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LIFE, ETC.: J. W. Blakesley, 1839; A Crichton (Jardine's Naturalist's
Library), 1843; J. S. Blackie, Four Phases of Morals, Socrates,
Aristotle, etc., 1871; G. Grote, Aristotle, edited by A. Bain and G.
C. Robertson, 1872, 1880; E. Wallace, Outlines of the Philosophy of
Aristotle, 1875, 1880; A. Grant (Ancient Classics for English
readers), 1877; T. Davidson, Aristotle and Ancient Educational Ideals
(Great Educators), 1892.




A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT




BOOK I




CHAPTER I


As we see that every city is a society, and every society Ed. is
established for some good purpose; for an apparent [Bekker 1252a] good
is the spring of all human actions; it is evident that this is the
principle upon which they are every one founded, and this is more
especially true of that which has for its object the best possible,
and is itself the most excellent, and comprehends all the rest. Now
this is called a city, and the society thereof a political society;
for those who think that the principles of a political, a regal, a
family, and a herile government are the same are mistaken, while they
suppose that each of these differ in the numbers to whom their power
extends, but not in their constitution: so that with them a herile
government is one composed of a very few, a domestic of more, a civil
and a regal of still more, as if there was no difference between a
large family and a small city, or that a regal government and a
political one are the same, only that in the one a single person is
continually at the head of public affairs; in the other, that each
member of the state has in his turn a share in the government, and is
at one time a magistrate, at another a private person, according to
the rules of political science. But now this is not true, as will be
evident to any one who will consider this question in the most
approved method. As, in an inquiry into every other subject, it is
necessary to separate the different parts of which it is compounded,
till we arrive at their first elements, which are the most minute
parts thereof; so by the same proceeding we shall acquire a knowledge
of the primary parts of a city and see wherein they differ from each
other, and whether the rules of art will give us any assistance in
examining into each of these things which are mentioned.





