Politics
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Aristotle >> Politics
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CHAPTER XI
We have already mentioned, that both the city and all the country
should communicate both with the sea and the continent as much as
possible. There are these four things which we should be particularly
desirous of in the position of the city with respect to itself: in the
first place, health is to be consulted as the first thing necessary:
now a city which fronts the east and receives the winds which blow
from thence is esteemed most healthful; next to this that which has a
northern position is to be preferred, as best in winter. It should
next be contrived that it may have a proper situation for the business
of government and for defence in war: that in war the citizens may
[1330b] have easy access to it; but that it may be difficult of access
to, and hardly to be taken by, the enemy. In the next place
particularly, that there may be plenty of water, and rivers near at
hand: but if those cannot be found, very large cisterns must be
prepared to save rain-water, so that there may be no want of it in
case they should be driven into the town in time of war. And as great
care should be taken of the health of the inhabitants, the first thing
to be attended to is, that the city should have a good situation and a
good position; the second is, that they may have good water to drink;
and this not be negligently taken care of; for what we chiefly and
most frequently use for the support of the body must principally
influence the health of it; and this influence is what the air and
water naturally have: for which reason in all wise governments the
waters ought to be appropriated to different purposes, and if they are
not equally good, and if there is not a plenty of necessary water,
that which is to drink should be separated from that which is for
other uses. As to fortified places, what is proper for some
governments is not proper for all; as, for instance, a lofty citadel
is proper for a monarchy and an oligarchy; a city built upon a plain
suits a democracy; neither of these for an aristocracy, but rather
many strong places. As to the form of private houses, those are
thought to be best and most useful for their different purposes which
are distinct and separate from each other, and built in the modern
manner, after the plan of Hippodamus: but for safety in time of war,
on the contrary, they should be built as they formerly were; for they
were such that strangers could not easily find their way out of them,
and the method of access to them such as an enemy could with
difficulty find out if he proposed to besiege them. A city therefore
should have both these sorts of buildings, which may easily be
contrived if any one will so regulate them as the planters do their
rows of vines; not that the buildings throughout the city should be
detached from each other, only in some parts of it; thus elegance and
safety will be equally consulted. With respect to walls, those who say
that a courageous people ought not to have any, pay too much respect
to obsolete notions; particularly as we may see those who pride
themselves therein continually confuted by facts. It is indeed
disreputable for those who are equal, or nearly so, to the enemy, to
endeavour to take refuge within their walls--but since it very often
happens, that those who make the attack are too powerful for the
bravery and courage of those few who oppose them to resist, if you
would not suffer the calamities of war and the insolence of the enemy,
it must be thought the part of a good soldier to seek for safety under
the shelter and protection of walls more especially since so many
missile weapons and machines have been most ingeniously invented to
besiege cities with. Indeed to neglect surrounding a city with a wall
would be similar to choosing a country which is easy of access to an
enemy, or levelling the eminences of it; or as if an individual should
not have a wall to his house lest it should be thought that the owner
of it was a coward: nor should this be left unconsidered, that those
who have a city surrounded with walls may act both ways, either as if
it had or as if it had not; but where it has not they cannot do this.
If this is true, it is not only necessary to have walls, but care must
be taken that they may be a proper ornament to the city, as well as a
defence in time of war; not only according to the old methods, but the
modern improvements also: for as those who make offensive war
endeavour by every way possible to gain advantages over their
adversaries, so should those who are upon the defensive employ all the
means already known, and such new ones as philosophy can invent, to
defend themselves: for those who are well prepared are seldom first
attacked.
