for order is
law; and it is more proper that law should govern than any one of the
citizens: upon the same principle, if it is advantageous to place the
supreme power in some particular persons, they should be appointed to
be only guardians, and the servants of the laws, for the supreme power
must be placed somewhere; but they say, that it is unjust that where
all are equal one person should continually enjoy it. But it seems
unlikely that man should be able to adjust that which the law cannot
determine; it may be replied, that the law having laid down the best
rules possible, leaves the adjustment and application of particulars
to the discretion of the magistrate; besides, it allows anything to be
altered which experience proves may be better established. Moreover,
he who would place the supreme power in mind, would place it in God
and the laws; but he who entrusts man with it, gives it to a wild
beast, for such his appetites sometimes make him; for passion
influences those who are in power, even the very best of men: for
which reason law is reason without desire.

The instance taken from the arts seems fallacious: wherein it is said
to be wrong for a sick person to apply for a remedy to books, but that
it would be far more eligible to employ those who are skilful in
physic; for these do nothing contrary to reason from motives of
friendship but earn their money by curing the sick, whereas those who
have the management of public affairs do many things through hatred or
favour. And, as a proof of what we have advanced, it may be observed,
that whenever a sick person suspects that his physician has been
persuaded by his enemies to be guilty of any foul practice to him in
his profession, he then rather chooses to apply to books for his cure:
and not only this [1287b] but even physicians themselves when they are
ill call in other physicians: and those who teach others the gymnastic
exercises, exercise with those of the same profession, as being
incapable from self-partiality to form a proper judgment of what
concerns themselves. From whence it is evident, that those who seek
for what is just, seek for a mean; now law is a mean. Moreover; the
moral law is far superior and conversant with far superior objects
than the written law; for the supreme magistrate is safer to be
trusted to than the one, though he is inferior to the other. But as it
is impossible that one person should have an eye to everything
himself, it will be necessary that the supreme magistrate should
employ several subordinate ones under him; why then should not this be
done at first, instead of appointing one person in this manner?
Besides, if, according to what has been already said, the man of worth
is on that account fit to govern, two men of worth are certainly
better than one: as, for instance, in Homer, "Let two together go:"
and also Agamemnon's wish; "Were ten such faithful counsel mine!" Not
but that there are even now some particular magistrates invested with
supreme power to decide, as judges, those things which the law cannot,
as being one of those cases which comes not properly under its
jurisdiction; for of those which can there is no doubt: since then
laws comprehend some things, but not all, it is necessary to enquire
and consider which of the two is preferable, that the best man or the
best law should govern; for to reduce every subject which can come
under the deliberation of man into a law is impossible.

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