CHAPTER II


Now if in this particular science any one would attend to its original
seeds, and their first shoot, he would then as in others have the
subject perfectly before him; and perceive, in the first place, that
it is requisite that those should be joined together whose species
cannot exist without each other, as the male and the female, for the
business of propagation; and this not through choice, but by that
natural impulse which acts both upon plants and animals also, for the
purpose of their leaving behind them others like themselves. It is
also from natural causes that some beings command and others obey,
that each may obtain their mutual safety; for a being who is endowed
with a mind capable of reflection and forethought is by nature the
superior and governor, whereas he whose excellence is merely corporeal
is formect to be a slave; whence it follows that the different state
of master [1252b] and slave is equally advantageous to both. But there
is a natural difference between a female and a slave: for nature is
not like the artists who make the Delphic swords for the use of the
poor, but for every particular purpose she has her separate
instruments, and thus her ends are most complete, for whatsoever is
employed on one subject only, brings that one to much greater
perfection than when employed on many; and yet among the barbarians, a
female and a slave are upon a level in the community, the reason for
which is, that amongst them there are none qualified by nature to
govern, therefore their society can be nothing but between slaves of
different sexes. For which reason the poets say, it is proper for the
Greeks to govern the barbarians, as if a barbarian and a slave were by
nature one. Now of these two societies the domestic is the first, and
Hesiod is right when he says, "First a house, then a wife, then an ox
for the plough," for the poor man has always an ox before a household
slave. That society then which nature has established for daily
support is the domestic, and those who compose it are called by
Charondas _homosipuoi_, and by Epimenides the Cretan _homokapnoi_; but
the society of many families, which was first instituted for their
lasting, mutual advantage, is called a village, and a village is most
naturally composed of the descendants of one family, whom some persons
call homogalaktes, the children and the children's children thereof:
for which reason cities were originally governed by kings, as the
barbarian states now are, which are composed of those who had before
submitted to kingly government; for every family is governed by the
elder, as are the branches thereof, on account of their relationship
thereunto, which is what Homer says, "Each one ruled his wife and
child;" and in this scattered manner they formerly lived. And the
opinion which universally prevails, that the gods themselves are
subject to kingly government, arises from hence, that all men formerly
were, and many are so now; and as they imagined themselves to be made
in the likeness of the gods, so they supposed their manner of life
must needs be the same. And when many villages so entirely join
themselves together as in every respect to form but one society, that
society is a city, and contains in itself, if I may so speak, the end
and perfection of government: first founded that we might live, but
continued that we may live happily. For which reason every city must
be allowed to be the work of nature, if we admit that the original
society between male and female is; for to this as their end all
subordinate societies tend, and the end of everything is the nature of
it. For what every being is in its most perfect state, that certainly
is the nature of that being, whether it be a man, a horse, or a house:
besides, whatsoever produces the final cause and the end which we
[1253a] desire, must be best; but a government complete in itself is
that final cause and what is best. Hence it is evident that a city is
a natural production, and that man is naturally a political animal,
and that whosoever is naturally and not accidentally unfit for
society, must be either inferior or superior to man: thus the man in
Homer, who is reviled for being "without society, without law, without
family." Such a one must naturally be of a quarrelsome disposition,
and as solitary as the birds. The gift of speech also evidently proves
that man is a more social animal than the bees, or any of the herding
cattle: for nature, as we say, does nothing in vain, and man is the
only animal who enjoys it. Voice indeed, as being the token of
pleasure and pain, is imparted to others also, and thus much their
nature is capable of, to perceive pleasure and pain, and to impart
these sensations to others; but it is by speech that we are enabled to
express what is useful for us, and what is hurtful, and of course what
is just and what is unjust: for in this particular man differs from
other animals, that he alone has a perception of good and evil, of
just and unjust, and it is a participation of these common sentiments
which forms a family and a city. Besides, the notion of a city
naturally precedes that of a family or an individual, for the whole
must necessarily be prior to the parts, for if you take away the whole
man, you cannot say a foot or a hand remains, unless by equivocation,
as supposing a hand of stone to be made, but that would only be a dead
one; but everything is understood to be this or that by its energic
qualities and powers, so that when these no longer remain, neither can
that be said to be the same, but something of the same name. That a
city then precedes an individual is plain, for if an individual is not
in himself sufficient to compose a perfect government, he is to a city
as other parts are to a whole; but he that is incapable of society, or
so complete in himself as not to want it, makes no part of a city, as
a beast or a god. There is then in all persons a natural impetus to
associate with each other in this manner, and he who first founded
civil society was the cause of the greatest good; for as by the
completion of it man is the most excellent of all living beings, so
without law and justice he would be the worst of all, for nothing is
so difficult to subdue as injustice in arms: but these arms man is
born with, namely, prudence and valour, which he may apply to the most
opposite purposes, for he who abuses them will be the most wicked, the
most cruel, the most lustful, and most gluttonous being imaginable;
for justice is a political virtue, by the rules of it the state is
regulated, and these rules are the criterion of what is right.





CHAPTER III


SINCE it is now evident of what parts a city is composed, it will be
necessary to treat first of family government, for every city is made
up of families, and every family [1253b] has again its separate parts
of which it is composed. When a family is complete, it consists of
freemen and slaves; but as in every subject we should begin with
examining into the smallest parts of which it consists, and as the
first and smallest parts of a family are the master and slave, the
husband and wife, the father and child, let us first inquire into
these three, what each of them may be, and what they ought to be; that
is to say, the herile, the nuptial, and the paternal. Let these then
be considered as the three distinct parts of a family: some think that
the providing what is necessary for the family is something different
from the government of it, others that this is the greatest part of
it; it shall be considered separately; but we will first speak of a
master and a slave, that we may both understand the nature of those
things which are absolutely necessary, and also try if we can learn
anything better on this subject than what is already known. Some
persons have thought that the power of the master over his slave
originates from his superior knowledge, and that this knowledge is the
same in the master, the magistrate, and the king, as we have already
said; but others think that herile government is contrary to nature,
and that it is the law which makes one man a slave and another free,
but that in nature there is no difference; for which reason that power
cannot be founded in justice, but in force.