CHAPTER XII
As the citizens in general are to eat at public tables in certain
companies, and it is necessary that the walls should have bulwarks and
towers in proper places and at proper distances, it is evident that it
will be very necessary to have some of these in the towers; let the
buildings for this purpose be made the ornaments of the walls. As to
temples for public worship, and the hall for the public tables of the
chief magistrates, they ought to be built in proper places, and
contiguous to each other, except those temples which the law or the
oracle orders to be separate from all other buildings; and let these
be in such a conspicuous eminence, that they may have every advantage
of situation, and in the neighbourhood of that part of the city which
is best fortified. Adjoining to this place there ought to be a large
square, like that which they call in Thessaly The Square of Freedom,
in which nothing is permitted to be bought or sold; into which no
mechanic nor husbandman, nor any such person, should be permitted to
enter, unless commanded by the magistrates. It will also be an
ornament to this place if the gymnastic exercises of the elders are
performed in it. It is also proper, that for performing these
exercises the citizens should be divided into distinct classes,
according to their ages, and that the young persons should have proper
officers to be with them, and that the seniors should be with the
magistrates; for having them before their eyes would greatly inspire
true modesty and ingenuous fear. There ought to be another square
[1331b] separate from this for buying and selling, which should be so
situated as to be commodious for the reception of goods both by sea
and land. As the citizens may be divided into magistrates and priests,
it is proper that the public tables of the priests should be in
buildings near the temples. Those of the magistrates who preside over
contracts, indictments, and such-like, and also over the markets, and
the public streets near the square, or some public way, I mean the
square where things are bought and sold; for I intended the other for
those who are at leisure, and this for necessary business. The same
order which I have directed here should be observed also in the
country; for there also their magistrates such as the surveyors of the
woods and overseers of the grounds, must necessarily have their common
tables and their towers, for the purpose of protection against an
enemy. There ought also to be temples erected at proper places, both
to the gods and the heroes; but it is unnecessary to dwell longer and
most minutely on these particulars--for it is by no means difficult to
plan these things, it is rather so to carry them into execution; for
the theory is the child of our wishes, but the practical part must
depend upon fortune; for which reason we shall decline saying anything
farther upon these subjects.
CHAPTER XIII
We will now show of what numbers and of what sort of people a
government ought to consist, that the state may be happy and well
administered. As there are two particulars on which the excellence and
perfection of everything depend, one of these is, that the object and
end proposed should be proper; the other, that the means to accomplish
it should be adapted to that purpose; for it may happen that these may
either agree or disagree with each other; for the end we propose may
be good, but in taking the means to obtain it we may err; at other
times we may have the right and proper means in our power, but the end
may be bad, and sometimes we may mistake in both; as in the art of
medicine the physician does not sometimes know in what situation the
body ought to be, to be healthy; nor what to do to procure the end he
aims at. In every art and science, therefore, we should be master of
this knowledge, namely, the proper end, and the means to obtain it.
Now it is evident that all persons are desirous to live well and be
happy; but that some have the means thereof in their own power, others
not; and this either through nature [1332a] or fortune; for many
ingredients are necessary to a happy life; but fewer to those who are
of a good than to those who are of a bad disposition. There are others
who continually have the means of happiness in their own power, but do
not rightly apply them. Since we propose to inquire what government is
best, namely, that by which a state may be best administered, and that
state is best administered where the people are the happiest, it is
evident that happiness is a thing we should not be unacquainted with.
Now, I have already said in my treatise on Morals (if I may here make
any use of what I have there shown), that happiness consists in the
energy and perfect practice of virtue; and this not relatively, but
simply; I mean by relatively, what is necessary in some certain
circumstances; by simply, what is good and fair in itself: of the
first sort are just punishments, and restraints in a just cause; for
they arise from virtue and are necessary, and on that account are
virtuous; though it is more desirable that neither any state nor any
individual should stand in need of them; but those actions which are
intended either to procure honour or wealth are simply good; the
others eligible only to remove an evil; these, on the contrary, are
the foundation and means of relative good. A worthy man indeed will
bear poverty, disease, and other unfortunate accidents with a noble
mind; but happiness consists in the contrary to these (now we have
already determined in our treatise on Morals, that he is a man of
worth who considers what is good because it is virtuous as what is
simply good; it is evident, therefore, that all the actions of such a
one must be worthy and simply good): this has led some persons to
conclude, that the cause of happiness was external goods; which would
be as if any one should suppose that the playing well upon the lyre
was owing to the instrument, and not to the art. It necessarily
follows from what has been said, that some things should be ready at
hand and others procured by the legislator; for which reason in
founding a city we earnestly wish that there may be plenty of those
things which are supposed to be under the dominion of fortune (for
some things we admit her to be mistress over); but for a state to be
worthy and great is not only the work of fortune but of knowledge and
judgment also. But for a state to be worthy it is necessary that those
citizens which are in the administration should be worthy also; but as
in our city every citizen is to be so, we must consider how this may
be accomplished; for if this is what every one could be, and not some
individuals only, it would be more desirable; for then it would
follow, that what might be done by one might be done by all. Men are
worthy and good three ways; by nature, by custom, by reason. In the
first place, a man ought to be born a man, and not any other animal;
that is to say, he ought to have both a body and soul; but it avails
not to be only born [1332b] with some things, for custom makes great
alterations; for there are some things in nature capable of alteration
either way which are fixed by custom, either for the better or the
worse. Now, other animals live chiefly a life of nature; and in very
few things according to custom; but man lives according to reason
also, which he alone is endowed with; wherefore he ought to make all
these accord with each other; for if men followed reason, and were
persuaded that it was best to obey her, they would act in many
respects contrary to nature and custom. What men ought naturally to
be, to make good members of a community, I have already determined;
the rest of this discourse therefore shall be upon education; for some
things are acquired by habit, others by hearing them.