CHAPTER IV


Since then a subsistence is necessary in every family, the means of
procuring it certainly makes up part of the management of a family,
for without necessaries it is impossible to live, and to live well. As
in all arts which are brought to perfection it is necessary that they
should have their proper instruments if they would complete their
works, so is it in the art of managing a family: now of instruments
some of them are alive, others inanimate; thus with respect to the
pilot of the ship, the tiller is without life, the sailor is alive;
for a servant is as an instrument in many arts. Thus property is as an
instrument to living; an estate is a multitude of instruments; so a
slave is an animated instrument, but every one that can minister of
himself is more valuable than any other instrument; for if every
instrument, at command, or from a preconception of its master's will,
could accomplish its work (as the story goes of the statues of
Daedalus; or what the poet tells us of the tripods of Vulcan, "that
they moved of their own accord into the assembly of the gods "), the
shuttle would then weave, and the lyre play of itself; nor would the
architect want servants, or the [1254a] master slaves. Now what are
generally called instruments are the efficients of something else, but
possessions are what we simply use: thus with a shuttle we make
something else for our use; but we only use a coat, or a bed: since
then making and using differ from each other in species, and they both
require their instruments, it is necessary that these should be
different from each other. Now life is itself what we use, and not
what we employ as the efficient of something else; for which reason
the services of a slave are for use. A possession may be considered in
the same nature as a part of anything; now a part is not only a part
of something, but also is nothing else; so is a possession; therefore
a master is only the master of the slave, but no part of him; but the
slave is not only the slave of the master, but nothing else but that.
This fully explains what is the nature of a slave, and what are his
capacities; for that being who by nature is nothing of himself, but
totally another's, and is a man, is a slave by nature; and that man
who is the property of another, is his mere chattel, though he
continues a man; but a chattel is an instrument for use, separate from
the body.




CHAPTER V


But whether any person is such by nature, and whether it is
advantageous and just for any one to be a slave or no, or whether all
slavery is contrary to nature, shall be considered hereafter; not that
it is difficult to determine it upon general principles, or to
understand it from matters of fact; for that some should govern, and
others be governed, is not only necessary but useful, and from the
hour of their birth some are marked out for those purposes, and others
for the other, and there are many species of both sorts. And the
better those are who are governed the better also is the government,
as for instance of man, rather than the brute creation: for the more
excellent the materials are with which the work is finished, the more
excellent certainly is the work; and wherever there is a governor and
a governed, there certainly is some work produced; for whatsoever is
composed of many parts, which jointly become one, whether conjunct or
separate, evidently show the marks of governing and governed; and this
is true of every living thing in all nature; nay, even in some things
which partake not of life, as in music; but this probably would be a
disquisition too foreign to our present purpose. Every living thing in
the first place is composed of soul and body, of these the one is by
nature the governor, the other the governed; now if we would know what
is natural, we ought to search for it in those subjects in which
nature appears most perfect, and not in those which are corrupted; we
should therefore examine into a man who is most perfectly formed both
in soul and body, in whom this is evident, for in the depraved and
vicious the body seems [1254b] to rule rather than the soul, on
account of their being corrupt and contrary to nature. We may then, as
we affirm, perceive in an animal the first principles of herile and
political government; for the soul governs the body as the master
governs his slave; the mind governs the appetite with a political or a
kingly power, which shows that it is both natural and advantageous
that the body should be governed by the soul, and the pathetic part by
the mind, and that part which is possessed of reason; but to have no
ruling power, or an improper one, is hurtful to all; and this holds
true not only of man, but of other animals also, for tame animals are
naturally better than wild ones, and it is advantageous that both
should be under subjection to man; for this is productive of their
common safety: so is it naturally with the male and the female; the
one is superior, the other inferior; the one governs, the other is
governed; and the same rule must necessarily hold good with respect to
all mankind. Those men therefore who are as much inferior to others as
the body is to the soul, are to be thus disposed of, as the proper use
of them is their bodies, in which their excellence consists; and if
what I have said be true, they are slaves by nature, and it is
advantageous to them to be always under government. He then is by
nature formed a slave who is qualified to become the chattel of
another person, and on that account is so, and who has just reason
enough to know that there is such a faculty, without being indued with
the use of it; for other animals have no perception of reason, but are
entirely guided by appetite, and indeed they vary very little in their
use from each other; for the advantage which we receive, both from
slaves and tame animals, arises from their bodily strength
administering to our necessities; for it is the intention of nature to
make the bodies of slaves and freemen different from each other, that
the one should be robust for their necessary purposes, the others
erect, useless indeed for what slaves are employed in, but fit for
civil life, which is divided into the duties of war and peace; though
these rules do not always take place, for slaves have sometimes the
bodies of freemen, sometimes the souls; if then it is evident that if
some bodies are as much more excellent than others as the statues of
the gods excel the human form, every one will allow that the inferior
ought to be slaves to the superior; and if this is true with respect
to the body, it is still juster to determine in the same manner, when
we consider the soul; though it is not so easy to perceive the beauty
of [1255a] the soul as it is of the body. Since then some men are
slaves by nature, and others are freemen, it is clear that where
slavery is advantageous to any one, then it is just to make him a
slave.