CHAPTER XIV
As every political community consists of those who govern and of those
who are governed, let us consider whether during the continuance of
their lives they ought to be the same persons or different; for it is
evident that the mode of education should be adapted to this
distinction. Now, if one man differed from another as much, as we
believe, the gods and heroes differ from men: in the first place,
being far their superiors in body; and, secondly, in the soul: so that
the superiority of the governors over the governed might be evident
beyond a doubt, it is certain that it would be better for the one
always to govern, the other always to be governed: but, as this is not
easy to obtain, and kings are not so superior to those they govern as
Scylax informs us they are in India, it is evident that for many
reasons it is necessary that all in their turns should both govern and
be governed: for it is just that those who are equal should have
everything alike; and it is difficult for a state to continue which is
founded in injustice; for all those in the country who are desirous of
innovation will apply themselves to those who are under the government
of the rest, and such will be their numbers in the state, that it will
be impossible for the magistrates to get the better of them. But that
the governors ought to excel the governed is beyond a doubt; the
legislator therefore ought to consider how this shall be, and how it
may be contrived that all shall have their equal share in the
administration. Now, with respect to this it will be first said, that
nature herself has directed us in our choice, laying down the selfsame
thing when she has made some young, others old: the first of whom it
becomes to obey, the latter to command; for no one when he is young is
offended at his being under government, or thinks himself too good for
it; more especially when he considers that he himself shall receive
the same honours which he pays when he shall arrive at a proper age.
In some respects it must be acknowledged that the governors and the
governed are the same, in others they are different; it is therefore
necessary that their education should be in [1333a] some respect the
same, in others different: as they say, that he will be a good
governor who has first learnt to obey. Now of governments, as we have
already said, some are instituted for the sake of him who commands;
others for him who obeys: of the first sort is that of the master over
the servant; of the latter, that of freemen over each other. Now some
things which are commanded differ from others; not in the business,
but in the end proposed thereby: for which reason many works, even of
a servile nature, are not disgraceful for young freemen to perform;
for many things which are ordered to be done are not honourable or
dishonourable so much in their own nature as in the end which is
proposed, and the reason for which they are undertaken. Since then we
have determined, that the virtue of a good citizen and good governor
is the same as of a good man; and that every one before he commands
should have first obeyed, it is the business of the legislator to
consider how his citizens may be good men, what education is necessary
to that purpose, and what is the final object of a good life. The soul
of man may be divided into two parts; that which has reason in itself,
and that which hath not, but is capable of obeying its dictates: and
according to the virtues of these two parts a man is said to be good:
but of those virtues which are the ends, it will not be difficult for
those to determine who adopt the division I have already given; for
the inferior is always for the sake of the superior; and this is
equally evident both in the works of art as well as in those of
nature; but that is superior which has reason. Reason itself also is
divided into two parts, in the manner we usually divide it; the
theoretic and the practical; which division therefore seems necessary
for this part also: the same analogy holds good with respect to
actions; of which those which are of a superior nature ought always to
be chosen by those who have it in their power; for that is always most
eligible to every one which will procure the best ends. Now life is
divided into labour and rest, war and peace; and of what we do the
objects are partly necessary and useful, partly noble: and we should
give the same preference to these that we do to the different parts of
the soul and its actions, as war to procure peace; labour, rest; and
the useful, the noble. The politician, therefore, who composes a body
of laws ought to extend his views to everything; the different parts
of the soul and their actions; more particularly to those things which
are of a superior nature and ends; and, in the same manner, to the
lives of men and their different actions.