CHAPTER VI


But it is not difficult to perceive that those who maintain the
contrary opinion have some reason on their side; for a man may become
a slave two different ways; for he may be so by law also, and this law
is a certain compact, by which whatsoever is taken in battle is
adjudged to be the property of the conquerors: but many persons who
are conversant in law call in question this pretended right, and say
that it would be hard that a man should be compelled by violence to be
the slave and subject of another who had the power to compel him, and
was his superior in strength; and upon this subject, even of those who
are wise, some think one way and some another; but the cause of this
doubt and variety of opinions arises from hence, that great abilities,
when accompanied with proper means, are generally able to succeed by
force: for victory is always owing to a superiority in some
advantageous circumstances; so that it seems that force never prevails
but in consequence of great abilities. But still the dispute
concerning the justice of it remains; for some persons think, that
justice consists in benevolence, others think it just that the
powerful should govern: in the midst of these contrary opinions, there
are no reasons sufficient to convince us, that the right of being
master and governor ought not to be placed with those who have the
greatest abilities. Some persons, entirely resting upon the right
which the law gives (for that which is legal is in some respects
just), insist upon it that slavery occasioned by war is just, not that
they say it is wholly so, for it may happen that the principle upon
which the wars were commenced is unjust; moreover no one will say that
a man who is unworthily in slavery is therefore a slave; for if so,
men of the noblest families might happen to be slaves, and the
descendants of slaves, if they should chance to be taken prisoners in
war and sold: to avoid this difficulty they say that such persons
should not be called slaves, but barbarians only should; but when they
say this, they do nothing more than inquire who is a slave by nature,
which was what we at first said; for we must acknowledge that there
are some persons who, wherever they are, must necessarily be slaves,
but others in no situation; thus also it is with those of noble
descent: it is not only in their own country that they are Esteemed as
such, but everywhere, but the barbarians are respected on this account
at home only; as if nobility and freedom were of two sorts, the one
universal, the other not so. Thus says the Helen of Theodectes:

"Who dares reproach me with the name of slave? When from the
immortal gods, on either side, I draw my lineage."

Those who express sentiments like these, shew only that they
distinguish the slave and the freeman, the noble and the ignoble from
each other by their virtues and their [1255b] vices; for they think it
reasonable, that as a man begets a man, and a beast a beast, so from a
good man, a good man should be descended; and this is what nature
desires to do, but frequently cannot accomplish it. It is evident then
that this doubt has some reason in it, and that these persons are not
slaves, and those freemen, by the appointment of nature; and also that
in some instances it is sufficiently clear, that it is advantageous to
both parties for this man to be a slave, and that to be a master, and
that it is right and just, that some should be governed, and others
govern, in the manner that nature intended; of which sort of
government is that which a master exercises over a slave. But to
govern ill is disadvantageous to both; for the same thing is useful to
the part and to the whole, to the body and to the soul; but the slave
is as it were a part of the master, as if he were an animated part of
his body, though separate. For which reason a mutual utility and
friendship may subsist between the master and the slave, I mean when
they are placed by nature in that relation to each other, for the
contrary takes place amongst those who are reduced to slavery by the
law, or by conquest.




CHAPTER VII


It is evident from what has been said, that a herile and a political
government are not the same, or that all governments are alike to each
other, as some affirm; for one is adapted to the nature of freemen,
the other to that of slaves. Domestic government is a monarchy, for
that is what prevails in every house; but a political state is the
government of free men and equals. The master is not so called from
his knowing how to manage his slave, but because he is so; for the
same reason a slave and a freeman have their respective appellations.
There is also one sort of knowledge proper for a master, another for a
slave; the slave's is of the nature of that which was taught by a
slave at Syracuse; for he for a stipulated sum instructed the boys in
all the business of a household slave, of which there are various
sorts to be learnt, as the art of cookery, and other such-like
services, of which some are allotted to some, and others to others;
some employments being more honourable, others more necessary;
according to the proverb, "One slave excels another, one master excels
another:" in such-like things the knowledge of a slave consists. The
knowledge of the master is to be able properly to employ his slaves,
for the mastership of slaves is the employment, not the mere
possession of them; not that this knowledge contains anything great or
respectable; for what a slave ought to know how to do, that a master
ought to know how to order; for which reason, those who have it in
their power to be free from these low attentions, employ a steward for
this business, and apply themselves either to public affairs or
philosophy: the knowledge of procuring what is necessary for a family
is different from that which belongs either to the master or the
slave: and to do this justly must be either by war or hunting. And
thus much of the difference between a master and a slave.




CHAPTER VIII


[1256a] As a slave is a particular species of property, let us by all
means inquire into the nature of property in general, and the
acquisition of money, according to the manner we have proposed. In the
first place then, some one may doubt whether the getting of money is
the same thing as economy, or whether it is a part of it, or something
subservient to it; and if so, whether it is as the art of making
shuttles is to the art of weaving, or the art of making brass to that
of statue founding, for they are not of the same service; for the one
supplies the tools, the other the matter: by the matter I mean the
subject out of which the work is finished, as wool for the cloth and
brass for the statue. It is evident then that the getting of money is
not the same thing as economy, for the business of the one is to
furnish the means of the other to use them; and what art is there
employed in the management of a family but economy, but whether this
is a part of it, or something of a different species, is a doubt; for
if it is the business of him who is to get money to find out how
riches and possessions may be procured, and both these arise from
various causes, we must first inquire whether the art of husbandry is
part of money-getting or something different, and in general, whether
the same is not true of every acquisition and every attention which
relates to provision. But as there are many sorts of provision, so are
the methods of living both of man and the brute creation very various;
and as it is impossible to live without food, the difference in that
particular makes the lives of animals so different from each other. Of
beasts, some live in herds, others separate, as is most convenient for
procuring themselves food; as some of them live upon flesh, others on
fruit, and others on whatsoever they light on, nature having so
distinguished their course of life, that they can very easily procure
themselves subsistence; and as the same things are not agreeable to
all, but one animal likes one thing and another another, it follows
that the lives of those beasts who live upon flesh must be different
from the lives of those who live on fruits; so is it with men, their
lives differ greatly from each other; and of all these the shepherd's
is the idlest, for they live upon the flesh of tame animals, without
any trouble, while they are obliged to change their habitations on
account of their flocks, which they are compelled to follow,
cultivating, as it were, a living farm. Others live exercising
violence over living creatures, one pursuing this thing, another that,
these preying upon men; those who live near lakes and marshes and
rivers, or the sea itself, on fishing, while others are fowlers, or
hunters of wild beasts; but the greater part of mankind live upon the
produce of the earth and its cultivated fruits; and the manner in
which all those live who follow the direction of nature, and labour
for their own subsistence, is nearly the same, without ever thinking
to procure any provision by way of exchange or merchandise, such are
shepherds, husband-men, [1256b] robbers, fishermen, and hunters: some
join different employments together, and thus live very agreeably;
supplying those deficiencies which were wanting to make their
subsistence depend upon themselves only: thus, for instance, the same
person shall be a shepherd and a robber, or a husbandman and a hunter;
and so with respect to the rest, they pursue that mode of life which
necessity points out. This provision then nature herself seems to have
furnished all animals with, as well immediately upon their first
origin as also when they are arrived at a state of maturity; for at
the first of these periods some of them are provided in the womb with
proper nourishment, which continues till that which is born can get
food for itself, as is the case with worms and birds; and as to those
which bring forth their young alive, they have the means for their
subsistence for a certain time within themselves, namely milk. It is
evident then that we may conclude of those things that are, that
plants are created for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake
of men; the tame for our use and provision; the wild, at least the
greater part, for our provision also, or for some other advantageous
purpose, as furnishing us with clothes, and the like. As nature
therefore makes nothing either imperfect or in vain, it necessarily
follows that she has made all these things for men: for which reason
what we gain in war is in a certain degree a natural acquisition; for
hunting is a part of it, which it is necessary for us to employ
against wild beasts; and those men who being intended by nature for
slavery are unwilling to submit to it, on which occasion such a. war
is by nature just: that species of acquisition then only which is
according to nature is part of economy; and this ought to be at hand,
or if not, immediately procured, namely, what is necessary to be kept
in store to live upon, and which are useful as well for the state as
the family. And true riches seem to consist in these; and the
acquisition of those possessions which are necessary for a happy life
is not infinite; though Solon says otherwise in this verse:

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