They ought to be fitted both for labour and war, but rather [1333b]
for rest and peace; and also to do what is necessary and useful, but
rather what is fair and noble. It is to those objects that the
education of the children ought to tend, and of all the youths who
want instruction. All the Grecian states which now seem best governed,
and the legislators who founded those states, appear not to have
framed their polity with a view to the best end, or to every virtue,
in their laws and education; but eagerly to have attended to what is
useful and productive of gain: and nearly of the same opinion with
these are some persons who have written lately, who, by praising the
Lacedaemonian state, show they approve of the intention of the
legislator in making war and victory the end of his government. But
how contrary to reason this is, is easily proved by argument, and has
already been proved by facts (but as the generality of men desire to
have an extensive command, that they may have everything desirable in
the greater abundance; so Thibron and others who have written on that
state seem to approve of their legislator for having procured them an
extensive command by continually enuring them to all sorts of dangers
and hardships): for it is evident, since the Lacedemonians have now no
hope that the supreme power will be in their own hand, that neither
are they happy nor was their legislator wise. This also is ridiculous,
that while they preserved an obedience to their laws, and no one
opposed their being governed by them, they lost the means of being
honourable: but these people understand not rightly what sort of
government it is which ought to reflect honour on the legislator; for
a government of freemen is nobler than despotic power, and more
consonant to virtue. Moreover, neither should a city be thought happy,
nor should a legislator be commended, because he has so trained the
people as to conquer their neighbours; for in this there is a great
inconvenience: since it is evident that upon this principle every
citizen who can will endeavour to procure the supreme power in his own
city; which crime the Lacedaemonians accuse Pausanias of, though he
enjoyed such great honours.
Such reasoning and such laws are neither political, useful nor true:
but a legislator ought to instil those laws on the minds of men which
are most useful for them, both in their public and private capacities.
The rendering a people fit for war, that they may enslave their
inferiors ought not to be the care of the legislator; but that they
may not themselves be reduced to slavery by others. In [1334a] the
next place, he should take care that the object of his government is
the safety of those who are under it, and not a despotism over all: in
the third place, that those only are slaves who are fit to be only so.
Reason indeed concurs with experience in showing that all the
attention which the legislator pays to the business of war, and all
other rules which he lays down, should have for their object rest and
peace; since most of those states (which we usually see) are preserved
by war; but, after they have acquired a supreme power over those
around them, are ruined; for during peace, like a sword, they lose
their brightness: the fault of which lies in the legislator, who never
taught them how to be at rest.
CHAPTER XV
As there is one end common to a man both as an individual and a
citizen, it is evident that a good man and a good citizen must have
the same object in view; it is evident that all the virtues which lead
to rest are necessary; for, as we have often said, the end of war is
peace, of labour, rest; but those virtues whose object is rest, and
those also whose object is labour, are necessary for a liberal life
and rest; for we want a supply of many necessary things that we may be
at rest. A city therefore ought to be temperate, brave, and patient;
for, according to the proverb, "Rest is not for slaves;" but those who
cannot bravely face danger are the slaves of those who attack them.
Bravery, therefore, and patience are necessary for labour, philosophy
for rest, and temperance and justice in both; but these chiefly in
time of peace and rest; for war obliges men to be just and temperate;
but the enjoyment of pleasure, with the rest of peace, is more apt to
produce insolence; those indeed who are easy in their circumstances,
and enjoy everything that can make them happy, have great occasion for
the virtues of temperance and justice. Thus if there are, as the poets
tell us, any inhabitants in the happy isles, to these a higher degree
of philosophy, temperance, and justice will be necessary, as they live
at their ease in the full plenty of every sensual pleasure. It is
evident, therefore, that these virtues are necessary in every state
that would be happy or worthy; for he who is worthless can never enjoy
real good, much less is he qualified to be at rest; but can appear
good only by labour and being at war, but in peace and at rest the
meanest of creatures. For which reason virtue should not be cultivated
as the Lacedaemonians did; for they did not differ from others in
their opinion concerning the supreme good, but in [1334b] imagining
this good was to be procured by a particular virtue; but since there
are greater goods than those of war, it is evident that the enjoyment
of those which are valuable in themselves should be desired, rather
than those virtues which are useful in war; but how and by what means
this is to be acquired is now to be considered. We have already
assigned three causes on which it will depend; nature, custom, and
reason, arid shown what sort of men nature must produce for this
purpose; it remains then that we determine which we shall first begin
by in education, reason or custom, for these ought always to preserve
the most entire harmony with each other; for it may happen that reason
may err from the end proposed, and be corrected by custom. In the
first place, it is evident that in this as in other things, its
beginning or production arises from some principle, and its end also
arises from another principle, which is itself an end. Now, with us,
reason and intelligence are the end of nature; our production,
therefore, and our manners ought to be accommodated to both these. In
the next place, as the soul and the body are two distinct things, so
also we see that the soul is divided into two parts, the reasoning and
not-reasoning, with their habits which are two in number, one
belonging to each, namely appetite and intelligence; and as the body
is in production before the soul, so is the not-reasoning part of the
soul before the reasoning; and this is evident; for anger, will and
desire are to be seen in children nearly as soon as they are born; but
reason and intelligence spring up as they grow to maturity. The body,
therefore, necessarily demands our care before the soul; next the
appetites for the sake of the mind; the body for the sake of the soul.
CHAPTER XVI
If then the legislator ought to take care that the bodies of the
children are as perfect as possible, his first attention ought to be
given to matrimony; at what time and in what situation it is proper
that the citizens should engage in the nuptial contract. Now, with
respect to this alliance, the legislator ought both to consider the
parties and their time of life, that they may grow old at the same
part of time, and that their bodily powers may not be different; that
is to say, the man being able to have children, but the woman too old
to bear them; or, on the contrary, the woman be young enough to
produce children, but the man too old to be a father; for from such a
situation discords and disputes continually arise. In the next place,
with respect to the succession of children, there ought not to be too
great an interval of time between them and their parents; for when
there is, the parent can receive no benefit from his child's
affection, or the child any advantage from his father's protection;
[1335a] neither should the difference in years be too little, as great
inconveniences may arise from it; as it prevents that proper reverence
being shown to a father by a boy who considers him as nearly his equal
in age, and also from the disputes it occasions in the economy of the
family. But, to return from this digression, care ought to be taken
that the bodies of the children may be such as will answer the
expectations of the legislator; this also will be affected by the same
means. Since season for the production of children is determined (not
exactly, but to speak in general), namely, for the man till seventy
years, and the woman till fifty, the entering into the marriage state,
as far as time is concerned, should be regulated by these periods. It
is extremely bad for the children when the father is too young; for in
all animals whatsoever the parts of the young are imperfect, and are
more likely to be productive of females than males, and diminutive
also in size; the same thing of course necessarily holds true in men;
as a proof of this you may see in those cities where the men and women
usually marry very young, the people in general are very small and ill
framed; in child-birth also the women suffer more, and many of them
die. And thus some persons tell us the oracle of Traezenium should be
explained, as if it referred to the many women who were destroyed by
too early marriages, and not their gathering their fruits too soon. It
is also conducive to temperance not to marry too soon; for women who
do so are apt to be intemperate. It also prevents the bodies of men
from acquiring their full size if they marry before their growth is
completed; for this is the determinate period, which prevents any
further increase; for which reason the proper time for a woman to
marry is eighteen, for a man thirty-seven, a little more or less; for
when they marry at that time their bodies are in perfection, and they
will also cease to have children at a proper time; and moreover with
respect to the succession of the children, if they have them at the
time which may reasonably be expected, they will be just arriving into
perfection when their parents are sinking down under the load of
seventy years. And thus much for the time which is proper for
marriage; but moreover a proper season of the year should be observed,
as many persons do now, and appropriate the winter for this business.
The married couple ought also to regard the precepts of physicians and
naturalists, each of whom have treated on these [1335b] subjects. What
is the fit disposition of the body will be better mentioned when we
come to speak of the education of the child; we will just slightly
mention a few particulars. Now, there is no occasion that any one
should have the habit of body of a wrestler to be either a good
citizen, or to enjoy a good constitution, or to be the father of
healthy children; neither should he be infirm or too much dispirited
by misfortunes, but between both these. He ought to have a habit of
labour, but not of too violent labour; nor should that be confined
to one object only, as the wrestler's is; but to such things as are
proper for freemen. These things are equally necessary both for men
and women. Women with child should also take care that their diet
is not too sparing, and that they use sufficient exercise; which it
will be easy for the legislator to effect if he commands them once
every day to repair to the worship of the gods who are supposed to
preside over matrimony. But, contrary to what is proper for the
body, the mind ought to be kept as tranquil as possible; for as plants
partake of the nature of the soil, so does the child receive much of
the disposition of the mother. With respect to the exposing or
bringing up of children, let it be a law, that nothing imperfect or
maimed shall be brought up, .......... As the proper time has been
pointed out for a man and a woman to enter into the marriage state, so
also let us determine how long it is advantageous for the community
that they should have children; for as the children of those who are
too young are imperfect both in body and mind, so also those whose
parents are too old are weak in both: while therefore the body
continues in perfection, which (as some poets say, who reckon the
different periods of life by sevens) is till fifty years, or four or
five more, the children may be equally perfect; but when the parents
are past that age it is better they should have no more. With respect
to any connection between a man and a woman, or a woman and a man,
when either of the parties are betrothed, let it be held in utter
detestation [1336a] on any pretext whatsoever; but should any one be
guilty of such a thing after the marriage is consummated, let his
infamy be as great as his guilt deserves.
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